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Abstract
In this thesis, I am arguing for a single claim, namely that perceptual experiences are judgements, 
and I am arguing for it in a very specific way.  This has not been a popular theory, although some 
have defended similar theories.  One main reason  that this has been a historically unpopular theory 
is  to  do with the problems of conflicting beliefs.   I  can see (strictly speaking,  experience)  the 
Müller-Lyer lines as being of different lengths, they look different lengths, and yet I know that they 
are the same length.  Hence, I have explicit contradictory judgements on a judgement-theory of 
experiences.  However, despite this being the major historical obstacle, two widely held theses in 
the philosophy of perception in recent times also stand as an impediment to this theory, namely the 
theses that experiences have a  phenomenal character which individuates them from judgements, 
and that experiences, unlike judgements or beliefs, have non-conceptual content. 
I seek to offer an ''incremental defence'' of the judgement-theory of experiences by arguing in stages 
against the competing theories, and defending the judgement-theory from the objections that arise 
from the motivations for these other theories.  As regards the phenomenal character of experience, I 
argue  that  once  the  representational  theory  is  accepted,  the  path  is  open,  should  a  range  of 
individuating  conceptual  contents  for  experiences  be  found,  to  analyse  the  psychology  of 
experience in terms of this content.  I define this conceptual content, and then I motivate and defend 
the theory that experiences are judgements.
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1Chapter 1  Background: The Sense-Data Theory
1  Introduction
The theory that I am defending is an analysis of perception in terms of judgement.  Perceptions are, 
according to this analysis, a class of judgements. The initial analysandum is ''s perceives y'', where s 
is the subject and  y the object perceived.  In ''looks'' terms, the analysandum can be stated as ''y 
looks some way to s''.  ''Some way'' is a property, F.  In the most simple of cases, this ''some way'' 
will concern at least, e.g., "yellow", "red, "over there".1  The  basic analysandum with respect to 
vision is (1).2
(1) y looks F to s.3
''Perception'' is often taken to be a success notion, and I will adopt this terminology: a perception is 
a successful experience in that in undergoing the experience, s is perceptually related to an external 
object which is the way that it looks.4  If y is an external object, or something ''real'' or ''actual'', then 
(1) reports an aspect of a perception, the aspect whereby s sees the F of y.5
The experience merely as-of something F (''it looks to me as though”, or “as if there is an 
F'') may or may not be veridical.6 Illusion is only partially successful, and hallucination is fully 
unsuccessful.  If there is a  y which looks some way to  s and  is,  actually is,  this way, then the 
experience is veridical in this respect; if it is all of the ways that it looks, then it is fully veridical 
(and, of course, it will be some ways that it does not look).  If  y is only partially the way that it 
looks  to  s,  the  experience  is  an  illusion.   If  there  is  no  external  y,  then  the  experience  is  a 
hallucination, and, I argue, the object which looks some way is a merely intentional object.
Whether one is really entitled to say that anything looks this way if there is only a merely 
intentional object is an interesting question.  Compare this to a child afraid of the monster under 
1 I am not enquiring here into which properties can be represented in perception, whether they are ''low'' or ''high'' 
level as discussed in, e.g., Siegel (2005).
2 As is standard in the literature, I treat vision as the central case.
3 For example,  y looks red to  s.   This is a simple case of a monadic property,  but whatever is said of this will  
generalise to properties of any adicity.
4 I do not enquire in detail as to whether, say, an after-image is ''external'' or not.  I think that it probably is, but I do  
not argue for this.
5 If one wishes, one could read “F-ness” instead of “F” here, should one worry about a slight hint of grammatical 
awkwardness.
6 Y  may be, say, green, and yet look blue to s.  Does s see y, i.e. does the green object look blue to s?  This depends. 
If an object has no properties which are said to be of an object which looks some way to s, then s is not seeing that 
object.  See below.
2their bed.  They are afraid of something, namely ''the monster'', but there is no monster.  There is 
nothing that is responsible in any way for frightening them.7  Likewise, if the child hallucinates the 
monster, then it feels natural to say that nothing actually looked like a monster, because there is no 
monster, nor anything else, that appeared as a monster.  And yet the child had an experience as of a 
monster.   This is something that is common to hallucinations of a monster and, if there could be 
such things, perceptions of a monster.  It is also common to having an illusory experience of, say, a 
sheet on the floor as a monster.  In each case, the child could describe and identify what they took to 
be ''the monster'', even though there is nothing to identify in the success-sense of identify.  Nothing 
exemplifies the property monster, despite the fact that the experience is as-of a monster.
Relatedly, as thoughts are like this in that ''s thinks that there is a monster'' does not entail 
that there is a monster even though s is taking there to be a monster, I am arguing that experiences 
are also propositional as in: it  looks to  s that  p.8  This is also an intensional context.9  p is the 
completion of a looks-report, how s would propositionally report how things look.
On  the  theory  I  am  defending  this  is  the  subjective  element  of  the  experience,  the 
psychology of the experience, and not a mere description of it.  Consider a perceptual experience of 
a red square, and consider everything that one automatically comes to judge about the red square. 
Let the propositional content that one can glean from the experience of the red square be the content 
of a judgement.  The standard view is that the difference between these two mental acts resides in  
the way that the experience but not the judgement is sensational, qualitative, or phenomenal in some 
sense.  
I  am  denying  this,  and  defending  the  position  that  the  look  of  the  red  square  in  the 
psychological sense, i.e. what is subjective, is the propositional content.  Further, I am arguing that 
the experience is a judgement.
According  to  the  theories  I  will  discuss  in  chapter  1,  experience  has  no  propositional 
component to it, no  representational component at all.  This leaves experiences as being merely 
7 The child may be responsible for being frightened in some way, e.g. they might be an overly-nervous child, but this  
is not the same thing.
8 For example, it looks to s that there is a red square over there.  This is the propositional analysis of it looking to s as 
if there is a red square, s seeming to see a red square and so on.  The that-clause signifies the propositional nature of 
things looking some way,  and the context of  looking is  in  this way the same as  the context of,  e.g.,  judging.  
Whether or not one finds a slight grammatical awkwardness in this construction - myself I do not - this should not  
tell in any way against the point.  After all, we do not say such things as “it is judged to be that  p by s” but this 
certainly does not tell against the correctness of “s judges that p”.
9 Strictly speaking only linguistic contexts are intensional.  And so the report of the experience is an intensional. 
Intensional contexts do not allow salva veritae substitution, and are not existentially committing.  If s believes that 
Superman flies, substituting ''Clark Kent'' for ''Superman'' will not preserve the truth value, and it does not follow 
from this that Superman ''exists''.  Intensional contexts also are ambiguous between  de re and  de dicto readings. 
After Quine (1956), a de re reading of ''Quine believes that someone is happy'' would be that Quine believes of a 
particular person that they are happy,  and the  de dicto reading that  Quine believes the general  proposition that 
someone is happy.
3qualitative, sensational, or phenomenal.  The relation between these two components of perception 
is  the  subject  of  chapters  2,  3,  and  4.   In  chapters  5  and  6,  I  extend  this  to  a  defence  of 
conceptualism about content and then to the judgement-theory of perception.
The theory  that  I  am defending is  an analysis  of (1) in terms of a three-place relation 
between the subject, s, a propositional content which is identified with the way that the object looks, 
p, and the object, y.  The way that the object looks, in the subjective sense, is the representational 
content  of  the  perception,  what  is  conveyed  to  the  subject.   On  a  rival  theory,  the  notion  of 
experiential consciousness is (partly at least) analysed in terms of the subject being in a phenomenal 
experiential  state,  or  bearing  a  phenomenal experiential  relation  either  to  an  object  or  to  a 
proposition.
A common way of precisifying the contrast is to begin with Jackson's distinction between 
three uses of ''looks'', the comparative, epistemic and phenomenal.10  An example of the first is the 
following content of a thought: It looks like a dog.
As Jackson points out, the full form of this is: It looks the way that a dog normally looks.  It 
is a relative notion, not the use of ''looks'' in (1) which expresses an experience and is not relative in  
this sense.  The dog would have to look some way for this way to be compared to the normal way. 
The subject (grammatical object) here is "the way a dog normally looks".  The comparative use of 
''looks'',  e.g.  "It  looks like a  dog",  invites  the question about  what  that  look is  which is  being 
compared to another look.  This can be read in two ways.  Either it is a question about the visual 
properties, or it is a question about the how the experience subjectively is for the subject.  
 ''The look of a dog'' is ambiguous between the way that a dog looks to  s, in the sense of 
what is conveyed to s about the dog, and on a rival theory the phenomenal aspect of the experience 
of the dog, and the  visual properties that the dog has.  The visual properties of the dog are the 
properties of the dog that are experienced.  At least, e.g., its colour, texture, shape and so on.  These 
are not the look of a dog in the subjective sense of the way in which the dog looks to s, or how the 
dog looks to s.  On the epistemic understanding of ''looks'', this is the propositional content of the 
experience, and on the phenomenal understanding of ''looks'' it is a phenomenal state of s or relation 
s is in.   These are not the visual properties, the properties presented as being of the dog.  For 
example,  on the sense-data theory the visual properties  are  those which,  canonically,  cause the 
sensing of the sense-datum.  These latter  properties,  or, rather,  the sensing of them, is,  on this 
theory, how the dogs looks in the subjective sense.
The theory that  I  am defending is  that  the look of  the dog in  the sense of  how things 
subjectively are when the dog is experienced is the propositional content of a judgement about the 
10 See Jackson (1977) Chapter 2, after Chisholm (1957) Chapter 4.
4dog in terms of which the experience is analysed.  Jackson calls this the epistemic use of ''looks''.  A 
rough example, lacking in the detail which will have to wait until later, is the following: It looks to 
s that  there  is  a  dog there.   Or,  another  example:  it  looks that  the tree is  green.   How things  
subjectively are for the subject is what I will call the  psychology of the mental act.  This term is 
meant to be as neutral as possible.  The psychology of a judgement is exhausted by the content of 
that judgement, the proposition  p, in addition to the attitude of judgement. The psychology of a 
judgement that p is different from the psychology of hoping that p, or desiring that p, because the 
attitudes are different.  This is a different notion from that of what the judgement is about, the 
object as opposed to the  content of the act.   The visual properties  are properties of the object, 
partially the way that the object is when it is experienced, and not the way in which the object is 
experienced.
In  it  looking  to  s that  there  is  a  dog  there,  there  is  no  mention  of  s undergoing  any 
phenomenal experience at all.  The standard position is that there is obviously a difference between 
s perceiving the dog and s merely judging that there is a dog.  Analysing perception in terms of the 
epistemic use of ''looks'' is not the standard theory.  The standard theory is that experiences have the 
phenomenal element, an element which Jackson (1977) accounts for with the phenomenal use of 
''looks''.  Jackson's arguments are for the sense-data theory on which the look of the dog in the 
subjective sense is analysed as the subject sensing a sense-datum, an object of experience which is 
necessarily distinct from an external object which may be perceived.
In this chapter, I argue against the sense-data theory, and the other two classical twentieth-
century theories of perception, the adverbial theory and the theory of appearing.  In doing so, I 
defend the epistemic understanding of ''looks''  in terms of its  propositional  nature.   Sense-data, 
however, are but one way of cashing out the notion of phenomenal nature of experience, and in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4 I argue against these other notions: I defend the reductive representational  
theory on which the subjective element of experience, the psychology of experience, is identified 
with the representational content.  In chapters 5 and 6 I defend the conceptual nature of experiences 
and the thesis that experiences are judgements.
In this chapter, in  §2 I introduce the sense-data theory,  and in  §3 and §4 I discuss some 
classic arguments for the theory before in §5 the adverbial reaction to it.  In §6 and §7, I define  
''direct'' and ''indirect'' and discuss the theory of appearing.  In §8, I Introduce the representational 
theory in contrast to the difficulties faced by the sense-data theory.
52  Sense-Data and the Phenomenal Principle
The main precursor to the representational theory was the sense-data theory.   According to the 
sense-data theory,  experience is a phenomenal relation between the subject and a sense-datum.11 
Although sense-data  are  standardly defined as mind-dependent  entities,  Moore introduced them 
such that it is a question whether or not they are (sometimes) identical to the surfaces of external 
physical  objects   The  purpose  of  this  neutral  introduction  was  to  define  the  direct  object  of 
perception.  The introduction of the notion was meant to be the naming of an uncontroversially 
ostensible feature of perception.  Similarly, Price argues as follows.
The term sense-datum is meant to be a neutral term ... The term is meant to stand for something  
whose existence is indubitable (however fleeting), something from which all theories of perception 
ought to start.12
From  this  observation,  the  proponent  of  sense-data  takes  it  that  whenever  there  is  a  visual 
experience this visual experience is to be analysed in terms of a relation to a sense-datum which 
exemplifies the properties it is presented as having (compare, in contrast, those mental relations that 
are expressed in terms of intensional linguistic contexts).  It is then further taken that this relation is  
a "real relation" in the sense that if it holds between two terms then these two terms must exist.  
This is made explicit by Robinson as the Phenomenal Principle.
P If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular
sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware of which does
possess that quality.13
According to P, when we have phenomenal impression, or sensing, of, say, a brown sense-datum, 
as, for example, in the case of accurate perception of the colour of a brown table, there is something 
actually brown before the mind.  Exploiting the very same method of introspection, is it not equally 
natural to hold that when I look away from the desk lamp there is equally an after-image, a coloured 
shape that, although not (but not necessarily not) presented to me as external, is likewise presented? 
Certainly, one wonders where the after-image is, and what it is.  But it feels peculiar to wonder if it 
is.  This is not an argument but the statement of a very powerful intuition.  Price makes this clear as 
11 Versions of this theory are defended by, e.g., Price (1932), Broad (1925), Russell (1912), Moore (1965a), (1965b),  
Jackson (1977), Robinson (1994), and Lowe (1981).  Lewis (1929) defends a similar theory.
12 Price (1932) p. 19
13 Robinson (1994) p. 32.  Also see Broad (1965), and Pitcher (1971) Chapter I Section C.
6follows.
When I say "This table appears brown to me" it is quite plain that I am acquainted with an actual 
instance of brownness (or equally plainly with a pair of instances when I see double).  This cannot 
indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable.14
We also find that something like P (although not formulated explicitly) was something like a pre-
theoretical observation for other proponents of sense-data.15  Here, for example, is Russell.
When I look at my table and see a certain brown colour, what is quite certain [is that] "a brown 
colour is being seen" … Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty. 
And this applies to dreams and hallucinations as well as to normal perceptions: when we dream or 
see a ghost, we certainly do have the sensations [perceptions] we think we have, but for various  
reasons it is held that no physical object corresponds to these sensations.  Thus our certainty of our 
knowledge of our own experiences does not have to be limited in any way to allow for  exceptional  
cases. Here, therefore, we have for what it is worth, a solid basis from which to begin our pursuit of  
knowledge.16
On this theory, if s has a phenomenal experience as of an F, then there is an x which is F of which s 
is phenomenally aware.17  Russell called the relation that s bears to this sense-datum 'acquaintance' 
and Broad called it 'sensing'.18  Recall (1).
(1) y looks F to s.
The sense-data analysis of what is expressed in (1), (2), breaks down into two elements: a sensing  
of  a  sense-datum,  x,  which  accounts  for  the  phenomenal,  conscious,  experience;  and a  second 
element which accounts for a relation between the sensing and the object of perception (assuming 
the experience is not hallucinatory), y, which, depending on the features of the relation, renders the 
experience veridical or non-veridical.19
14 Price (1932) p. 63
15 Martin (2000) Section 5 makes this point.
16 Russell  (1912)  p.  8.   This  is  an  example  of  sense-data  being  used  epistemology  as  a  secure  foundation  for 
knowledge.  I am concerned with what Crane (2000) calls their ''metaphysical'' use in analysis of perception.
17 See Martin (2000) and Crane (2000) for historical discussion of the origins of this theory.
18 Russell also argued that we were, in his sense, acquainted with universals.  I will use Broad's 'sensing' instead.
19 I will sometimes suppress the way in which y looks to s, i.e. F in (1), where it is not strictly relevant.  There is a 
slight problem in exposition here in that if the experience is hallucinatory, there is no y which looks any way in any 
sense, i.e. which is seen to be any way.  I note this here, and context should make it obvious when there is this  
looseness in exposition in this respect.  To repeatedly make this qualification would be very cumbersome.
7(2) s senses x.
s sensing x either bears D to y, or not.
 
The  first  clause  in  (2),  s sensing  x,  expresses  the  experience  on  the  sense-data  theory.  The 
experience is a relation of sensing between s and x.  x exemplifies the properties which according to 
P are transparently in front of the mind in experience.  For example, the phenomenal look Price 
took to occur in cases of double vision is analysed on the sense-data theory as a sensing relation 
between the subject and two sense-data.20
The second clause in (2) expresses a relation  D which may or may not hold between the 
sensing and some object by definition distinct from x.  This relation is either a causal relation, a 
matching  relation,  or  a  combination  of  both.21  It  determines  the  object  of  perception  and the 
veridical status of the experience.   If there is some  y which caused the sensing of  x and which 
matches the properties of x, then the experience is an element of a veridical perception which is a 
complex of these relations.  If there is some y which causes the sensing but only partially matches 
the properties of x, then the experience is an element of an illusory perception, which is a complex 
of these relations.  If there is no  y which is (appropriately, I do not go into this here) caused the 
sensing, then the experience is a hallucination, as it forms no part of a complex in which the subject  
could be said to be (relevantly) related to an object which could be the object of a perception.  This 
is  the manner  in which the sense-datum theory distinguishes the object  of perception from the 
object of experience.
In his discussion of sense-data theories and his arguments against them, Pitcher makes the 
following point.
Whatever disagreements there may be amongst different sense-datum philosophers as to the nature 
or status of sense-data, most of them would, I think, be willing to assert some form or other of the 
following unclear principle: that the term "sense-datum" refers to what is"immediately" or "directly" 
given or presented to someone's consciousness in all sense experience; that is, to what is immediately 
and directly before one's consciousness in sense perception (whether "veridical" or not) when the 
work  of  the  mind  or  the  imagination,which  usually  and  automatically  performs  the  act  of 
interpretation (or inference, or "taking for granted") is stripped away.22
20 Or two sensing relations between the subject and two sense-data.  This is not something into which I enquire.
21 There are well-known difficulties in specifying how D can be formulated in terms of causation.  I do not discuss this 
here, as I am not defending this theory.
22 Pitcher (1971) p. 10
8I will take this as a canonical statement of the sense-data theory as I am concerned with it.  It is 
important to note that I am setting aside the question of the interpretation of the sense-datum, i.e. 
the  representational  content  of  the  experience,  until  subsequent  chapters.   Pitcher  continues  as 
follows.
the source of whatever evil the notion of sense-data has inflicted on the philosophical world ... is the 
idea that sense-data are ontologically distinct from physical objects, and even from the surfaces of  
physical objects, where "physical object" is construed in the realist's sense, namely, as designating an 
extended object  whose existence is   not  dependent  upon its  being perceived.   Since only some  
physical  existents  are  objects  and only some have surfaces,  however,  the  claim might  be better  
generalized as follows: no sense-datum is identical with anything in the physical world.  I consider 
this non-identity thesis to be absolutely essential to any view that can properly be called a sense-
datum theory.23
I concur with this.24  My purpose is to defend the theory that perceptions are judgements.  Hence, it 
is necessary to ward off sense-data and the arguments in favour of sense-data (as sense-data are not  
the object of judgements, and nor do they accompany them or feature in any way in judgement). 
Robinson defines sense-data as having the following features: they are something of which we are 
aware; they are non-physical;  they are logically private objects, in that only one subject can be 
aware of each sense-datum; they exemplify sensible [experienced,  not perceived] properties, they 
are not intentional [representational].25  They are by definition non-identical with external objects 
and do not feature in an analysis of judgement.26  On the sense-data theory, the sensing of a sense-
datum, is a purely phenomenal (or 'sensible') experience common to perceptions, hallucinations and 
illusions.  Furthermore, to sense the sense-datum is not for that mental act to intend or represent the 
sense-datum.  Phenomenal experiences are not about anything in this sense.  Let me now consider 
the arguments for sense-data.
23 Pitcher (1971) pp. 10-11
24 Even if ''evil'' and ''inflicted'' seem a bit strong.
25 Robinson (1994) pp. 1-2.  On this standard view, the sense-data do not have intentionality in themselves  even  
though it may perhaps be put that the sensings of sense-data, and by extension perhaps the sense-data themselves,  
somehow stand in some kind of a representational relation to those objects that cause them.  For s to sense a sense-
datum x is not representationally transparent to s in the sense that in virtue of this relation alone an object other than 
x, and which is the intentional object, is represented to s.  One could not “read off” the external cause or matching 
object, or the fact that there is or might be one, from the sensing of a sense-datum alone.  And the sense-datum itself 
is not the intentional object of the experience.
26 Judgements have intentional objects, which may or may not be external objects and may or may not have, i.e.  
exemplify, the properties they are represented as having.  Sense-data exemplify the properties they are presented as 
having.
93  The Argument from Perspectival Change and the Notion of the Visual Field
Consider the following argument from Russell.
If our table is "really" rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute  
angles and two obtuse angles.  If the opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to 
a point away from the spectator, if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were  
longer.  All of these things are not commonly noticed in looking at the table, because experience has 
taught us to construct the "real" shape from the apparent shape, and the "real" shape is what interests  
us as practical men.  But the "real''shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we  
see.  And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we move about the room; so that here again  
the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the 
table.27
An earlier version comes from Hume.
The table which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which 
exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image which was 
present to the mind.28
The argument here is that what we sense changes as we change our perspective.  As, by hypothesis,  
the object perceived does not change, it must be concluded that the object sensed is not identical to 
it. A reconstruction of the argument is as follows.
P1 s senses an x which changes its intrinsic properties as s moves relative to y.
P2 y itself does not change, or at least not systematically in the intrinsic manner of x as 
in s's sensing of x in P1.
P3 If x changes in respect of property F under conditions C and y does not, then x and y 
are non-identical.
C x and y are non-identical.
I think that this is a fair reconstruction of the central thrust of the argument.29  It was pointed out by 
Reid that the table looks to get farther away.  To point this out is to argue that the change in the 
27 Russell (1912) p. 3
28 Hume (2008) p. 13
29 See Heumer (2001) Chapter V Section I for an extensive discussion of various formulations of the argument. 
10
experience of the table does not licence P1.  This is, in my opinion, correct, and nothing, I contend,  
in any sense, looks, appears or is sensed to get smaller.  We are not aware in experience of anything 
which changes in intrinsic size; nothing is sensed which changes size.   This, I submit, is true as a 
point of fact.  The table does not look to get smaller: it looks only to get  farther away or to be 
egocentrically positioned and/or orientated differently.30
However, a proponent of the argument might concede that it does look to get farther away in 
the  epistemic sense, but that the object that constitutes the phenomenal appearance of the table, 
namely the sense-datum, does get smaller as it takes up less space in the visual field.
 But it seems to me that nothing in vision, and nothing in the visual field, "gets smaller''.  
There is a tendency of philosophers to introduce a notion of the visual field as an object of, or 
salient  element  in,  experience,  construed as,  or  based  on,  a  two-dimensional  field  of  coloured 
patches.31  On the simplest of this type of view, the visual field is like a sensed mosaic of coloured 
patches of card, and as the subject moves around, every change in the visual field is analogous to 
the replacement of one or more pieces of card by another, differently shaped, piece of card.  The 
idea that the visual field is two-dimensional has appealed to many people since Berkeley, despite 
the fact that it looks to be an introspectible fact that this is not the case.32  Here, for example, are 
two passages from Broad.
whenever a penny looks to me elliptical, what really happens is that I am aware of an object which 
is, in fact, elliptical.  This object is connected in some specially intimate way with the round physical 
penny, and for this reason is called an appearance of the penny.  It really is elliptical, and for this 
reason the penny is said to look elliptical.
When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware of something; and it is certainly plausible 
to hold that this something is elliptical in the same plain sense in which a suitably bent piece of wire,  
looked at straight from above, is elliptical.  If, in fact, nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very 
hard to understand why the penny should seem elliptical rather than any other shape.33
However, this seems to me to be questionable as a reporting of the facts.  The penny does not look 
elliptical, it looks to be a circle (a very short cylinder) that is turned from face-on.  There now arises  
30 If sense-data are taken to be three dimensional, then I think that this argument will still not go through.  The sense-
data will be described so as to match exactly the behaviour of a real three dimensional table in the visual field, with  
the exception that they will be changing in intrinsic shape and not in extrinsic properties.  But there would be no  
reason that I can see to conclude, on the basis of this argument, that there are such sense-data  Why should three-
dimensional sense-data persuade me more of P1 than do two-dimensional sense-data?
31 See, e.g., Peacocke (1983) Section 1.
32 This is conceded even by many proponents of sense-data, e.g. in Price (1932) and Jackson (1977).  However some, 
e.g. Foster (2000) and Robinson (1994), hold that the visual field is two-dimensional.
33 Broad (1965) pp. 89-90
11
immediately another question: if that is so, and nothing looks to be elliptical, then how is it that the 
penny looks like  this when face-on and like  that when turned from face-on?  One ought to be 
careful here, for a statement like this can be erroneously taken to indicate that ''this'' and ''that'' are 
naming appearances in the visual field.  
Rather,  the  penny  looks  to  be  orientated  in  a  particular  way,  and  then  orientated  in  a 
different way.  The use of ''looks'' invoked here, i.e. the phenomenal use which refers to an elliptical 
object, is illicit.  This is partly motivated by the fact that a three-dimensional object can be occluded 
from each perspectival point by a two-dimensional shape projected onto a plane along the points of 
intersection of the outward edges of the object as they meet the perspectival lines emanating from 
the point, and where the plane is drawn perpendicular to the central perspectival line at the first 
point of contact with the edge of the object.  In the case of a circle, this shape is an ellipse.
As  an  illustration  of  this  line  of  thought,  consider  Peacocke's  introduction  of  primed 
predicates which we can apply to properties of the visual field.
If a particular experience e has the familiar sensational property which in normal circumstances is 
produced by a white object (such as a tilted plate) which would be precisely obscured by an opaque 
elliptical region (r, say)  of the imagined interposed plane, let us express this fact in the notation 
"elliptical`(r,  e) and white`(r,  e)."  These primes predicates"elliptical`" and "white`" should not be 
confused with their unprimed homonyms.   In using the notation, we are not thereby saying that  
experiences have colour properties or spatial properties.  With this apparatus we can express what 
would more traditionally have been expressed by saying: "There is a yellow elliptical region of the 
visual field next to a white square region".34
Peacocke holds that the prime properties are not exemplified.  However, the argument is otherwise 
the same: although they are not exemplified, they are manifest in perceptual experience.   However, 
it is not true, at least so far as it seems to me, that there is anything experiential corresponding to 
this notion.  Peacocke's argument is not that these are objects of sensing, but that they are salient 
elements of experiences which are not analysable in terms of the spatial and orientation properties 
of objects.  This is a subtle difference, but I reject the underlying observation in both cases.  
The introduction of these properties seems to me to be an intellectual act of a fairly high 
level, and not something that is manifest in experience.
This generalises to all of the cases purported in various specific examples of P1.  In the 
cases  explicitly  under  discussion,  the  penny and the table  are  seen  to  be at  different  positions 
relative to the axes of the visual field of the perceiver.  This renders the change identified in P1 
34 Peacocke (1983) pp. 20-21
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relational change.  And this is compatible with P2, so C is blocked.  To get from the tilting of the 
coin,  and thus a different  relational  property of the coin being seen,  to "the coin looks like an 
ellipse" or further to "an ellipse is sensed", requires assuming something like P1.35    And this is to 
assume P.  
The ''visual field'' is only the field of things seen, or, in general, the notion of the extent over 
which the eye can range.  We are not perceptually aware of the visual field in experience in the 
sense that we are aware of it as we are aware of the objects, including empty space, in it.  The visual 
field is the area in which things are visible, but it itself is not visible (similarly, the eye is the organ 
through which things  are seen but  itself  is  not seen).   My desk is  currently in my visual field 
because it is currently something that is seen by me.  The objects I currently am seeing comprise my 
current visual field.  But the visual field is not an entity in experience over and above this.  If I have  
a bag with two cans of soup in it, the contents of the bag are the two cans of soup (and the empty  
space),  and not  two cans  of  soup (and the  empty  space)  plus  a  ''content  field''.   Likewise  for 
experience: there is no experiential field in the sense over and above the things seen.
It is certainly true that I can conceive of something like the visual field in terms of a mosaic 
of pieces of card for every scene such that the shapes and colours are perfectly matched to the 
objects seen in the way that the elliptical piece of card is matched to occlude the penny at some 
point.  We are very good at doing this.  It must, of course, be granted that this scene may completely 
take me in, as in the case of a trompe l'oeil.  However, this enforces on us an account of illusion 
(assuming that one takes this to be an illusion), and not necessarily sense-data.   It can be further 
granted that there could in some sense be a visual field very much like this mosaic of pieces of card, 
except that the mosaic is of sense-data which are two-dimensional colour-patches.  There is nothing 
incoherent about this position, and there may be no way of actually proving it false.36  However, it 
seems to me that the argument from perspective is not a good argument in favour if it.  That it is 
possible to adopt "the painterly view", so to speak, of the visual field and consider the ''visual field'' 
as introduced in thought as two-dimensional does not show that there is a visual field and that it is 
two-dimensional, or that it has any of Peacocke's primed properties  It is not possible to literally 
adopt the "painterly view" within experience.
Noe,  similarly  to  Peacocke,  argues  that  we  actually  do  see  what  he  calls  'occlusion 
properties', but Noe think that these properties are 'features of the world', and not features of our 
experience.
But  O-properties  [occlusion properties]  are not  merely visible  qualities,  such as shape,  size and 
35 See Pitcher (1971) Chapter I Section C for discussion of this.
36 This is so, that is, if depth is not accepted as an experiential fact.
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colour.  They are the look of things, visual appearances.  It is this fact that enables us to see what is  
true in the two-step approach to vision.  Vision is a process of learning how things are from how they 
look.   To see a  round plate  from an angle,  for  example,  is  to  see  something with an elliptical  
occlusion shape.  We see its roundness in the fact that it looks elliptical from here.37
But the penny has no occlusion property in the same sense that it has the property of circularity. 
The way in which it looks is either the way in which it looks to s or the visual properties available 
to be seen by s.  The visual properties available to be seen by s include its shape, size and position. 
Noe seems to be attributing the occlusion properties to the object in the way in which the circularity  
is attributed to the face of the penny.  If these are the look of the penny, then either they are the 
visual properties available to be seen, or Noe is asserting a version of the sense-data theory on 
which the (phenomenal) look of an object is analysed as the sensing of the occlusion properties and 
the perceptible as opposed to the sensible properties are related via some relation other than the 
sensing.
If  one was inclined to accept  that  the occlusion properties are literally properties of the 
perceived objects, then to block C one could make another move.  This move would be to give a 
relational  metaphysics for external  objects:  elliptical-from-a;  circular-from-b;  and so on.  These 
would be something very much like Noe's occlusion properties.  This relational metaphysics is very 
similar to that which Broad and Price call the 'multiple location theory' of external objects.  Either 
objects are full complexes of first-order fully relational properties which are seen, or they have a 
first-order intrinsic core with (classes of) second-order relational properties of each of these first-
order properties which are (directly) seen.  Noe's occlusion properties look rather like these second-
order properties.  This would revise our ordinary conception of objects to a greater or lesser extent, 
but would not enforce a sense-datum theory of the sort objected to by Pitcher.  However, it is not 
necessary to accept it.38
I conclude, therefore, that the argument from perspective is not a compelling argument for 
sense-data.39
37 Noe (2002) p. 61
38 See Robinson (1994) Chapter II Section 2 and Price (1932) Chapter 1 for the multiple-location theory.  I do not  
think it necessary to adopt this theory, but it seems to me more defensible than Robinson at least take it to be.  One 
technical argument Robinson gives against the theory is that an elliptical surface cannot be identical with a round 
one.  This argument might hold if the theory was given in a form which asserted this identity.  But this need not be 
so, as the elliptical property, or the smaller could be a second-order property of a first-order intrinsic property.  If it  
is a first-order intrinsic property,  then no identity is actually asserted for the object  is  full  relational.   Another 
argument is that it redefines our conception of external objects.  This is true, but it was also great surprise to find out  
that external objects are actually comprised mostly of empty space.
39 And this argument does not fare better, in my opinion, with respect to three-dimensional sense-data.  If anything, it  
is even weaker for three-dimensional sense-data, as it trades on purported two-dimensional features of the visual  
field.  Indeed, Jackson (1977), who argues for three-dimensional sense-data, does not rest his argument on these 
classical arguments.
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4  The Argument from Illusion
In illusion, an object is experienced in a way that the object is not.  In hallucination, there is no 
object which has any of the properties that are experienced.40  Thus, hallucination could be seen as a 
kind of limit-case of illusion.41  There are two types of illusion, I think, which can be distinguished. 
In  discussing a  response like  the  one  above to  the argument  from perspective,  typified  by the 
"elliptical" penny, and the argument from illusion, typified by the "bent" stick which I will explain 
in more detail below, Robinson says the following.
Austin ... claimed that a stick in the water did not look like a bent stick, but like a straight stick in 
water.  Similarly, a penny from an angle does not look elliptical, it looks like a round object viewed 
from an angle.  This strategy can be generalised to many, if not all, cases of illusion.  If one were  
taking ''looks'' in this judgemental sense, then, given that one has no serious tendency to be deceived,  
then the stick does not look bent and the penny does not look elliptical, and this response to the 
argument would be powerful.  Once, however, one accepts that there is a phenomenological sense to  
''looks'' which is not analysable in terms of a tendency to make judgements, then the situation is  
more complicated.42
The claim that there is such a purely phenomenological, i.e. phenomenal, sense, and that this is  
analysable in terms of sense-data, is the first premise of the argument.  The argument from the 
illusion, e.g. that of the bent stick, is of the same form as the argument from perspective.  One has 
to grant the equivalent version of P1, and the underlying principle, in order that the argument get off 
the ground.  One has to grant that there is a sense in which the stick in water "looks bent".  It is  
alleged that it looks bent and not just that it looks as if it is in water in precisely the way that it is 
alleged that the penny "looks elliptical", i.e. a purely phenomenal sense.  Broad has the following to 
say about the ''bent stick''.
We say that it looks bent.  And we certainly do not mean by this that we mistakenly judge it to be bent; we  
generally make no such mistake.  We are aware of an object which is very much like what we should be aware  
of if we were looking at a stick with a physical kink in it, immersed wholly in air.  The most obvious analysis 
of that facts is that, when we judge that a straight stick looks bent, we are aware of an object which really is 
40 It will also be necessary, within this definition, to account for “veridical hallucinations”, where there is an object  
which exemplifies the properties of the object seen but which is in fact not seen.  I do not go into this here, but some  
causal condition is the usual manner of doing this.  However, see also Lewis (1980) for an argument against this. 
Note that this causal condition will tell us which object is, or is not, seen, but not in virtue of this what it is to see the 
object.  
41 On certainly need not say this, of course, but I lack the space to argue in detail for this as against other theories.
42 Robinson (1994) p. 55
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bent, and which is related in a peculiarly intimate way to the physically straight stick.  The relation cannot be 
that of identity, since the same thing cannot at once be bent and straight, in the same sense of these words.  If  
there be nothing with a kink in it before our minds at the moment, why should we then say that the stick looks  
bent?  No doubt we can quite well mistakenly believe a property to be present which is really absent, when we  
are dealing with something known to us indirectly, like Julius Caesar or the North Pole.  But in our example we 
are  dealing  with  a  concrete  visible  object,  which  is  bodily  present  to  our  senses;  and  it  is  very  hard  to 
understand how we could seem to ourselves to see the property of bentness exhibited in a concrete instance, if 
in fact nothing was present to our minds that possessed that property.43
This is the same line of argument that I objected to in the previous section.  I think it untrue that we 
are aware of an object which is 'very much like what we should be aware of if we were looking at a  
stick with a physical kink in it, immersed wholly in air'.  Is it the case that there is something "bent"  
in the visual field?  This may be true in a sense, if the subject is taken in and they judge there to be a 
bent stick.  But in this case, the subject mistakes the stick as it is in the water for an object that it is 
not, namely an actually bent stick.  This would be a form of illusion, certainly, for some property 
has been attributed in experience to an object which does not have it, namely the property bent to 
"that brown thing".  But, as Austin argued in the central case, nothing does look bent.  Nothing is 
experienced as bent, rather it is experienced as being in the water.44  
Experience of the stick changes when the stick is submerged.  The light reflected from the 
stick  and  through  the  water  into  the  air  and  eventually  into  the  eye  is  refracted  through  two 
mediums, the air and the water, with different refractive indexes.  This accounts for the change in 
experience of the stick, because what is experienced changes, i.e. there was a stick in the air before,  
and now there is a stick in the water.  If I look through the bottom of a glass, the room ''looks 
warped'', but this is, as Austin pointed out, not because there is a warped room.  However, if I paint 
the stick white, there is a difference in what is seen.  The stick is now white.  I can no longer see the  
brown of the stick when it is painted white, and I can no longer accurately see the shape or the 
position of the stick because it is in the water.  
However, these are not faults on my side.  Nothing has gone wrong experientially: it is not as 
if I am in the position of the child who mistakenly sees (experiences) a monster under the bed.
Compare the reflection of an object in a circus mirror.  We may say that the circus mirror 
does not accurately represent the object that it reflects.  But this is too hasty.  The circus mirror does 
not accurately represent the object that it  represents if ''accurate''  here means a representation in 
reflection of the kind given by a plane mirror.  The circus mirror gives an accurate representation of 
43 Broad (1965) pp. 90-91
44 'We may perhaps be prepared to agree that the stick looks bent; but then we can see that it's partly submerged in 
water, so that is exactly how we should expect it to look'. Austin (1964) p. 26, and Chapter III in general.
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the object that it reflects relative to its own standard.  Consider now the refractive index of air as 
compared to water.  The way that the stick appears, in the sense of the way in which its visual 
properties are available to be seen, is determined by the refractive index of air in the same way that 
it is determined by the refractive index of water.
In terms of the visual properties being available to be seen, it does not in fact matter whether 
the subject is taken in or not; indeed the subject only suffers an illusion in the sense of erroneously 
taking there to be something there, which in fact is not, if they actually take there to be a bent stick. 
The  particular  point  at  issue  here  is  whether  experience  in  itself  conflicts  with  reality. 
Kalderon defines the standard conception of illusion as follows.
On  the  standard  conception  of  illusion,  if  o's  appearing  F in  S's  experience  is  illusory,  then  
appearance and reality conflict.  So o must appear in S's experience in a way that conflicts with o's 
not being F.45  
Is a change in the refractive index of the medium, and/or range of mediums, through which the stick 
is seen is enough to introduce a conflict between appearance and reality?  If this is so, why then is it 
not that a refractive index of anything other than one (even air is does not have an index of one) is 
enough  to  introduce  such  a  conflict?   Indeed,  why  should  any  refractive  index,  be  it  one  or 
otherwise, be identified as setting the veridical standard?
 Kalderon makes the following point about experiential phenomena pertaining to experiences 
of colours and edges.
Surfaces can be seen to be flat and edges seen to be straight.  But flat surfaces and straight edges 
viewed through a microscope are neither flat nor straight ... If perception is partial, then an object  
need not display all of its colours from a given perspective.  Even if it is possible to view the entire  
surface of the drop of blood through a microscope, the drop of blood may not reveal all of its colours  
to that perspective.  Similarly, even if it is possible to view the entire surface of the painting and see 
it  as  composed  of  yellow and blue  dots,  the  painting  may  not  reveal  all  of  its  colours  to  that  
perspective.46
In each of the cases here, there is an explanation of why the object perceived looks the way it does.  
This  explanation  pertains  to  matters  external  to  the  subject,  independent  of,  and prior  to,  their 
experience.  The refractive index of water explains the experience of the stick; the perspectives on 
45 Kalderon (unpublished)
46 Kalderon (unpublished)
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the  penny,  the  edge  which  ''looks  straight'',  and  the  pointilist  painting,  explain  the  respective 
experiences.  Likewise, the experience of the stick through a vacuum would explain the experience 
of the stick.  In each case, the object seen is seen through some medium.  
It could be put, I think, that the "bent stick" is the stick-in-water.  The stick-in-water looks 
different from the stick-in-air, or the stick simpliciter, because it  is different in the sense that its 
visual properties are different; how it is available to be seen is different; and the reason for this is  
that it is now in water, whereas previously it was in air. What I am now looking at is the laptop-in-
air, but if I look at it through the bottom of the glass, what I am looking at is the laptop-in-air-
through-the-glass.  In none of these cases does the experience conflict with reality,  and nothing 
interposes itself between my mind and the world.
 ''Interposing'' here is the crucial notion.  The contention is that there is a particular type of 
object,  a  sense-datum,  which is  a relatum in experience,  and which (in  a sense to  be defined) 
interposes itself in experience between the mind and the object of perception.  In the language of 
neutral sense-data, the question is: Is the sense-datum identical to anything external?  
A somewhat crude, but not misleading, statement of direct realism would be that things stay 
exactly the way that they veridically look when they are not being looked at.   The complex of the  
stick in the water really is "like that" whether or not someone is looking at it.  It follows from this, I  
think,  that  there  is  nothing  non-veridical  about  the  experience  of  the  stick  in  the  water.   The 
comparison sense of veridical is that of the child experiencing a monster under the bed.  In this case, 
the experience has ''gone wrong''.  Nothing went wrong in experience of the bent stick, unless the 
experience is genuinely as-of a bent stick and not of a stick in water.  And, as with the perspectival 
case, the proponent of sense-data is not entitled to assume that there really is, in the standard case, 
i.e. where the subject is not taken in, such an experience.
If the reflection of an object is seen in a mirror, it cannot be said that the object itself is seen 
directly, or immediately.  Rather, the reflection of it is so seen.  However, if the stick is seen in the 
water, then the stick is seen directly, so far as the complex of the stick and the water is seen directly  
and the stick is a part of this complex.  The seeing of the stick cannot be separated from its being 
seen as it is presented in the water.  But, equally so, the seeing of the part of the stick that is not  
submerged cannot be separated from the seeing of this part of the stick as it is presented in the 
atmosphere.47
It could be put that the complex of the stick in the water represents, in some natural sense,  
47 Is the complex stick-in-water seen, or is the stick seen through the water?  This is an interesting question, but not 
one that I think that I need answer here.  The central point is that the visual properties of the stick, i.e. the properties  
of the stick available to be seen in the way in which the world makes them available to be seen, are changed by the 
way that the stick is in the world, i.e. submerged.
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the  position  and  size  of  the  stick  incorrectly  in  the  similar  manner  in  which  a  circus  mirror  
incorrectly represents the object which it  reflects.   However,  this is the world "misrepresenting 
itself", so to speak, relative to some standard which we impose (based on standard conditions of 
experience), and not the  subject misrepresenting the world in the sense that there is a mismatch 
between experience and reality.  This only occurs when I take there to be a bent stick.
The central  issue here is that the argument from illusion is an argument against a direct 
realist theory of perception.  In this case, the negation of direct realism involves the invocation of a 
sense-datum in experience, an entity not invoked in thought.  This direct realist view of perception 
is very well described as the ''window model''  of perception.   Maund, when discussing Austin's 
attack on the arguments from perspective and illusion, says the following.
In one passage, Austin directed his criticism against traditional epistemologists who drew radical 
conclusions  from  the  observation  that  circular  objects  looked  differently  under  a  variety  of  
circumstances.  Austin asked what he took to be a damaging question: 'If something is straight does  
it jolly well have to look straight at all times and in all circumstances?  Obviously no one seriously 
supposes this'.  Well, as M. Burnyeat has pointed out, there have been many philosophers who have  
supposed that, and not just scholastic philosophers.  He argues that is it an assumption underlying an 
influential model of perception, one no less influential for often being a tacit model: what he calls the  
'window model of perception' ... On this model, physical objects are thought of as directly revealed 
by the act of perception.  In perception, we perceive the object simply as it is.   Like opening a 
window and looking out, the act of perceiving reveals the things perceived as it really is.48
This ''window model'' is the pre-theoretical view of perception that we all have, and which is the 
theory that Hume famously stated was 'destroyed' by the 'slightest' philosophy.  When we open our 
eyes, the world is presented to us as if we had opened a window to throw light over the dark room.  
Perception makes us aware of the external world, without making us aware of an intermediary.
On the classical view of this kind of theory, one which is found in the modern disjunctive 
literature  as  well  as  in  the  sense-data  literature,  experience  of  an  object  is  an  analysed  as  as 
something like a sensing relation between the subject and the external object.49  This theory is the 
target of the classical sense-data theory of the type to which Pitcher objects and which I am here 
48 Maund (2003) pp. 102-103
49 Actually, this is not exactly clear on many disjunctive theories, but experience has to be a relation of some sort on 
this theory, for there is no other way that the external world be before the mind.  It cannot just ''be there'' to be seen,  
for it is there to be seen when I have my eyes closed: opening my eyes has to result in some sort of relation over and 
above ''being receptive to'', or something like that.  Being receptive to is not the same as receiving, and perception is 
certainly reception of the world.  What happens when I open my eyes is that I take it in, and ''taking in the world''  
must be a relation of some sort.  Alston (1999) and Langsam (1997), for example, present the disjunctive theory as 
the theory of appearing.
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arguing against.  However, one does not have to think of the window model in terms of a sensing 
relation.  The theory that I am defending, as it takes experiences to be three-place relations between 
the subject, a content, and the object, is direct in the sense in which I define below.  In judging  
correctly of external objects, and coming to know thereby, of those objects and their properties, we 
are equally as well directly aware of them as we would be on a theory on which the relation is a  
two-place relation.  The difference between the sense-data theory and the theory that I am defending 
with respect to direct realism is that the propositional content is not an object of experience in the 
way that the sense-datum is.
I conclude, therefore, that the argument from illusion is unsuccessful as an argument for the 
sense-data theory.  There is no compelling case for the acceptance of anything  bent in the visual 
field in the case of the ''bent stick'',  and in the case of, say, the white wall with blue light shone on  
it, there is no compelling case for any conflict between experience and reality, and hence no need 
for a sense-datum which interposes itself between the mind and the world which explains this.50
I  conclude  from  the  above  discussion  that  the  the  arguments  for  sense-data  are  not 
compelling.
50 This also undercuts any argument that there is no way of choosing which experience is the veridical one, as there is  
no  ''privileged''  perspective:  there  is  no  non-priveliged  persepctive  in  this  sense,  as  there  are  no sense-data  to  
consider. Jackson (1977) Chapter  4 Section 10 rejects this argument.  There are two other common arguments for 
sense-data, one being the argument from certainty.  As I am certain of sense-data, but not certain of external objects, 
they must be distinct.  This is dubious on independent grounds.  There is no need to accept that certainty of the  
presence of an F,and uncertainty of a G means that F and G apply to different metaphysical classes of object, or that 
certainty that p and uncertainty that q means that p and q are propositions of different metaphysical types, or refer to 
different metaphysical  types of entity.   See, e.g.,  Austin (1962) Section 3, Pitcher (1971) Chapter II Section B.  
There  is  another  classical  argument  for  sense-data,  the  causal  argument  from hallucination,  presented  in,  e.g.,  
Robinson (1994).  This argument is like the argument from indistinguishability in that it makes use of what Maund 
(2003) p. 120 calls the 'continuity principle' in addition to P.  The continuity here is between proximally causally 
sufficient brain-states for an experience with a given psychology (merely internal  indistinguishability would not 
entail identity of object experienced: internally identical experience of two indistinguishable scenes does not allow 
us to conclude that the very same thing is seen in each case).  In conjunction with P, this results in an internalist  
sense-datum theory of experiences in that the psychology of an experience is determined by the internal state of the  
subject, and not by any factors external to the body.  Lowe (2008) calls this the 'cut-off argument': cutting off the  
causal chain at the proximal brain-state leaves the experience, i.e. sensing of a sense-datum, unaffected.  As an 
argument  for  sense-data,  this  fares  no  better  than  the  above  arguments  in  respect  of  its  assumption  of  P. 
Questioning  the  argument  in  general  as  an  argument  for  internalism  about  the  psychology  and  content  of 
experiences, is central to the disjunctive literature.  Martin (2004), Langsam (1997), Johnston (2004), Foster (2000) 
Part II Chapter 2, and Snowdon (2005), for example, discuss or advance ways of questioning the argument.   Fish 
(2009)  Chapter  5  questions  whether  or  not  it  is  empirically  true  that  fixing  the  brain  state  results  in  a  fixed 
experience.  I  would like to defend an externalist  theory of experiences  in the sense that the relata  of veridical  
experiences are external objects, and hence perception is direct.  However, to discuss this in detail with respect to  
the argument would take me far too far afield given space-constraints.  The theory that I am defending is compatible 
both  with  the  acceptance  and  denial  of  the  argument  (without  P).   Indeed,  and  importantly,  in  defending  a  
judgement-theory, and denying that there really is any notion of experiential phenomenal character in chapter 4, the 
position that I am defending is that experiences have the same types of contents as thoughts.  Externalism about 
thought content is not universally,  but widely,  accepted since Putnam (1975) and Burge (1986).    The relation  
between the theory that I am defending and disjunctivism is also not altogether clear, and, again, to enquire into this 
would be to broaden the scope of this thesis too widely.
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5  Adverbialism
The adverbial theory denies P, denies the sense-data theory, but denies in general that experience is 
to be analysed as a relation between the subject and an object.51  Rather, experience is analysed as 
the exemplification of a monadic property,  an ''adverbial  modification'',  which may or may not 
stand in some causal relation to an external object which would hence be perceived.52  The adverbial 
modification is a monadic phenomenal property exemplified by the subject and in terms of which 
the phenomenal aspect of experience is analysed. Instead of analysing ''y looks  F to  s'' as on the 
sense-data theory, the adverbial analysis is (3).
(3) s senses-F-ly.
Sensing-F-ly is an adverbial mode of sensing.  This mode of sensing is a purely qualitative monadic 
property of s.  If the adverbial mode of sensing is undergone by the subject as a result of standing in 
D to  y, then the experience is a perception of  y.  The adverbial mode of sensing is itself not a 
relation, although it may stand in one, unlike the sensing of a sense-datum which is itself a relation.
As well as the fact that experiences seem introspectibly to be relations to objects (which, of 
course, the representational theory can account for), and not to feature monadic properties of the 
mind, a central problem for this theory is Jackson's famous many-property problem.53  Another, 
related, problem is that of integrating the adverbial experience into thought.
Jackson's  many property  problem is  that  the  adverbial  theory,  as  it  treats  the  adverbial 
modification  as  unanalysable,  cannot  account  for  certain  relations  between  experiences.   For 
example, let it be that  s is experiencing an  F and a  G.  The adverbial theory will analyse this as 
sensing-F-G-ly.   However,  this is itself  simple and has no elements.   Thus, this has nothing in 
common with merely sensingF-ly.  Further, sensing F-G-H-I-ly cannot distinguish between sensing 
an F G and an H I, and a F I and a H G.  But we would want so say that experiencing a green circle 
and a yellow square is different from experiencing a green square and a yellow circle.54  If the 
adverbial  theory  holds  only  to  simple  sensings,  say,  sensing  F-ly,  G-ly,  H-ly  and  I-ly,  this 
decomposes the overall sensing from qualified elements within the sensing and thus technically 
avoids  the  problem of  suppressing semantic  complexity.   But  this  rendering  of  the theory still 
cannot cope with the seeing just given as an example unless there is some way of explaining the 
51 See Chisholm (1957) and Ducasse (1942).  Latter day defenders include Tye (1984).
52 It would not be possible to analyse this in terms of a matching relation, as the property exemplified is unstructured.
53 See Jackson (1977) Chapter 4.
54 And introducing spatial  elements,  e.g.  to-the-right-of, will not  help as these will either fall  foul of the original 
problem or introduce a non-adverbial element (e.g., to the right of, instead of to-the-right-of).
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sensings' relations to each other.  And this regimentation reintroduces an object of the sensing, or a 
field of sensing, as the element that orders the sensings.
Tye  (1984),  for  example,  responded  to  this  argument  by  arguing  that  the  sensings  are 
individuated by their causes.  However, unless the causes of the sensings, and thus what they are 
about, is made manifest to the subject in experience, which must involve the subject in a relation 
other than that of the unstructured adverbial sensing, this cannot account for the structure internal to 
the experience.55   
Relatedly, in addition to these difficulties pertaining to matters internal to the experience it is 
very difficult to see how experience construed as the exemplification of a monadic property with a 
purely qualitative nature could stand in the required logical relation to judgements and other mental 
acts based on perception.  How could the subject interpret the qualitative element in a fashion that  
allows  them  to  relate  experiences  to  thoughts?   On  the  sense-data  theory,  although  there  are 
notorious problems here, there is a more or less plausible story about how a qualitative relation to a 
structured field of objects could be logically related to thoughts about such things.56
Despite adverbialism in its classical form having its defenders, I conclude, as do most, that 
adverbialism as classically conceived is dealt a fatal blow by Jackson's many-property problem.57  I 
move on now to discuss the notions of ''direct''  and ''indirect''  perception,  before discussing the 
theory of appearing.  From there I will firm up some commitments that I draw from features of the 
theories discussed in chapter 1.
6  Direct and Indirect Perception
The theory that I am defending is that when s perceives y,  s judges that p, where s judging that p 
directly relates  s to  y because the content  p determines or picks out  y.  It would be a mistake to 
interpret this as the claim that s is related to p, and as a result of this s bears a logically independent 
relation to y as on the sense-data theory.  Rather, it is what it is for s to judge that p that s is directly 
related to y in the veridical case, as p is, to put it in this way, giving structure to the relation that 
obtains between s and y not interposing itself as an entity between s and y.
The theory that I am defending is a direct theory.   As I define this, a direct theory of  s 
perceiving  y is  that  s and  y are  both terms in the relation  in  terms  of  which the perception  is 
55 See Robinson (1994) Chapter VII Section 7.  
56 For a vivid description of this difficulty see Foster (2000) Part III Chapter 6 Section II.
57 And it seems very much at odds with introspection, to say the least.
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analysed, where this relation is simple and does not decompose into further parts.58
The structure of the sense-data analysis  of  s seeing  y is a conjunctive analysis  with two 
clauses.  In the first s senses x, the sense-datum, and in the second, s sensing x stands in D to y.  We 
can call any conjunctive analysis of this sort, whereby s is related to y in virtue of being related to 
some  x, which is further related to  y, an  indirect theory.   I define direct and indirect realism as 
follows.59
Direct Realism: The object of  s's conscious relation in an experience is an external  
object when the experience is veridical.
Indirect Realism: The object of s's conscious relation in an experience is never an 
external object, but either this conscious relation or the object which 
is a term in this relation is related to an external object when the 
experience is veridical.60
On the indirect theory, the external object of perception, y, is only related indirectly to the s in the 
sense that  s does  not  bear  a  simple  conscious  relation  to  y;  rather,  s bears a  simple  conscious 
relation to  x, and this relation itself is caused by the object of the perception, or the object of the 
conscious  relation  bears  a  relation  to  the  object  perceived,  or  a  combination  of  both.   By  a 
''conscious  relation''  I  mean a mental  relation.   Causation and matching are not  such relations.  
Examples of a mental relation include hoping, desiring, judging, etc.  Thus, as the object of the 
conscious relation is not external, it can be said that the object interposes itself between the subject  
and the external object.  This relation, causation or matching, is not a conscious relation.  Compare 
a direct perception of y, (4), and to formulations of an indirect perception of y, (5).
(4) s bears R, the sensing relation, to y
(5) s bears R to a sense-datum, x, and this was caused by an external object, y
or,
s bears R to a sense-datum, x, and x matches an external object y
(or some combination of causation and matching)
58 Schematically, one would write this as R(s, p, y).
59 Cornman (1975) Chapter 1 formulates matters like this.
60 Or experiences are not relations to objects, in which case as external objects are objects, the experience is trivially 
indirect.  Note an adverbial theory on which an experience is the exemplification of a monadic property,  which  
accounts for the ''phenomenal'' element, and a relation to an external object would count as direct.  However, as with  
sense-data, the arguments for the adverbial theory are not compelling, and this would not get around the problems 
raised in this section.
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A mental act M of s involving an object y is direct with respect to y if ''s is in M'' can be analysed in 
terms of a simple relation, irreducible into logically more simple relations in which s and y are both 
terms.   For example, ''s desires that glass of wine on the table'' can be analysed as a direct relation 
between s and the glass of wine.  s does not bear a relation to some intermediary in order to desire 
the glass of wine.  That  s and y are both terms in a simple relation means that this relation takes 
these as terms and not, as on the sense-data theory,  relations in which these are terms.  On the 
sense-data theory, s perceives y if the experience, i.e. s sensing x, is related by D to y.
I reject the sense-data and adverbial theories, but not just on the basis that they are indirect.  
For one could argue that to sense a sense-datum is to perceive the object and that sensing a sense-
datum which belongs (to use Price's terminology) to an object can be interpreted as a three-place 
simple relation and so therefore is not indirect.  The proponent of this view is quite entitled to this  
position, but that there are sense-data would need to be established independently of this, and I do 
not think that this need be accepted.
However, there is another problem with this view, and that is that it is rather unclear how 
consciousness of a sense-datum could be said allow us to be conscious of the object to which it 
belongs.  If I look at a signpost in a language I do not understand, I am conscious of the words on 
the sign.  But I am not conscious of their meaning, of the states of affairs, commands, etc., which 
are signified.  I am in a sense indirectly related to these meanings as I am conscious of words and 
sentences that are related to these meanings, but I am not  consciously related to these meanings. 
The relation to an external object via the sensing of a sense-datum is at least somewhat analogous to 
this, for the sense-datum would give us no information about the object to which it belongs in the 
same manner as the foreign writing on the sign.  It looks to me as though this similarity better fits  
the indirect view than it does the triadic direct version, for on the triadic direct version ought it not  
to be that sensing the sense-datum does give us information about the object to which it belongs?61 
This matter comes up again in §7 where I discuss the theory of appearing.
On the representational theory that I will defend, to represent that p is to represent the object 
that  p determines.  It is much more clear on this theory than on the sense-data theory how, say,  
judging of  the  piano that  it  will  be  delivered  tomorrow is  to  be conscious  of  the  piano.   The 
proponent of sense-data, of course, would hold that sensing the sense-datum that belongs to the 
61 It is not really plausible, in my opinion, to hold that the sense-datum could provide us with information about, or 
bring before the mind, the object to which it belongs because it, say, resembles it as on the antiquated mimetic 
theory of  representation.   And given  that  the  sense-dataum exists  in  some peculiar  space  or  in  the  brain  it  is 
exceedingly unlikely that it  would resemble in any way the object to which it  belongs.  And even if it did, its  
resembling, like its belonging, is not, so to speak, stamped on the sense-datum in a way in which it makes manifest  
the object to which it belongs in any way within the experience.
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piano is a non-conceptual way of being conscious of the piano and no less indirect.  However, it is 
much less clear that sensing a sense-datum can really be a way of being conscious of the object to 
which it belongs as it is hard to see how any information about the object to which it belongs could 
be gleaned from sensing the sense-datum.  It is more difficult to see how sensing the sense-datum 
brings the object before the mind.  
And in judging of the piano that it will be delivered tomorrow, the proposition does not even 
look like it interposes itself between my mind and the piano: in thinking this, I am thinking of the 
piano.  But the sense-datum seems not to be like this.  The sense-datum seems ill-suited to the role 
it would be being asked to play on a direct theory.
There is  another  interpretation  of directness  which concerns an object  as opposed to its 
surfaces.  Moore (1965a) raises the question of whether we are only directly aware of the surfaces  
of objects.  Armstrong (1968) and Jackson (1977) discuss the direct-indirect distinction in similar 
terms.  Armstrong says that 'it is clear that it is not the apple as a whole which acts upon the eyes to  
produce perceptions.  If, for example, the back half of the apple had been cut away, this would have 
have  no  effect  upon the  resultant  perception'.62  Jackson elucidates  this  with  the  'in  virtue  of' 
locution: 'I see an opaque physical object in virtue of seeing a part of it'.63  
It is intuitive that in some sense of "the strictest sense" we see the surface of the apple.  This 
is the only part of the whole apple to which, as Jackson argues, we bear a conscious relation with a 
specific counterfactual profile.  Nevertheless, to accept this is to accept a direct realism in another 
important other sense: what we are directly conscious of is a  part of an external object.  This is 
different from the standard sense-data case, where the sense-datum is a wholly distinct entity from 
the perceived object.64
When the light reflects off the apple, it is correct that in some modal, causal sense it actually 
reflects off the surface of the apple; but it seems also to be true that it reflects off the whole apple 
because the surface is a surface of the apple.  After all, as a comparison, when I touch the keyboard,  
we do not want to say only that my fingertip touches the keyboard.  This is because of the type of 
relation that touching is.  I touch the keyboard using my finger which is a part of me.  My finger is 
touching the keyboard in that it is directly adjacent to it.  This is not the relation of touching that is 
meant  when  I  say  that  I touch  it.   There  is  a  distinction  here  between  the  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  aspects  of  perception.   With  regard  to  this  distinction,  consider  Snowdon's 
definition of direct perception.65
62 Armstrong (1968) p. 87
63 Jackson (1977) p. 19
64 Unless some version of the multiple-location theory is adopted, but this is not really a sense-datum theory in the 
strict sense.
65 As  in  Snowdon's  discussion,  the  epistemological  understanding  of  ''direct''  often  pertains  to  whether  or  not  a 
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x [directly] perceives y iff x stands, in virtue of x's perceptual experience, in such a relation 
to y that, if x could make true demonstrative judgements, then it would be possible for x to 
make the true demonstrative judgement 'That is y'.66
That we can make demonstrative reference, where this is understood in intuitive contrast for the 
moment to thought about an object under a de dicto, non-referential, description, to external objects 
is  denied  by  Moore,  as  well  as  Russell.67  I  am defending  the  position  in  later  chapters  that 
experiences are the applications of perceptual demonstratives.  So, to say that s perceives y is to say 
that s applies a demonstrative to y.  But there is still the distinction between the demonstrative link 
to the object in the metaphysical sense, i.e. which object is the relatum, and the epistemological 
sense of how it is before the mind.  The object is directly perceived, but epistemologically this does 
not entail that the rear of the apple is perceived in the same way as is the front.
But this distinction, between different parts of the apple being before the mind in different 
ways, one explicitly in content of the experience and the other not, however it is cashed out, does 
not render the perception of the whole indirect in any troublesome way.  For these are two different 
relations.  If I touch one brick of the house, I am touching the house, even though I am not touching 
the whole of the house: touching in this sense is transitive over the part-whole relation.  In contrast, 
if I build one wall of the house, I did not build the house, but only a part of the house: building has  
no  sense  which  is  not  transitive  over  the  part-whole  relation.   The  metaphysical  relation  of 
perception is like the former, and the epistemological relation like the latter.68
7  The Theory of Appearing
I  turn  now to  the  last  of  the classical  triumvirate  of  early to  mid  twentieth-century perceptual 
theories,  the  theory  of  appearing.69  Alston,  in  defending  the  theory  of  appearing,  makes  a 
proposition is inferred or not.  See, e.g.,  the discussions in Fumerton (1985) and Heumer  (2001).  On my theory the 
experience is a judgement and so not inferred.
66 Snowdon (1992) p. 56
67 See Moore (1965a).  Bermudez (2000) distinguishes between the 'immediate' perception of objects, which is an  
epistemological notion, and 'direct' perception, which is a metaphysical notion.  The object of immediate perception  
is the surface, and direct perception the whole.
68 The  representational  theory  of  perception  can  render  the  epistemological/metaphysical  distinction  neatly.   The 
facing surface of the apple is represented under a content as being located at certain positions, coloured, textured, 
and so on.  The rear surface of the apple is not explicitly represented in this way in the content.  If s sees of y that p, 
s need not see of y that q even though p and q are both true of y.  I do not enquire into the independent matter of how 
to draw this distinction in detail with respect to, e.g., facing and rear surfaces.
69 See, e.g., Barnes (1965) and Paul (1965).
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distinction between an 'internal' and an 'external' theory of perception in terms of how the object of 
perception is specified within the analysis  of perception.  On the internal theory,  it  is specified 
within the clause which deals with the conscious relation, and on the external theory in another 
clause.  This is closely related to the matter of directness. The sense-data theory, and the adverbial 
theory are external theories.  The theory of appearing is an internal theory.  Consider his following 
discussion of the external theory and the requirement for “extra conditions” over and above the 
specification of the “sensory”, for which we can read “conscious”, element of perception.
"Obviously", one might say, "it is not enough for my genuinely experiencing the tree that I merely 
have certain kind of experience".  How could that be sufficient?  Obviously, it could be sufficient  
only if a perceptual relation to the tree is built into the nature of the sensory relation itself. And the 
apparent  obviousness  of  the  need  for  extra  conditions  is  just  the  apparent  obviousness  of  the 
supposition that sensory experience cannot be so characterized, that it is "all in the head" or mind, 
something purely subjective and confined to the perceiving subject. Opposed to this intuition is the 
view that sensory experience is essentially a relational affair, a matter of something "appearing" or 
being "presented" or "given" to the subject as such-and such ... Where the something in question is 
an external physical object, e.g., this tree, then this relational state of affairs that is constitutive of the  
sensory experience ensures that the subject perceives this tree.70
This is the picture that the direct realist has of perception: veridical perception is a matter of a 
conscious direct relation to an external object.  This relation, as it has the external object as one of 
its terms and the subject as the other, allows for an analysis in terms of a direct relation between the 
subject and the object, as I described above.  Alston argues against external theories, i.e. theories 
that specify the object of perception via a relation to the conscious experience, by arguing that the 
necessary and sufficient conditions given by such analyses, exemplified best by the well-known 
causal analyses, fail to capture the nature of our concept of perception due to the possibility of cases 
of what we would count as perception that do not meet these necessary and sufficient conditions. 
This is underwritten by a general argument, however, namely the fact that our concept of perception 
necessitates that any analysis directly relate the subject to the object perceived in a particular way. 
Recall my discussion in §6 of the direct/indirect distinction and in §5 of the notion of a ''conscious'' 
or ''mental'' relation.  Alston's following point can be extended to a matching relation.
No matter how x causally contributes to the production of an experience, I do not see, or otherwise 
perceive, x in having that experience unless x presents itself to my experience as an object.  How 
70 Alston (1990) p. 74
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could the fact that x plays a role in bringing about that experience make it true that I  see x?  The 
experience itself is, by hypothesis, either an awareness of some sense-datum distinct from x, or it is  
simply a way of being conscious.  x is not presented or given to my awareness in the experience.  
That being the case, no causal relation of x to the experience could make it true that I  see x or, 
indeed, that I am aware of x in any way at all.  Causality is no substitute for awareness; there is no 
magic  by which an item becomes an object  of  awareness just  by virtue of standing in a causal  
relation to the experience.71
The  proponent  of  an  external  theory  will  argue  that,  for  example,  sensing  a  sense-datum  or 
exemplifying an adverbial modification is which stands in a particular relation to the external object 
is what it is to have the object presented to the subject, or for the subject to be conscious of it, and  
that this is not "magic".  Nevertheless, I think that Alston raises a very subtle point.
If I look in a mirror, the object seen is the reflection, and not the object reflected, any more 
than I see a thumb which made a print in wax when I see the wax.72  In having to look in the mirror 
at the reflection to come by knowledge of the reflected object, my relation to the reflected object is 
certainly indirect as it is mediated by a direct relation to the reflection: I need be conscious of no 
other object than the reflection in order to see the reflection, but not so for the reflected object.  The 
relation that the reflection has to the reflected object is analogous to a causal relation between a 
sense-datum and the object to which it belongs.  It is really a rather remote relation that I bear to the 
reflected object in seeing the reflection.  What I am seeing is a distinct object, namely the reflection 
(or state of an object, namely the mirror), caused by another distinct object.  It seems inaccurate to  
say that I am conscious of the reflected object in virtue merely of seeing the reflection.
Consider the classical indirect sense-data theory.  It is clear that the subject is conscious of 
the sense-datum, and a criterion for this can be given, namely that the subject can acquire concepts 
of the sense-datum and its properties, or acquire knowledge of the sense-datum without inference. 
The object which belongs to the sense-datum, however, is much more problematically an object of 
conscious awareness.  In what way is the subject really conscious of it at all?  Generally speaking, I  
am not conscious of some y which caused an x, or some y which matches an x, simply in virtue of 
looking at the  x.  Alston seems to me to be quite correct in this point.  How could something be 
brought before the mind via a matching or causal relation to an object which I am experiencing?73
Alston's preferred theory is the theory of appearing on which the appearing (perceiving) 
71 Alston (1990) p. 95
72 Sometimes people deny this and hold that we do see the objects of reflection when we see the reflection in precisely  
the way in which we do not see a thumb which made a print in wax when we see the wax.  But why, for example,  
should the increased detail in the reflection or continued causal link, even a causal link of a particular kind, which 
sustains the ongoing reflection and not the thumbprint, allow for this?
73 Foster (2000) pp. 32-33 also makes a similar point.
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relation is fundamental.  For s to perceive y is for y to appear some way to s.74  Mentioning now the 
properties in experience, recall that the sense-data theory analyses (1) as (6).
(1) y looks F to s.
(6) s senses an x which is F.
s sensing the x which is F stands in some relation D to y.
In opposition to this, the theory of appearing analyses (1) as (7).
(7) y stands in the appearing-F relation to s.
The  appearing-F relation is a direct relation between the subject and the object.  However, the 
nature of the relation is mysterious.  Alston says of it that it is a non-conceptual primitive relation 
which  directly  relates  the  subject  to  the  world.    Alston  and  Langsam  argue  that  there  is  a 
fundamental relation of appearing-F that holds between subjects and objects.   Just as the sensing 
relation on the sense-data theory is inherently "phenomenal",  so is the appearing-F relation, the 
appearing-G relation, only differently so, and so on.  In arguing that the relation is fundamental, and 
not analysable into further (specifically conceptual) terms, Alston makes the following argument.
With my eyes shut I think about the scene before me.  I remember the trees in my yard.  I wonder  
whether there are squirrels and robins out there at the moment.  I hypothesize that my neighbour  
across the street is working in his garden.  That is, I form various propositional attitudes concerning  
what is or what might be in front of me.   Then I open my eyes and take a look.  My cognitive  
condition is radically transformed.  Whereas before I was just  thinking about,  wondering about, 
remembering the trees, squirrels and the houses, and so on, these items are now directly presented to 
my awareness.  They are  present to me,  whereas before I was merely dealing with propositions 
about them  ... The difference cannot  lie in the conceptual aspect of perceptual experience; there  
was plenty of that before I opened my eyes.75
This argument only goes through if it is granted that propositional attitudes cannot account for the 
difference in what is before the mind, or more accurately the way in which those things are before 
the mind, between perceptual experience and other thought. I, of course, will argue against this in 
subsequent chapters. 
74 See Alston (1999) and (2005), and Langsam (1997) for recent defences.
75 Alston (1999) p. 186
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But there is also a specific argument against the theory of appearing, despite the points of 
agreement I have with Alston.  Robinson and Jackson pose a dilemma for the theory of appearing. 76 
Either the relation is an unanalysable two-place relation as in the analysis of ''s perceives y as F'' and 
''s perceives something G'' in (8), or it is a three-place relation as in (9).
(8) s stands in the appearing-F relation to y.
s stands in the appearing-G relation to y.
(9) s, the property F, and y stand in the appearing relation.
s, the property G, and y stand in the appearing relation.
If the two-place analysis is offered, then the relation appearing-F is fundamental in that it cannot be 
analysed into components common to other relations.  Thus, the appearing-F and appearing-G in (8) 
are wholly distinct.  Likewise, appearing-F has no element in common with thinking of y as an F. 
But if the three-place analysis  is offered,  the analysis  is,  as Robinson puts it,  'too generic'  and 
something that no one will disagree with.  What is required is an analysis of y, F, and s standing in 
the appearing relation, not a statement that they do stand in that relation.
The sense-data  analysis  is  that  s senses  an  F,  where sensing is,  as  Robinson calls  it,  a 
'sensible' mode of consciousness, by which he means a non-propositional sensational or qualitative 
mode  of  consciousness.  If  the  theory  of  appearing  offers  a  sensible mode  of  relational 
consciousness of F in an experience of y where y is not F, Robinson argues that the theory looks 
like it collapses into a version of the sense-datum theory or some other more fundamental theory.  
What does it mean to say that y sensibly appears F but is itself not F?  What does it mean that a y 
which is  F may appear  F,  G,  H etc., to  s?  Is the property involved exemplified or not?  If so, it 
looks like a version of the sense-data theory, and if not, a version of something like Lewis' (1929) 
qualia theory.  The theory seems to say only that there is a reducible relation, i.e. a relation which 
can be analysed into more fundamental relations, but this is merely a precursor to giving a theory.
Thus,  the  theory  faces  a  dilemma:  either  admit  that  y appearing-F  to  s has  no  part  in 
common with  y being believed to be  F by  s, or admit that the relation is a three-place relation. 
However, to admit this is then not really to say anything at all, for everyone will agree that for s to 
see y as F is for y to appear F to s.  If y can appear F but not be F, what does this mean?  It looks as 
though the theory is a statement of a problem, rather than a solution to it.  Furthermore, I think that  
it does submit to analysis, and that the notion of the phenomenal nature of experience invoked can 
76 See Robinson (1994) Chapter II Section 2 and  Jackson (1977) Chapter 4.
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be rejected, as I argue in subsequent chapters.
8  Representationalism
Drawing  on the  above  difficulties  with  the  sense-data  theory,  the  theory  of  appearing  and the 
adverbial  theory,  let  me  introduce  the  representational  theory.   The  sense-data  theory  is 
unmotivated, I think, and the appearing and adverbial theories inherit the problems that the sense-
data theory has with its indirect nature as well as their own difficulties.
On the representational theory, experiences are, as I have been tacitly arguing, propositional. 
They are representational in that they represent objects, properties, states of affairs, facts, whatever 
one's ontology is comprised of, to the subject.
  They are the takings in of things, rather than the facing of a mute sense-datum, adverbial 
modification or featuring in an appearing-relation.  This is the understanding inherent in Jackson's 
epistemic use of ''looks'': in saying that it looks to me that the cup is on the table, I am saying just  
this; it looks to me that the cup is on the table, not that ''I am sensing a sense-datum''.  This is unfair  
to a degree as we shall see, for the sense-datum may only accompany the representational aspect of 
experience.  However, I will argue that just as sense-data are unmotivated by the arguments above, 
so  sense-data  or  sense-data  like  accompaniments  to  representational  experiences  are  also 
unmotivated.
In experience, it seems to me that I am undergoing a mental act which is like judgement.  It  
is propositional, and it has force.  This is the theory that I am defending here by first arguing against 
sense-data,  and  then  against  the  phenomenal  notion  as  it  pertains  to  the  discussion  of  the 
representational theory.  Finally, I argue against non-conceptual content, and for the thesis that the 
attitude in experience is judgement.  However, does experience being a relation to a proposition not 
fall foul of any of the objections to the sense-data theory that I have advanced?  Particularly, as a 
proponent of the ''direct'' or ''naive'' realist theory might argue, does it not fall foul of the criterion of 
directness?  Consider Johnston's argument, for example, that the 'Fact-Directed View', as he calls it, 
does not 'earn the right to the metaphor of the sense taking in concrete reality'.  He continues as 
follows.
According to the View, the relation between what we sense and what we sometimes go on to  judge 
is particularly intimate.  It is identity ... The objects of judgement are bearers of truth values, and 
when their subject matter is contingent those bearers can either be true or false. Since the truth about 
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the scene is mostly contingent, most perceptual judgements are directed at truth-value bearers that  
might have been false.  But concrete reality does not consist of items that could have been false . 
Concrete reality consists of items whose existence accounts for the truth of what is true and the 
falsity of what is contingently false.77
But it need not be on the representational theory that the objects of perception, as opposed to the 
contents, are not concrete things.78  Concrete things (or obtaining states of affairs) are the objects of 
some  true  contingent  propositions,  namely  those  propositions  which  could  be  the  contents  of 
veridical perception.
In defence of this, consider Evans' interpretation of Frege.  On this interpretation, to grasp 
the sense, which is a specific way in which a mental act having a content is analysed and which 
generalises to all types of mental representation, does not indirectly relate the subject to the object 
of the content, and nor is it that the contents grasped become the object of the act.
Frege's idea was that to understand an expression, one must not merely think of the reference that is 
the reference, but that one must, in so thinking think of the reference in a particular way.  The way 
in which one must think of the reference is that expression's sense.  No substantial, or positive theory 
of the way of thinking of something is presupposed by this conception of sense.79
This point applies to all accounts of representation, conceptual or non-conceptual.  Evans continues.
we can appreciate how wrong-headed it is to consider a Fregean sense as necessarily  intermediary 
between thinker and referent, as something which must, from a certain point of view, get in the way, or 
anyway render indirect what might be direct.  A way of thinking of an object is no more obliged to get  
in the way of thinking of an object, or to render thinking of an object indirect, than is a way of dancing 
liable to get in the way of dancing, or to render dancing somehow indirect.80
Thus, if experiences are representational, then on this understanding, which seems to me to be the 
correct  one,  they are three-place relations,  as on the theory of appearing.   Only the relation is 
analysable: it is the representation relation holding between the subject, the content, and the object 
determined by the content:  to experience  that  p is to  experience  the  y picked out by  p.81  My 
77 Johnston (2006) p. 270
78 See the end of chapter 2 §2 for more on this.
79 Evans (1981) p. 282.  See also Evans (1982) Chapter 2.
80 Evans (1981) p. 288
81 Let me here note two related features of the theory that experiences are judgements and that they are three-place 
relations that I do not enquire into here.  The first concerns whether or not the theory is a disjunctive theory or could 
turn out to be one.  See, e.g., Martin (2004) and (2006) for metaphysical disjunctivism.  On this disjunctive theory,  
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argument here is that this can be taken to be judgement.
9  Conclusion
Before summarising my conclusions from chapter 1, let me briefly consider some further objections 
that  some  might  raise.   The  first  is  that  in  defending  a  direct  realist  judgement  theory,  I  am 
committing to a realist theory of colours, and not to an anti-realist or secondary-quality theory of 
colours.  I grant that this is a difficulty, but all theories come with their difficulties, and this is a 
widely faced problem.82  There is also the problem that one might raise of the ''time-lag'' argument. 
This argument is that the experience  M takes place at a time  t later than the state of the object  y 
perceived via M and so M at time t cannot be of y at a time previous to t.  This enforces on me the 
position that the subject at t in M is directly related to a past state of y.  The subject ''sees into the 
past'' in this sense.  A final objection that one might raise, in the spirit of Russell and Hume, is that  
this theory invokes the notion of the subject and that this ought to be analysed away.  I think that 
this is incorrect, and that there is a bona fide notion of the subject.  However, I hope that  I can help 
myself to this without argument as it would exceed the scope of this thesis.  If it turned out that  
some thick notion of the subject, some Cartesian notion, ought to be analysed away, I think that  
using s in the analysans of ''s perceives y'' is still harmless.
Let  me  now  draw  some  conclusions  and  commitments  from  the  theories  that  I  have 
discussed.  The first conclusion is that there are no compelling arguments for sense-data.  Likewise, 
the unstructured monadic properties invoked on the adverbial theory are also not compelling.  The 
theory of appearing is, to agree with Robinson, too generic (and the other horn of the dilemma leads 
to similar difficulties as with the adverbial theory).  
I do agree, however, with Alston's distinction between an internal and an external theory as 
veridical perceptions are relations to external objects and non-veridical perceptions not, although there is debate as 
to which side to put illusions, and hence they are different types of mental act: they have no non-trivial common 
factor.   The disjunctive theory was in fact  partly motivated by Evans (1982) and McDowell's  (1984) theory of 
judgement,  however I lack the space to enquire into this with respect  to my theory.   Recent representationalist 
discussions, e.g., Tye (2007) and (2009b), and Schellenberg (2010), have linked the idea of representationalism and 
relationalism in the  sense  of  there  being  a  different  type  of  experience  when there  is  an  object  to  which  the  
experience is a relation and when there is not.  However, again, I do not enquire into this matter.  In respect of  
dealing with veridicality, the judgement-theory is at a significant advantage with respect to hallucinations as these  
are judgements which fail to pick out an object of judgement.  Hence, the experiential problem becomes a sub-
problem of the usually more tractable problem of false  judgements or beliefs which fail to pick out any object. 
However, I do not press this, for this is a standard feature of the representational theory.  See, e.g., Lycan (1996),  
Dretske (2003), and Harman (1997).
82 There  are various realist  theories  of colour.   For example,  Hacker (1987) defends simple,  primitivist,  intrinsic, 
theories of colour, and Byrne and Hilbert (2003) that colours are spectral reflectanceies.  There are other options, but 
I do not pursue this here.
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regards the specification of the object of perception with regards to the analysis of the experience 
and  his  arguments  for  an  internal  theory.   This  ties  in  neatly  with  my  discussion  of  the 
direct/indirect distinction.83  It seems that the object of experience is the object of consciousness 
because the relation that we bear to it is very clearly a conscious relation, and that this is not true of 
the relations that, on the sense-data and adverbial theories, we are supposed to bear to the objects 
which cause these experiences (and maybe match them).  There does seem to be a difficulty here. 
Hence,  I  would prefer  to  defend an internal  theory in  this  sense.   This  ties  in  neatly with my 
definition of ''direct'', as a theory on which the subject and object are terms in a simple relation that  
does not take as a term a relation featuring either the subject or the object.
The form of the analysis that I am defending is similar to the theory of appearing in that 
perceptual experience is analysed in terms of a three-place relation.  Only, instead of a primitive 
appearing relation,  I am arguing that the relation is that of judgement  and that it  is three-place 
because the judgements are de re.  The way that the object looks, in the subjective sense, is, as with 
Jackson's epistemic understanding of ''looks'', the propositional content of the judgement.
This theory,  then, is not  necessarily a causal theory of perception.  The causal theory of 
perception specifies as a condition that if s sees y, then y has caused at least some element of this. 
On the canonical sense-data theory, y has caused the sensing of the sense-datum, and this model is 
repeated for other such Alstonian external analyses of experience.84  However, one could also hold 
that y caused a perception of y if one thought that there was a reason for this.  The rejection of this 
comes naturally with a rejection of the sense-data and adverbial theories, as the causal condition 
(plus, perhaps, a matching condition) is necessary on this theory to specify the object perceived as 
the experience itself does not specify this, and it is necessary to tie the experience to an external 
object in a more robust fashion than mere matching (these are Alstonian external theories).85
In rejecting sense-data as objects which exemplify properties in phenomenal experience, I 
am in agreement with the adverbial theory.  However, I disagree with the unstructured monadic 
properties  invoked on the  adverbial  theory.   Nevertheless,  the  theory  that  I  am defending,  the 
judgement-theory,  shares  the feature  with  the adverbial  theory that  there  are  no sense-data,  no 
essentially experiential objects which exemplify the properties they are presented as having in an 
experiential phenomenal relation.  On this theory, there are only intentional objects, which may or 
may not exemplify the properties that they are represented as having, and there are no monadic 
phenomenal properties either.  Indeed, on the theory that I am defending, experiences are a class of 
83 And assumes, given my argument is that experiences are judgements, that the contents of thought are external.
84 The causal theory is that defended in, e.g., Grice (1961) and Pears (1976).
85 I do not make much of this, I just note it as a consequence.  Snowdon (1980/1981) rejects of the causal condition on  
perception as a conceptual truth.  Hyman (1992) also rejects it.  I make heavy use of experiences being caused in  
chapter 6, however I am wary of committing to this as a constitutive claim.
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judgements and hence do not have any phenomenal qualities to their psychology.
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Chapter 2  Transparency and Representationalism
1  Introduction
In chapter 1, I concluded that the case made for sense-data, the adverbial theory, and the theory of 
appearing  were  not  compelling.   The  theory  that  I  am  defending  is  an  extension  of  the 
representational theory which, unlike the sense-data theory, although not as defended by all of its 
proponents, and the adverbial and appearing theories, takes experience to have a representational 
content.  The representational content of a judgement, in combination with the attitude, exhausts the 
psychology of judging: there are no sensing relations, or sensory adverbial properties exemplified in 
judging.  No such phenomenal elements as these.  However, my task is to argue against  all  such 
phenomenal elements.
My tactic is first to secure the reductive representational theory, and then to argue that once 
this is accepted, there is no element of the psychology of experience for which an analysis in terms 
of judgement will not suffice.  There may be independent arguments against the judgement-theory, 
based either  on  perception  conceptualism or  on difficulties  in  analysing  certain  experiences  as 
judgements, but these are not difficulties that arise because of the difference in the  phenomenal 
nature of the psychology of experience, ''what it is like'', as opposed to thought.
As I am defending a single thesis about the mental, namely that experiences are a class of 
judgements individuated by their propositional content, there is a clear comparison case, and the 
meanings of terms such as ''phenomenal character'' and ''qualia'', which I introduce below, can be 
precisified in terms of this comparison.
In  §2,  I  introduce  the  representational  theory,  and  the  other  notions  involved.  In  §3,  I 
introduce Moore's  transparency argument,  which I  agree with,  and in  §4 I  compare this  to  the 
representational  version  of  transparency,  which  makes  clear  exactly  what  the  reductive 
representational theory is denying.
2  Representationalism and Qualia
Recall the ambiguity of the ''look''  of  y.  On one understanding, this is what I called the visual 
properties of  y, those which  s sees.1  If  y is a square, then one of the visual properties of  y is its 
1 These would be the actual visual properties, those seen.  Of course, these come from a class of visual properties in  
another sense, the class of those which could be seen.  The difference here is very close to the difference I pointed  
out with respect to two ways of understanding “visual field”.  In the general sense, this is the range of things that 
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squareness.  Other visual properties include, uncontroversially, colour and orientation and position.2 
The other ''look'' of  y is the psychology of the experience.  The psychology of experience is the 
subjective element, how things are for the subject.  The theories I discussed in chapter 1 analysed 
the psychology of experiencing,  say,  a  red square (at  least  partly)  in  terms of  either  a  sensing 
relation  to  an  actual  red  square,  or  a  phenomenal  unstructured  adverbial  modification  to  the 
subject's mind, or in terms of a primitive unanalysable phenomenal relation.  I will argue that not 
only can these theories be resisted, but the notion appealed to, that of a sensation or a phenomenal  
quality to experience but not to thought,  can be analaysed simply in terms of the propositional 
content of the experience.
On the theory being defended, (1) is analysed as (2) where y is an intentional object which 
may or may not be an external object.  In all cases such as (1) I argue that an intentional object is 
the object of the experience, and (2) is the analysis of (1).
(1) y looks F to s.
(2) s, the content p, which features the property F in some way, and the object y stand in 
the perceiving relation.3
I am arguing here that the difference between perception and thought does not enforce on us an 
analysis of experience as a constitutively different type of mental act from judgement, one with a 
phenomenal element  to  the  psychology  which  is,  by  contrastive  definition,  lacking  in  (mere) 
thought.4  The phenomenal aspect of perception, that which is analysed in terms of the sensing of a 
sense-datum on the  sense-data  theory  and  the  exemplification  of  an  adverbial  property  on  the 
adverbial theory, is the ''phenomenal character'' of experience.  This is defined in terms of ''what it is 
like'' for the subject to undergo the experience.
could be seen, the range of things over which the eye can be cast, as opposed to an actual visual field which is  
comprised of things seen.
2 The contents of experiences is not an area into which I enquire here.  See Siegel (2006) for discussion of this.
3 I have used “perceiving relation” here, which implies that (1) is a veridical look.  Some slight rephrasing will be in 
order  to  make (2)  general  to  cover  illusory and  hallucinatory cases  of  (1).   (2)  could  be  put  in  terms  of  the 
“experiencing relation”, where veridicality is settled by how many of the visual properties are  exemplified by the 
intentional object.  Recall my discussion at the beginning of chapter 1 §4.  A veridical case will be where all of the 
visual properties are exemplified by y, an illusory case will be where only some are exemplified, and a hallucinatory 
case will be where none are exemplified.  This renders the intentional object in the illusory case a complex of  
(represented) exemplified and merely represented properties.  I lack the space to go into the details of this, but let me 
give a brief example.  Consider the case where I see, say, a cat as a dog (and allow these kind properties to be 
admissible as visual properties).  I see all of the shape and colour properties accurately, let us say, but I misrepresent  
the property of being a dog with respect to this cat, the one whose shape properties I am veridically seeing.  Here it 
looks like the object of experience not only has the properties which are exemplified, but it also has, in the merely  
representational sense, the property of being a cat.
4 I am arguing that experiences are thoughts, or judgements, of a certain type individuated by their content but I will 
omit this qualification ('mere') as context makes it clear what I mean.
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Phenomenal Character: The quality that perceptual experiences possess which 
accounts for their phenomenal ''something that it is like'' 
nature.
On the theories discussed in chapter 1, I focused on this element of experience as analysed on the 
theories that I discussed.  Experience, though, as indeed some proponents of the sense-data theory 
also held, also has a representational element.  Here is Peacocke introducing the distinction between 
representational content and, as he calls them, “sensations”.  I  am arguing against sensations in 
perceptual  experience,  and  that  perceptual  experiences  are  a  class  of  judgements,  where  the 
psychology of judging is exhausted by the propositional content and the attitude.
 
Historically,  the distinction between putative perceptual  experiences and sensations has been the 
distinction between those experiences  which do  in  themselves  represent  the  environment  of  the 
experiencer as being in a certain way, and those experiences which have no such representational  
content.  A visual perceptual experience enjoyed by someone sitting at a desk may represent various 
writing implements and items of furniture as having particular spatial relations to one another and to  
the experiencer, and as themselves having various qualities, a sensation of smell, by contrast, may 
have no representational content of any sort, though of course the sensation will be of a distinctive 
kind.   The  representational  content  of  a  perceptual  experience  has  to  be  given  by  a  set  of  
propositions, which specifies the way the experience represents the way the world to be.5
'Sensations' are elements of experiences which bestow a qualitative conscious character in that there 
is 'something that it is like' to undergo them, but that do not represent, intend, or bring before the 
mind, any objects,  properties or states of affairs to which the the mental act  in which they are 
psychologically manifest may be a relation to.  They are purely ''qualitative''.
The  strongest  representational  analysis  of  experience  is  one  which  meets  Peacocke's 
Adequacy Thesis.6  If  the Adequacy Thesis is  met,  then there are  no “sensational”  elements  to 
perceptual experience; and, indeed, no psychological elements which diverge from those present in 
judgement, assuming (as Peacocke did) that the propositions are conceptually articulated.  This goes 
against  many  representational  theories  on  which  representing  a  content  in  perception  is 
psychologically different from representing a content in judgement as (at least) the propositions are 
5 Peacocke (1983) p. 5.  See Siegel (2010) for a detailed discussion of the ways in which 'content' is defined with 
respect to experience.  Pautz (2010) describes accuracy in terms of 'matching the world', which is roughly the same  
as Siegel's explanation, only that it does not presuppose a mind-to-world direction of fit, or that the contents are 
'committal'.  Chalmers (2004) talks of 'satisfaction conditions'.  See Searle (1983) Chapter 2 for the introduction of  
these notions.  That experiences are representational to a degree is very commonly accepted.
6 With some argument over 'physical objects', but this can be set aside for the moment.  See my discussion of Byrne 
(2001) below.
 
38
not conceptually articulated.
The Adequacy Thesis states that a complete intrinsic characterization of an experience  can be given 
by embedding within an operator like “it  visually appears to the subject  t  at  ...”  some complex  
condition concerning physical objects.  One component of this condition might be that there is a  
black telephone in front of oneself and a bookshelf a certain distance and direction to one's left,  
above and behind which is a window.  Such contents can  equally be the contents of perceptual or  
hallucinatory experiences.7
This is  closely related to Jackson's epistemic ''looks'':  as  with judgement,  the psychology of an 
experience is exhausted by the propositional content and the attitude.  The arguments in favour of 
sense-data  rest  on  an  assumption  of  the  phenomenal  principle,  and  in  arguing  against  the 
phenomenal rendering of ''looks'' in interpreting ''y looks F to s'', I defended something close to the 
epistemic use of ''looks'' as the correct one.  Sense-data and adverbial modifications are but one type 
of phenomenal element, however.
The basic representationalist thesis (of those which accept that there is some representational 
content) is only that the psychology of experience supervenes on the representational content.  This 
is, as Byrne notes, a weak thesis.
the sensational component of a perceptual experience cannot vary independently of its intentional 
[representational]  component:  the  phenomenal  character  of  a  perceptual  experience  is  entirely 
determined by the experience's propositional content – that is, by what  it represents.
[representationalism] does not take a stand on whether phenomenal character can be  explained in  
terms of, or reduced to, intentionality [representation] – at least it doesn't if these claims don't follow 
from the mere fact of supervenience.  And intentionalism is silent on physicalism, functionalism,  
psychosemantics, and other topics relevant to ''naturalizing the mind''.8
On an anti-representational theory, a 'phenomenist' theory in Block's terms, there are elements of the 
psychology  of  the  experience  which  do  not  supervene  on  the  representational  content  of  the 
experience.
7 Peacocke (1983) p. 8.  I argue later for the conceptualist claim about propositional content.  As is common, I use 
'representational content' and 'propositional content' interchangeably.
8 Byrne (2001) p. 199; p. 204.  I also use 'intentional' and 'representational' interchangeably, as is common in the 
literature. 
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Phenomenism: The psychology of perception does not wholly supervene (if at 
all: ''strong'' phenomenism as opposed to a ''weak'' 
representationalism/phenomenism)  on  the  representational  
content.
Representationalism: The psychology of perception supervenes on the 
representational content.
And  within  representationalism,  there  is  the  contrast  between  reductive  and  non-reductive 
representationalism.9
Reductive rep.: The psychology of experience reduces to the representational 
content, or can be wholly identified with it.
Non-reductive rep.: The psychology of experience does not reduce to the 
representational content, but it does supervene upon it.
Phenomenist and non-reductive representationalist theories hold that not only is there a genuine 
phenomenal  character to perception, but that it either does not even supervene on the content, or 
that it merely supervenes.  Reductive representationalism holds that it not only supervenes on the 
content  but  is  identical  to  it.   However,  even reductive representationalism in this  sense is  not 
(necessarily) as strong as the theory that I am arguing for.  I am arguing that perceptions are a class 
of judgements individuate by their content (and some further features which will become relevant in 
the final two chapters).  Hence, I am denying that there is any constitutive phenomenal difference 
between perception and thought which cannot be analysed in these terms.
On  many  even  reductive  theories,  as  I  discuss  below,  the  psychology  of  perception  is 
identical to the content but these contents (and the attitude of perception as opposed to judgement) 
are not identical to the contents in thought.  Hence there is still an individuating phenomenal aspect 
of perception.  This phenomenal character is unique to perceptual experience and individuates it as 
a different mode of consciousness from non-perceptual thought.10
9 See Chalmers (2004) Section 4.
10 Theories which clearly analyse out the notion of phenomenal character in this sense include those in Dennett (1991) 
and (1997), Armstong (1968), and Pitcher (1971); less clearly Dretske (1995) may take himself to be analysing this 
notion out.  That Dretske analyses out the phenomenal is less clear-cut than in the other cases.  Tye (1995) and 
(2000) also comes close, but as with Dretske, it is not exactly clear that this is so.  Similarly to Dretske, Tye analyses 
''phenomenal character'' as a type of representational content, and thus states with qualia (see below) as states with 
this content.  Looking at things this way, only a judgement-theory of experiences or a "no-experiences" theory,  
which  Armstrong  (1968)  and  Pitcher  (1971)  arguably  are,  would  count  as  theories  on  which  there  is  a  full  
elimination of qualia.  Dennett (1991) and (1997) is something of a quasi-behaviourist, and so this is also a clear 
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There is a further option, namely "inverse representationalism", whereby the propositional 
content of experience supervenes on this phenomenal character.
Inverse rep.: The psychology of experience supervenes on the phenomenal 
character.
Reductive representationalism is the thesis that the psychology  is the propositional content (of a 
certain  kind),11 and  so  entails  inverse  and  non-reductive  representationalism.  The  inverse 
representational  analysis  is  that  experiences  have  propositional  content  because they  have 
phenomenal character and the former supervenes on the latter.  
Reductive  representationalism  identifies  the  psychology  with  the  propositional  content. 
Non-reductive  representationalism holds  only to  the  supervenience  of  phenomenal  character  on 
content.
Qualia are qualitative elements of the psychology of experience which cannot be analysed 
out in terms of (identified with, or analytically eliminated) representational content in the strong 
sense  in  which  I  am  arguing  for;  i.e.  they  are  features  of  perceptual  experiences  but  not  of 
judgements.12
Phenomenist Qualia: Non-representational properties in terms of which experience 
is (at least) partially analysed and which are not identical with 
the representational content, and which account for the 
phenomenal character of experience.
Phenomenist Qualia are introduced in contrast to "representational properties" in experience.  A 
representational property of experience M of s is defined here as s undergoing M being analysed as 
s bearing a relation of representation to a propositional content p.
Representational property: The property of an experience in virtue of which something is 
represented, and which accounts for elements of the 
psychology of experiences; e.g., the representational property 
that judgements have of being relations to propositions.
case of analysing out qualia in the strongest; Pitcher is an avowed behaviourist, about beliefs at any rate, and so this  
is a stronger theory also than mine.  Whether judgements, and hence experiences, are to be analysed further in such 
a way exceeds the scope of this thesis.  
11 Plus attitude.  I will sometimes omit this, but it is implied.
12 Some philosophers do hold that there are qualia in thought.  I reject this position which was, until very recently, the  
almost unquestioned standard view.  See chapter 4.
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Hence, we can define non-phenomenist qualia of two strengths.  Firstly, we have supervening but 
non-reductive qualia, which supervene on the content but are not reducible to it.  Secondly there are 
reductive qualia, which do reduce to the content but which are not features of judgements.  On this 
view, I think that these types of qualia are, essentially, non-conceptual contents.
What is, according to the way that matters are being set up, not a quale is a purely functional 
difference  between  experience  and  judgement.   I  can  desire  that  p and  judge  that  p,  and  the 
difference  between these two mental  acts  is  a  functional  difference  between attitudes.   This  is 
psychologically manifest,  certainly, but one would not say that this difference is a difference in 
qualia between desiring and judging.
According to Block, qualia are monadic, logically private, metaphysically exhausted by the 
way in which they are present to the mind, and are non-representational.  Qualia are  'phenomenal' 
properties, that are not 'intentional', 'functional', or 'purely cognitive'.13  Dennett, a sceptic, defines 
qualia  as  'ineffable',  'intrinsic',  logically  private',  and  'directly  or  immediately apprehensible  in 
consciousness'.14  
As the claims being made in this area are often difficult to tease apart, I will proceed by 
directly examining some statements of the central notions in the literature.  Qualia are introduced in 
terms of the "feel" of perceptual experience.  Here, for example, is Tye.
The explanation [of the introduction of qualia] typically proceeds along something like the following 
lines: there is something it is like to taste green Chartreuse, to hear a chainsaw, to smell a skunk, to  
see the clear blue sky.  Each of theses states has a distinctive subjective character or raw “feel” to it.  
These raw “feels” - qualia, as they are often called – resemble and differ from one another to varying 
degrees. The subjective “feel” of the experience of red, for example, is more like the subjective 
“feel” of the experience of orange than it is like the  subjective “feel” of the experience of green. 
Subjective “feels” or qualia are what make  the states possessing them phenomenally conscious.15
Lycan defines qualia as follows.
A quale in this sense is a qualitative or phenomenal property inhering in a sensory state: the  color of 
an after-image, or that of a more ordinary patch in one's visual field; the pitch or  volume or timbre 
of a subjectively heard sound; the smell of an odor; a particular taste; the  perceived texture of an  
object  encountered by touch.  (The term "inhering in"  in  the   preceding sentence is  deliberately 
vague,  and  neutral  on  as  many  metaphysical  issues  as   possible.  In  particular,  qualia  may  be 
13 See Block (1996) p. 44.
14 See Dennett (1997) p. 622.
15 Tye (2006a) p. 139
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properties  of the experiences in which they inhere, or they may be related to those experiences in  
some other way).
A quale  can  be  thought  of  as  the  distinctive  phenomenal  property  of  an  apparent  phenomenal 
individual. (An "apparent phenomenal individual" is anything of the sort that Bertrand Russell would 
have taken to be a "sense-datum," such as (again) a colored region of one's  visual field, or a heard  
sound or an experienced smell.) But it is important to see that qualia  in this sense do not presuppose 
the existence of sense-data or other exotica. Sensory fields  are pervaded by qualia both in everyday 
veridical experience and in less usual cases. In our  first-order sense of the term, the latter point is the  
merest common sense, and to deny it would be to take a very radical position.16
Chalmers refers to the 'phenomenal properties' of the experience or of the subject.
Consciousness involves the instantiation of  phenomenal properties.  These properties characterise 
aspects of what it is like to be a subject (what it is like to be me right now, or what it its like to be a  
bat), or what it is like to be in a mental state (what it is like to see a certain shade of green, or  
example, or what it is like to feel a certain sharp pain).17
Some  representationalists,  such  as  Dretske  and Tye,  occasionally put  their  view by saying  that  
phenomenal  properties  are  identical  to  certain  represented  external  properties,  such  as  physical 
redness.  As I am putting things, that would be a category mistake: phenomenal properties are by 
definition properties of subjects or mental states, and physical redness is not (or need not be).18
But  Dretske  and  Tye  are  not,  I  think,  making  a  category  mistake.19  Rather,  they  analyse  the 
phenomenal  properties  in  terms  of  representational  content.   In  experience,  the  represented 
properties, as Lycan puts it, 'inhere' in the experience in a way in which they do not in thought (by 
being represented non-conceptually and conceptually respectively,  which still  leaves us with the 
difference between perception and thought).  The same properties can be represented in thought. 
The  difference  is  one  of  representation.   “Phenomenal  properties”  is  ambiguous  between  the 
representation of a property in experience and that represented property itself.20  The phenomenal 
property in the latter sense is a property of an object experienced and in the former sense is the 
property that the experience has of (non-conceptually and therefore “phenomenally”) representing 
that property.
16 Lycan (2006) Section 1
17 Chalmers (2004) p. 155
18 Chalmers (2004) p. 157
19 Chalmers here is referring to Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995) and (2000).
20 Recall my discussion of the “look” of the dog.
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This  individuates  experiences  from thought,  however  this  difference  in  representation  is 
playing the same role as are the non-representational qualia properties to a certain degree.  The 
representational properties, in the sense just described, in experience differ from the representational 
properties in thought for Lycan, Dretske and Tye.  Hence, although in a sense these are reductive-
representational theories, if judgement is the comparison-case, then they are not fully reductive in 
the  sense  that  they  account  for  the  ''what  it  is  like''  of  experience,  and  do  not  analyse  it  out 
completely.  It is this, very strong, position that I am arguing for.  I am arguing, essentially, against 
the very notion of experiential ''what it is like''.
Here is  Levine making this  point about the qualitative property being a property of the 
object experienced.
On one way of understanding the intentionalist [representationalist] thesis, the qualitative character  
of R [the experience] is identical to R representing [for example] the redness of the  fire engine. 
Thus it is a property of R all right, but not an instrinsic one, since representing what it represents is  
not an intrinsic property of a symbol.  On another way of understanding the intentionalist thesis, 
however, the qualitative character of the experience just is the redness of the fire engine.21
Levine says that he is unsure if anyone actually holds the thesis that the qualitative character is the 
represented property.  The qualitative character  of  an experience, though, cannot literally be the 
represented  property.   Rather,  the  qualitative  character  involves,  as  Lycan puts  it,  the  property 
'inhering'  in the experience.   There is  thus an ambiguity in ''qualitative character''.   Those,  like 
Dretske,  who  defend  in  a  fashion  this  second  thesis  do  in  a  sense hold  that  the  ''qualitative 
character'' is identified with the visual qualities, i.e. those qualities available to be seen.  On this 
analysis, the experience is a representation of the visual properties.  And this representation does not 
have the qualities of its representata.  The  way in which these properties are represented is not 
phenomenal in the sense that either the propositional content or the subject's bearing a relation to 
that  content  has  any  properties  like  the  properties  of  the  representata.   Experiences  are 
''phenomenal''  because the objects  are  represented in  such a  way as  to,  as I  will  put  it,  ''make 
manifest'' the properties of the object of the experience.22  However, it does not follow from this that 
experiences have any special property over and above this.
Consider again the sense-data theory.  The (phenomenal) look of an external y, in the sense 
of the way that y looks to s in experience M, is analysed as s bearing R (on this theory, sensing) to x. 
The ''look of y'' in this sense is not the visual properties of x, but the sensing of x, for the properties 
of x must be sensed in order that there be any psychological effect on s:  the psychology of  M is 
21 Levine (2003) p. 59
22 See chapter 4.
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analysed as ''s senses x''.  This is a classic quale, albeit a relational quale.  Adverbial modifications 
are monadic qualia with the same features.  The look of y in the sense of its visual properties, i.e. 
the properties available to be seen, on the other hand, involve in a way which is convoluted to 
express the properties of x which are sensed and to which the sensed properties of y are related.
On the theory I am defending, M is s representing the visual properties of y in relation R to 
content p which picks it out or determines y, and is the psychology of M.
If I ask you about your experience, you would report that, e.g., "well, there is something red 
there"; you would not say "my experience is red", or "I am undergoing a red experience".  This is 
so,  even if  it  were to come from the mouth of a proponent of the the sense-data  theory.   The 
experience is not red, and neither is the sensing of the sense-datum red.  The sense-datum is red.  
The qualities of the sense-datum which is sensed account for the psychology of the experience in 
that they are what is sensed when the object is seen.  So, the correct formulation is "I am sensing a  
red thing".  "I am undergoing a red experience", or something very much like this, is true only on  
the adverbial theory, or something very much like it.  On a theory like this, sensations are, like a 
thumbprint  in  wax,  literally  monadic  modifications  to  the  "substance"  of  the  subject's  mind. 
Judgements are not like this, as they are not the exemplification of qualitative monadic properties, 
but relations to contents.
The  judgement-theory  of  experiences  is  that  experiences  are  judgements  about  the 
experienced object.  Hence, that the visual properties of the object of experience 'inhere', as Lycan 
puts it, in experience but not in judgement therefore gives rise to an immediate objection to the 
judgement-theory.
When I think of a particular red square (as opposed to just some red square), I am, speaking 
very loosely,  in a sense "aware" of this  red square in  that  it  is  before my mind.   However,  in 
experience I am genuinely aware of it and its qualities in a different way, a particularly phenomenal  
way.  The experience "has qualia".  According to Lycan, a property is a quale, in a sense, when it  
inheres in an experience.  Qualia, understood as mental properties, on this reading, are the inhering 
of properties in experience: the property of experiences of having properties presented in a certain 
way.   Sometimes  properties  are  qualia,  sometimes  not.   Being  a  quale  is  rather  like  being an 
intentional object, except that if F is a quale in M, then M is an experience, but if F is not a quale in 
N, even though in N s thinks of F, then N is not an experience.  On one type of this view, one shared 
by Dretske and Tye, for example, experiences are non-conceptual representations and for the subject 
to be in a state with this type of content is for the subject to have an experience with phenomenal 
character.  Although the psychology of experience reductively supervenes on the content, e.g. a non-
conceptual representation of a property  F, experiences still have qualia in the sense that ''there is 
something that it is like'' in a phenomenal sense to undergo them.
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The objection to the judgement theory is that these qualia, which are really representational 
contents of a certain type which certain states have, and the ''phenomenal character'' individuate 
experiences from thoughts.  Langsam makes this argument as follows.
what it is like to have a perceptual experience is very different, is obviously different, from what it is  
like to have a thought.  These differences extend to perceptual experiences and thoughts that have the  
same contents.   For example, what it  is like to have a visual experience of a red object is very 
different from what it is like to have a thought of a red object.  Similarly, what it is like to have a  
visual experience of a red object is very different from what it is like to have a thought of a blue  
object.   But  such  differences  in  phenomenal  character  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  terms  of  the 
differing contents of the experience and its corresponding thought, for … the experience and thought 
can have the same content and yet  still differ in phenomenal character.23
It is not immediately obvious to me that this difference involves non-representational psychological 
properties or a different type of content in experience.  Langsam, arguing the contrary, continues.
We are assuming that the only consciously accessible feature of a thought is its content.  We are also  
assuming a picture of perceptual  experience according to which the phenomenal character of an 
experience is determined solely by its consciously accessible features.  Given  these assumptions, it 
seems plausible to me that the only way to account for the difference in  phenomenal character  
between an experience and a thought with the same content is to claim that what determines the 
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is not its content, but a feature of some other kind. 
In other words, perceptual experiences have nonintentional (intrinsic) features that are consciously 
accessible  and  that  determine  their  phenomenal  character:  qualia.   The  phenomenal  differences 
between experiences and thoughts with the same contents are naturally described in terms of the 
presence  or  absence  of  certain  kinds  of  appearances.   In  brief,  appearances  are  are  present  in 
perceptual experiences, and are not present in thoughts.  When I have a visual experience of red, 
something looks or appears red to me; at the very least,  it is as if something looks red to me.  But 
when I merely have a thought of a red object, nothing appears any way at all to me, and it is not even  
as if something appears red to me.24
Langsam uses 'phenomenal character' to cover a quality possessed both by perceptual experiences 
and non-perceptual thought, however the point is clear: there is a difference between experience and 
thought, namely the presence of the particular phenomenal quality of perceptual experience that is 
lacking in non-perceptual thought.
23 Langsam (2000) pp. 273-274
24 Langsam (2000) p. 274
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In the following famous passage, Nagel ascribes to mental states this quality which resists 
analysis into other terms.  Experience is but one case. 
fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like  
to  be that organism – something that it is like  for the organism.  We may call this the subjective 
character of experience.  It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses  
of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence.  It is not analysable in terms  
of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states since these could be ascribed to  
robots or automota that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.25
The purported failure of such analyses rests on the argument that physical-functional reductions 
must leave out this quality in the analysans.
Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced.  If the analysis 
leaves  something  out,  the  problem will  be  falsely posed.   It  is  useless  to  base  the  defence  of 
materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective  
character.  For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which  seems plausible when no attempt 
is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness.  Without some idea, 
therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of a 
physicalist theory.26
My interest is in whether there really is this phenomenal quality to the psychology of perceptual 
experience which resists analysis into representational, or intentional, terms, and if this can then 
further be extended into an analysis in terms of the notion of judgement. That is, I am not offering 
an analysis of the notion that Rosenthal identifies as 'creature consciousness', i.e. the concept of a 
subject being conscious  tout court.  Rather, my interest is in reducing the analysis of one kind of 
what Rosenthal identifies as 'state consciousness', that of experience, to another, that or judgement.27 
Block makes a precise distinction in this regard, between 'phenomenal' and 'access' consciousness.
Phenomenal  consciousness  is  experience.   P-conscious  properties  are  experiential  properties  P-
conscious states are experiential states, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties.  
The totality of the experiential properties of a state are “what it is like” to have it.  Moving from 
synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. 
P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions,  
25 Nagel (1997) p. 519
26 Nagel (1997) pp. 519-520
27 Obviously, if  s is state conscious in that  s is in  M and  M is a conscious state, then  s is creature conscious.  See 
Rosenthal (1986).
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but I would also include thoughts, wants, and emotions ... I take P-conscious properties to be distinct 
from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property.28
A state is A-conscious if it is poised for direct control of thought and action.  To add more detail, a  
representation is A-conscious if it is posed for free use in reasoning and direct “rational” control of  
action  and speech ...  An A-state  is  one  that  consists  in  having  an  A-  representation.   I  see  A-
consciousness as a cluster concept in which reportability is the element of the cluster that has the  
smallest weight even though it is often the best practical guide to A-consciousness.29
The paradigm A-conscious state is a judgement, and the paradigm phenomenally-conscious state is 
a wholly qualitative ''sensation''.  The significant contrast is between non-phenomenal thoughts and 
phenomenal perceptual experiences.  The question is, in these terms, whether P-properties can be 
analysed in terms of A-properties.  Mere supervenience is not enough for the analytical elimination 
of  P-properties  in  terms  of  A-properties.   What  is  required  for  the  complete  elimination  of  P-
properties is that experiences be taken to have not only the A-properties that judgements have in this 
functional sense, but that they also have the same type of contents which facilitate these functional 
properties.30
Recall Peacockes' definition of 'a set of propositions, which specifies the way the experience 
represents the world to be'.  In arguing that experiences have contents, I am committing to Pautz's 
'identity thesis':  '[experiences] are  identical  with  relations to  contents,  somewhat  as beliefs and 
desires are identical  with relations to contents.   The claim, then,  concerns the structure or real 
definition of experiences'.31  Pautz contrasts the identity conception with two others, the 'accuracy' 
and  the  'appearance-looks'  conceptions,  both  of  which  he  takes  to  render  the  assertion  that 
experiences  have  contents  to  be  uncontroversial.   What  is  controversial  is  whether  or  not 
experiences are to be constitutively analysed in terms of a relation to a proposition.32  
Representational properties are relations in which the subject stands which render the mental 
act that has that representational content "intentional of", "intended towards", "directed upon", or 
"about", the objects picked out or determined by that content.  This object is the intentional object,  
28 Block (1997) pp. 380-381
29 Block (1997) p. 382
30 Byrne (2009b) neatly distinguishes between sensory, sensational, and sensible properties.  A sensible property is a 
property of an external object.  A sensational property is a property of a sense-datum.   A sensory property is a  
property of the act of experiencing (i.e. not a second-order property of involving a sensible or sensational property).  
The reductive representational theory is that the "sensory properties" of M are analysed as a relation between s and p 
in that what M is 'like' for the subject is "that p".  This is a different question from what the sensible or sensational 
properties are like: recall the ambiguity of ''the look of y''.  With regard to the representational theory, one position is 
that experiences have sensational properties which themselves supervene on the terms.
31 Pautz (2009) p. 484
32 The appearance-looks conception stipulates only that it is true that 'it looks to s that p' and the accuracy conception 
that   the experience is 'accurate'.  Both of these can be accepted as non-constitutive claims.  See also Byrne (2009a).
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and this  intentional,  or  representational,  directedness  is  famously identified by Brentano as  the 
'mark' of the mental.  If M can be characterised as having a representational property, then M is a 
relation to some content p.
I am arguing that the representational content exhausts the psychology of experience, and in 
the experience having this content the intentional object picked out or determined by the content is 
experienced.33  The way in which the experience represents the world as being is not identical to that 
which  is  represented,  for  I  may  represent  something  square  and  yet  the  way  in  which  it  is 
represented is not square, and I may represent the same object in different ways.   The way in which 
things are represented is not identical to the act of representing, for the way in which things are  
represented can be shared among different acts of representing.34  In having a propositional content 
as the content of an experience, it is not that this content is what is perceived; rather, the object is 
what is perceived, and the content is the way in which it is perceived.35  The content, the way in 
which  things  are  perceived,  is  the  psychological component  of  the  experience,  and  the  thing 
perceived in this way is the object of the perception.
On  the  representational  theory,  the  psychological  look,  the  subjective  element,  is  the 
propositional content.  But the propositional element of the experience does not interpose itself in 
the way that the sense-datum does, it is not an object of awareness in any sense, but it accounts for 
the structure of the awareness of the perceived object in a way which does not render the relation 
indirect.  If I lift the bag by one handle, and then by the other, I have lifted the same bag twice but 
in two different ways.  Neither of these two ways of lifting the bag, once by one handle and then by 
the other, renders the lifting indirect, or the interposes some entity between myself and the bag in 
performing the action.  Likewise on the representational theory: representing y respectively under a 
content featuring the property F and under a content featuring the property G explains, is indeed the 
analysis of, the differing psychologies in respect of these two experiences, but in both cases the 
same y is directly perceived, as the representational content is not an object of experience.  All this 
is true of judgement also, and I am arguing that there need be no extra phenomenal element of 
experiences which judgements lack and which is constitutive of experiences as individuated as a 
type of  mental  act  from judging.   Having elucidated the representational  theory,  I  now turn to 
discuss one main argument in favour of it, the transparency argument.  
33 This may appear slightly misleading.  It is not that s experiences that p, and therefore s experiences y as p picks out 
or determines  y.  It  is that this is the analysis of  s experiencing  y under content  p.  There is no logical priority 
involved.
34 See Grossman (1974) for a discussion of the introduction of this act, content, object distinction in the Brentanian 
tradition.  There are close similarities between this and Frege's distinction between sense and the reference.  See,  
e.g., Follesdall (1969).
35 See Crane (2006) pp. 136-137, and Martin (2002a) p. 382 for two different ways of making this point, although 
neither are sympathetic to the theory being proposed here.  Siegel (2007) p. 127 also makes this point.
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2  Moore and The Transparency Argument
The transparency argument is a standard argument outlined in defence of representationalism.  A 
classic statement of the argument is the following from Harman.
Eloise is aware of the tree [that she is seeing] as a tree that she is now seeing.  So, we can suppose  
that she is aware of some features of her current visual experience.  In particular, she is aware that  
her current visual experience has the feature of being an experience of seeing a tree.  That is to be 
aware of an intentional feature of her experience; she is aware that her experience has a certain  
content.  On the other hand, I want to argue that she is not aware of those intrinsic features of her  
experience by virtue of which it has that content. Indeed, I believe that she has no access at all to the  
intrinsic features of her mental representation that make it a mental representation of seeing a tree.
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colours she experiences are all experienced as  features of the  
tree and its surroundings.  None of them are experienced as intrinsic features  of her experience.  Nor 
does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of  her experience.  And that is true  
of you too.  There is nothing special about Eloise's visual  experience.  When you see a tree, you do 
not experience any features as intrinsic features of  your experience.  Look at a tree and try to turn 
your attention to intrinsic features of your  visual experience.  I predict you will find that the only 
features there to turn your attention to  will be features of the presented tree, including relational  
features of the tree ''from here''.36
The  intrinsic  features  of  experience  which  Harman  claims  are  not  manifest  in  having  that 
experience, are the physical-functional features of the brain.  This should not be surprising, for these 
intrinsic features constitute (or realise) the mental state which is a representation to me of other 
things, and not these features.  Call the basic form of this argument 'relational transparency'.
Relational transparency: Introspection reveals only apparent properties of the objectual 
relata of experience, and not any properties of the experience.
An  extension  to  relational  transparency would  be  that  the  properties  and  objects  presented  in 
perceptual experience are properties of mind-independent objects.  Thus, if sense-data or, say, after-
images  are  mind-dependent  then  experience  of  these  would  not  satisfy this  stronger  version.37 
Relational  transparency,  I  think,  is  not  quite true,  as  introspection  reveals  that  experience  is  a 
relation,  however  this  does  not  undercut  the  transparency  argument,  at  least  insofar  as  I  am 
36 Harman (1997) p. 667
37 See Stoljar (2004) Section 2 for a discussion of this.  Martin (2002a) argues for the stronger version.
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defending it, for the same is true of judgement.  
In experience, the relata are brought before the mind and introspection will not reveal any 
qualitative features of the experience, but introspection will reveal that the experience is a relation 
between myself  and the relata,  whereas  this  relation is  not  revealed  in the experience.   Moore 
famously introduced the transparency discussion in discussion of sense-data.
Though philosophers have recognised that something distinct is meant by consciousness, they have 
never yet had a clear conception of what that something is ... the moment we try to fix our attention 
upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before  
us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the  
other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet is can be distinguished if we look attentively enough 
and we know what to look for.38
Hellie (2007) argues for an interpretation of Moore which I will now summarise.  Moore analyses 
what we would now call the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, traditionally "an act of 
sensation", in terms of 'consciousness' and the properties of the objects of consciousness.  
The analysans of "s  has a sensation of a blue object" features  s,  consciousness,  and (an 
instance of) the property blue.  The analysans of "s has a sensation of a green object" would feature 
s, consciousness and (an instance of) the property green.  The difference is analysed in terms of the 
differing  properties  of  the  object  of  experience  (for  Moore,  the  'objects'  are  properties).   The 
similarity is due to the shared element of 'consciousness'.  Consciousness is a relation, R, between a 
subject and an instance of a property.  For experience M to have a ''blue phenomenal character'' is 
for M to be s bearing R to blue.  And for M to have a ''green phenomenal character''  is for M to be s 
bearing  R to green.  Experiences are instances of the dyadic universal  consciousness.  Moore is 
arguing that the relation  consciousness which is exemplified in the case of  s seeing green and  s 
seeing blue is not "psychologically qualified" (my phrase) other than by the difference in relata.  
The two competing theories, which Moore argues against by arguing for the 'relational' view, 
are the 'content' and 'identity' views.  On the latter, (in modern terms) the phenomenal character of 
an experience of blue is itself blue.  The phenomenal character of an experience of green is itself 
green (what Peacocke would call green`).  Against this, Moore makes the following point.
when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to 
suppose that we have before us only a single term.  The term 'blue' is easy enough to distinguish, but  
the other element which I have called 'consciousness'  - that which sensation of blue has in common 
with sensation of green – is extremely difficult to fix.  That many people fail to distinguish it at all is  
38 Moore (1903) p. 442
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sufficiently shown by the fact  that  there are materialists.  And,  in general,  that  which makes the 
sensation  of  blue  a  mental  fact  seems  to  escape  us:  it  seems,  if  I  may use  a  metaphor,  to  be 
transparent – we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there  is  
something but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognized.39
The element of consciousness is 'extremely difficult to fix'.  The reason for this is that the property 
we are conscious of is evidently manifest in a way that is, it could perhaps be put, stronger or more 
vivid than the consciousness element.40  Moore's point is that in experience objects are presented. 
We are presented with properties and relations, but in introspection what is before the mind is the 
appearance, or the experience, of these objects and properties.  This is a relation, and hence these 
objects are present as the relata of relations which themselves  are the objects of  introspection.  The 
mistake we ought not to make is to confuse the relata of the relation, and any of their properties, 
with the relation being introspected.  The relation is there, but, to adapt Moore to my own position, 
it is there in the same way that the judging relation is there when I introspect my judgement that p, 
as opposed to merely judging that p.
Hellie responds on behalf of the proponent of the identity view that perhaps the phenomenal 
character associated with experiences of blue and green are different but similar because blue and 
green,  the  qualities  experienced,  are  both  determinates  of  the  determinable  property  of 
consciousness.  
However, consciousness is a relation which I am in to green and blue.  There is difficulty in 
attributing a property to this relation in the way that we attribute it to an object.   To say that the 
relation has a  property in  one case and another  in another  either  means,  for  example,  that  the 
relation holds between something green in one case and something blue in the other, or it is to say 
that, so to speak, the fabric of the relation itself, has some property (is “qualified” as I put it above). 
And this would be at least  introspectible  and likely manifest in the relation itself.  On the (now 
rather  unfortunately  named)  content  view,  the  property  (of  the  object)  experienced  is  either  a 
property of consciousness,  which is  a substance,  and thus an experience with blue phenomenal 
character is an instance of the property blue being exemplified by the substance of consciousness, or 
both  blue and also consciousness are monadic universals which when co-exemplified result in an 
experience which can be said to be one which has blue phenomenal character.41
39 Moore (1903) p. 446.  The remark about materialists is confusing to me.
40 It is sometimes put that it is "phenomenologically impressive".
41 See Hellie (2007) Section 2.4.  Something like the former is perhaps Brentano's original view. For example, Smith 
says the following of Brentano's original theory. 'For at the time of the first edition of the  Psychology  Brentano 
conceives  physical  phenomena  like  experienced  colours  and  sounds  as  existing  in  the  mind  as  parts  of  
consciousness, so that the intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the 
(real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed ... they are entia rationis, 
non-real parts of a real, mental substance ... the mind or soul is windowless; our acts of thought and sensation are 
directed in every case to what exists immanently within it, i.e. to those acts themselves or to immanent data of  
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Moore's relational view is that sensations are instance of the dyadic relation consciousness 
which hold between a subject and a property (of an object).   As Hellie neatly puts it, the object (or 
its property) 'saturates the second argument position of [the relation] consciousness'.42
According to Moore, introspection provides evidence of the relational view as against the 
content view if one is careful enough in one's introspection.  Moore is arguing both for the falsity of 
the content view and for the logical independence of the object of experience and instances of the 
relation  consciousness.   Once  it  has  been  established,  through  introspection,  that  perceptual 
experience has an act-object structure, idealism, which can be understood as the theory that the 
property experienced owes its exemplification to the existence of the experience of it, so to speak 
has the rug pulled out from under it: why believe in an idealist theory?43  However, this observation 
was also premised on the introspection of the fact that an experience of F and an experience of G 
differ not in the substance of the relation, or in a property that the relation has other than its having 
these different terms.
In the passage preceding the famous diaphanousness passage quoted above, Moore states the 
following.
A sensation is, in reality a case of "knowing" or "being aware of" or "experiencing something" ... 
This  relation  is  just  that  which  we  mean  in  every case  by "knowing".  To  have  in  your  mind 
"knowledge" of blue is not to have in your mind a "thing" or "image" of which blue is the content. 
To be aware of a sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image -  of a "thing", of which 
"blue" and some other elements are constituent parts in the same sense  in which blue and glass are 
constituent of a bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness in both cases is exactly the  
same.44
Thus, there is a distinction between the awareness of blue, i.e. the awareness that is the undergoing 
of  a  sensation,  and the  awareness  is  introspecting  the  sensation.   In  the  former  case,  there  is  
awareness of  the object  and its  properties and in  the latter  case there is  awareness still  of the 
sensible property in that the object is still experienced, but there is also awareness of the relation of 
consciousness.  However, being aware of blue, i.e. undergoing a sensation of something blue, and 
sense'.  Smith (1994) p. 41
42 Hellie (2007) p. 345.
43 See Hellie (2007) Section 3.  For example, in Moore (1903): 'I believe that every argument used to show that reality 
is spiritual has inferred (validly or invalidly) from “esse is percipi” as one of its premises; and that this again has 
never been pretended to be proved except by the use of the premise that "esse is percipi”. p437; "I will undertake to 
show," says Mr Taylor, "that what makes (any piece of fact) real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable  
aspect of a sentient experience". I am glad to think that Mr. Taylor has been in time to supply me with so definite a  
statement that this is the ultimate premiss of idealism.  My paper will at least refute Mr. Taylor's idealism if it refutes 
anything at all: for I  shall  undertake to show that what makes s thing real cannot possibly be its presence as an 
inseparable aspect of a sentient experience'. p. 438
44 Moore (1903) p. 449
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being aware of the sensation, i.e. introspecting the sensation or being aware of being aware of blue,  
submits to a univocal reading of ''aware''.45  
And in the latter case, I am not aware of anything blue: I am aware of an awareness of blue.  
There is nothing, as we would put it, qualitative about the relation of sensation as there is about the 
object of the sensation.  As Moore's argument is from introspection, it is of course possible to deny 
it.  However, it seems to me that Moore is correct about introspection, and all I can do is agree with  
Moore that introspection  does reveal that experience is relational, and that the experience is not 
"phenomenally qualified" in any way.  It is not qualified in the sense that it has a "qualitative" 
property in either of the following senses.  One, that it has an intrinsic visual qualification common 
to all visual experiences and absent in other mental acts which have their own modality-specific 
qualification.  Two, that it has a visual qualification that supervenes on the properties of the terms. 
Three, that it has any psychological qualification which distinguishes it from judgement.
To say that instances of the  consciousness relation are transparent is to say that they are 
''diaphanous'' in the sense that in all cases I experience the objects presented via the relation, and not 
any properties  of  the  relation  itself  when I  am in  the  relation.   The relation  makes  the  terms  
psychologically manifest, and that is all.  This is not to say that it is transparent to the mind in the  
sense that a perfect plane of glass would be transparent in that were I to look through it I would not 
register its presence.  On the contrary, I can register the presence of the relation in introspection,  
only  the  registering  of  the  relation  reveals  in  each  case  instances  of  the  very  same  relation, 
consciousness but with different terms (i.e. things experienced).46
Consider the view that experiences are qualified by their relata.  When I am conscious of F, 
and when I am conscious of G, it is true that I am in both cases bearing relation R to F and G, only 
the  relation  is  somehow qualified.  However,  the  relation,  i.e.  the  instance  of  consciousness,  is 
qualified in both cases by the fact that the terms are different.  This could be put as in (3) and (4).
(3) s is conscious of F, and s's conscious relation is qualified in manner F*
(4) s is conscious of G, and s's conscious relation is qualified in manner G*
Not only do I think that this is shown to be unsupported by introspection, but I do not think that it is 
likely to  be  theoretically necessary in  a  wider  context.   Consider  the  following analogy.   The 
number 1 is less than the number 2, and the number 1 is also less than the number 3.  Express this as 
two instances of the less than universal in (5) and (6).
(5) The number 1 stands in relation < to the number 2
45 Price (1932) also shares this view.  Martin (1998) notes this rarely commented on point.
46 'Register' here is neutral and compatible with any theory of introspection.
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(6) The number 1 stands in relation < to the number 3
Is the universal qualified in its instances by the terms between which it holds?  If we were to take as 
an  analysandum the  difference  between  what  is  expressed  as  (5)  and  (6),  we  would  have  as 
resources in the analysans the dyadic universal  less than, and the terms which it takes in the two 
states of affairs.  That the numbers 1, 2, and 3 are unique particulars with certain properties allows 
us to explain the difference between (5) and (6) without qualifying the universal in any way.  Of 
course, constitutive questions immediately arise as to the relations between the properties of the 
numbers, e.g. where they stand on the number line, and the relations that they bear to other numbers 
as expressed in (5) and (6), and so on.  However, I think that whatever is said about this, in this case 
the difference between (5) and (6) resides in the terms, not in the universal.   Experience is another 
case of this feature of relations.  Compare this with the claim that, say, an experience of red has a 
qualification to the experiential relation, and an experience of, say, green, a different one.  Compare 
this further to the claim that there is such a difference between modalities, and then further to the 
claim that there is such a difference between experience and thought.
Let me move on now to apply the transparency thesis, and this reading of Moore's argument, 
to the representational theory.
3  Transparency and Representationalism
Stoljar (2004) calls an analysis of the kind Moore gives a form the 'relational thesis'.
The relational thesis The phenomenal character of an experience is wholly
determined by the objects that one is related to in having the 
experience.47
Subscribers to the relational thesis include proponents of sense-data and the disjunctive theory.  On 
a relational theory, even a sense-data theory, the psychology of the experience, i.e. how things are 
subjectively for the subject, will not be identical to the properties of the objects.  As Stoljar says, it 
is determined by this in that the relation that this element of the experience is takes these objects as 
terms.  He describes representationalism as a denial of the relational thesis in the following way.
According to intentionalism [representationalism] ... to have an experience is in effect to stand in a  
47 This extends presumably to their properties and to the relations in which they stand.
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relation to some intentional object – say a property or proposition. Against the background of that  
approach, the relational thesis tells us that the phenomenal character of the experience is determined 
by features of the proposition or property that is the intentional object of the experience.48
However,  recall  my  agreement  with  Crane,  Martin  and  Siegel  at  the  end  of  §1  about 
representational  contents  and  represented,  or  intentional,  objects.   If  we  consider  the  thought 
expressed by the sentence ''my neighbour's dog enjoys swimming in the sea'',  the intentional object 
is my neighbour's dog.49  What is conveyed to in judging this is  that my neighbour's dog enjoys 
swimming in the sea, but this content is not something that the subject's mental act is about.  My 
neighbour's dog's enjoyment of swimming in the sea, this state of affairs, is not identical to the 
content  that  my neighbour's  dog enjoys  swimming in the sea.   Just  as  Moore cautioned not  to 
identify  a  sensation  of  blue  with  the  blue,  so  there  is  another  distinction  necessary here,  that 
between the intentional object and the representational content.  We have,  therefore,  a tripartite 
distinction between the act, the content and the object.
We can distinguish between two readings of the relational theory.  Stoljar's is what could be 
called  the  objectual-relational  thesis,  the  other  could  be  precisified  as  the  representational-
relational thesis.
The rep-relational thesis: The phenomenal character of an experience is wholly 
determined by the contents that one is related to in 
having the experience.
I am proposing an analysis of experience as a three-place relation, and thus as a relation to a content 
and an object.  On this theory, representing that  p  is what it is to experience the object,  y, as  p 
determines or picks out  y.  p is the psychology of the experience, the way in which, or how, y is 
experienced.  It is the subjective element of M, the way y looks in this sense, and not the way that y 
is  when  it  is  seen,  namely  the  visual  properties  of  y.   There  are  no  qualia:  no  psychological 
properties of  M which do not reduce to  p (as the proposition of attitude R).  It does not follow, I 
argue, from the fact that experiences make psychologically manifest the visual properties in a way 
that thought does not, that there is a corresponding element of the psychology, i.e. an element of the  
psychology which features in the analysans of "s experiences that p" and not "s judges that p".  On 
the  proposed theory,  the  representational-relational  thesis  accounts  for  the  psychology,  and the 
objectual-relational thesis refers only to the visual properties: the two are compatible.
48 Stoljar (2004)
49 Or the state of affairs of his enjoying swimming in the sea.  Nothing turns on this distinction, and I will talk of the  
intentional or represented objects rather than states of affairs.
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Suppressing the triadic nature of R and the relation between p and y, i.e. the relation between 
the content and the visual properties, (7) is a paraphrase of (1) using the neutral construction "s 
experiences  as-of  an  F".   The  reductive-representational  analysis  of  the  psychology  of  the 
experience in  (7) is (8).
(1) y looks F to s.
(7) s experiences as-of an F.
(8) s bears R to p.
p features in some way the property F.
The weaker non-reductive theory holds that the psychology is only determined by the relation to 
this content, not exhausted by this relation: there are some other psychological elements involved in 
(1) and (7) which (8) does not capture.
Kind makes a well-known distinction between 'weak' and 'strong transparency' with regard 
to the representational theory.
Strong transparency: it is  impossible to attend directly to our experiences, i.e. we cannot
attend to our experiences except by attending to the object represented 
by that experience.
Weak Transparency: it is difficult (but not impossible) to attend directly to our experience, 
i.e. we can most easily attend to our experience by attending to the  
objects represented by that experience.50
Reductive representationalism rests on Strong Transparency, but Strong Transparency must allow 
that the fact that the experience is a relation that can be introspected.  Kind puts it that one can come 
to attend to the experience in virtue of attending to the objects presented.  I would interpret this as  
the claim that there are no elements manifest in experience other than the objects presented, and, in 
introspection, than this fact  about experience.  Introspecting the experience is considering  how it  
looks, the psychological look, and not taking it to look that way; i.e., in experience I am related to 
50 Kind (2003) p. 230.  Kind, like Tye, is apt to put this that we 'attend' to experiences 'by attending' to the objects of 
the experience, and that we come to know of the phenomenal character of experience by attending to the objects of 
the experience.  So, in experience I see the blue of the sea and in introspection I attend to the blue of the sea again.  
However, by introspecting the experience by attending to the blue I come to be aware of the phenomenal character.  
This seems mysterious to me, as it looks to me like attending to the blue will not reveal any more than that was  
revealed in the experience, for the experience is attending to the blue.  Unless 'attend' means something necessarily 
distinct from this, but I do not see how it can.  To experience the blue is to be aware of it, or to attend to it.  I can  
focus on it, in the sense of paying careful attention to it, but this again is a type of experience.
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something blue, but in introspection I am related to its looking blue.  In order to introspect an 
experience as-of an F, one must be having such an experience.  I take this to be the point made by 
the mention of attending to the blue in order to introspect the experience: but these are two distinct  
mental acts.  When I introspect my experience, the experience, and not its objects, are the objects of 
the experience.  Looking at things from within the experience, there are no qualia, and there are no 
qualia to be discerned upon full introspective consideration of how the experience is from within it, 
but consideration of the experience ''from above'' reveals that the experience is a relation.
Carrying this over from Moore, then, if (9) is the content of the experience, then (10) is the 
content of the introspection.
(9) p
(10) I experience that p
 (it looks to me that p)
A much-discussed defence of transparency was given by Tye as follows.
Standing on a beach ...  I  found myself  transfixed by the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean … I  
experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience.  My experience itself  
certainly was not blue.  Rather it was an experience that represented the ocean as blue.  What I was  
really delighting in, then, were specific aspects of the content of my experience.  It was the content,  
not anything else, that was immediately accessible to my consciousness.51
Tye formulates the transparency argument as an argument against being able to 'directly' discern 
qualities of experiences as follows.
When we introspect our experiences ... we become aware of what it is like for us to undergo them.  
But we are not directly aware of those experiences ...  nor are we directly aware of any of their 
qualities.  The qualities to which we have direct access are the external ones, the qualities that, if  
they are qualities of anything, are qualities of external things.  By being aware of these qualities, we  
are aware of phenomenal character.52
This again contains the curious, to me at any rate, point that by attending to the blue I can come to  
know of the phenomenal character of my experience.  However, this cannot be correct, for the blue 
is what the experience is of.  In attending to the experience, I am attending to the experience of this 
51 Tye (1992) p. 160
52 Tye (2002a) p. 148
 
58
blue,  and not  experiencing the  blue.   'Directly'  here  means  something that  I  am aware  in the 
experience, and the argument is that in the experience no properties of the experience are made 
manifest.  In a another passage defending the transparency argument, Tye makes a similar point.
It seems to me that what I found so pleasing in the above instance, what I was focusing on, as it  
were, were a certain shade and intensity of the colour blue.  I experienced blue as a property of the  
ocean not as a property of my experience.  My experience itself certainly wasn't blue. Rather, it was 
an experience that represented the ocean as blue.  What I was really delighting in, then, was a quality 
represented by the experience.   It  was the colour,  blue,  not  anything else that  was immediately 
accessible to my consciousness and that I found so pleasing.  This point, I might note, seems to be  
the sort of thing G.E. Moore had in mind when he remarked that the sensation of blue is diaphanous. 
When one tries to focus on  it in introspection one cannot help but see right through it so that what 
one actually ends up attending to is the real colour blue.53
Representing  the content of the experience by (11),  as on the representational theory then (12) 
would be the content of the introspection.
(11) The ocean is that shade of blue.
(12) It looks to me that: the ocean is that shade of blue
This  relation is  the  consciousness   relation,  as Moore would have put  it,  and if  all  there is  in 
experience is (11), then all there is in introspection is the relation that one has to the (11).54  On the 
representational  theory,  this  relation  is  a  relation  to  a  content  which  gives  the  experience  its 
psychological component.  In (11), I experience the blue of the sea: but keep distinct the visual 
properties, i.e. the blue of the sea, from its looking blue in the psychological sense.  Even if by 
being related to the (11), I am related to the visual properties, (12) will reveal no more than this.  In  
(12),  I  introspect  the  experience,  i.e.  I  "look  at  the  experience  with  my mind's  eye".   As  the 
experience is not blue, I do not directly introspect something blue: rather, I introspect the content 
that the sea is that shade of blue.  This, on the representational theory, is the phenomenal character.55
The  opposing  view,  Kind's  Weak  Transparency,  is  that  there  are  other  psychological 
elements in experience.  Loar characterises this competing position as follows. 
53 Tye (2003) p. 10
54 Loar makes this point: '[an intuition is that] visual experience is transparent: when you attend to a visual experience 
as it  is going on, you will notice its objects,  i.e. the things you see or apparently see, including their apparent  
properties and relations, and you will notice your (diaphanous) visual relation to those external objects and relations; 
and, representationalists say, that is all'.  Loar  (2003) p. 77
55 Recall that according to, e.g., Tye and Dretske, the content is non-conceptual, and this is why there is a difference 
between experience and thought.
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normal visual experiences of the surface property of being red, which may be a primary or secondary 
quality, have a distinct intrinsic and introspectible property that we may call 'red*'.  This property is  
the subjective feel of those visual experiences, what it is like to have them.  Red* is a paradigm 
visual  quale;  and according to most  proponents of qualia we can discern it  by reflecting on our 
experiences, and thereby be aware of it  as a purely qualitative property of experience and not a 
property of ordinary objects of experience.  Similar intuition, though not so initially obvious, reveals 
shape qualia: while angularity is a feature of things out there in space, angularity* and its countless 
forms are visual qualia.56
Normal  red  is  a  property  of  'ordinary  objects  of  experience',  but  red*  is  a  'purely  qualitative 
property'  and not a 'property of ordinary objects of experience'.   The present question concerns 
whether or not (8) ought to make reference to property F*.  If it ought to, then even if in experience 
something like  (11)  is  the  content,  introspection  should  reveal  more  than  (12).   On the  above 
example, (12) should mention the blue* of experience, however this is analysed.
4  Conclusion
Having introduced the representational theory, and explained what I take to be Moore's transparency 
argument (and Harman's), I then elucidated this with respect to the representational theory.  I agree 
with (this reading of)  Moore.  In the next chapter, I outline the commitments that are required to  
argue against the non-reductive representational theory.  I then move on to the reductive theory, and 
thenceforth to argue that we can, should this be accepted, which I think it should, eliminate the 
notion of the phenomenal as canonically conceived.
56 Loar (2003) pp. 77-78
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Chapter 3  Defending Representationalism: Some More Specifics on Qualia
1  Introduction
Although I cannot submit a full-dress defence of representationalism here due to space-constraints, 
it  is important to show exactly what the commitments of the theory are,  and to show how the 
arguments allayed against it can be met.  In this chapter, I discuss some of the arguments against the 
supervenience thesis, and argue that these arguments can be replied to.  Thus, after defending the 
supervenience  claim  by  rebutting  the  arguments  against  it,  I  can  move  on  to  the  reductive 
representational theory.  In §2, I discuss some standard arguments for phenomenist qualia, and I 
answer specifically the argument from blurry vision.  In §3, I discuss the strength of the thesis 
required, and in §4 I argue that the inverted spectrum argument can be met.  Thus, I am in a position 
in chapter 4 to argue from the position that there are no elements in the psychology of experience 
which deviate from the content.  From there, I go on to argue that we can eliminate the notion of the 
phenomenal as a psychological quality that experiences have, and judgements do not.
2  Blurry Vision and Other “Standard” Arguments Against Non-Reductive Representationalism
The first set of arguments that I will discuss against the representational theory are the phenomenist 
arguments.  These are arguments to the effect that there are psychologically manifest elements of 
experiences which do not supervene on the representational content.  These are rather reminiscent 
of the arguments for sense-data, although they do not presuppose the phenomenal principle and 
hence sense-data and the sensing relation.
Peacocke  (1983)  introduced  some  by  now  "standard"  arguments  for  elements  of  the 
psychology of  experience  which  do not  supervene  on the  content.   His  most  famous  example 
concerns two trees of different size but seen at a distance such that they "take up the same size in 
the visual field".  This latter property is psychologically manifest, and not represented as a property  
of the two trees, for they are represented as being differently sized.  However, recall my discussion 
from chapter 1 of the visual field.  This argument is very reminiscent of those for sense-data, and I  
think that this argument for a visual field, or similar such properties, in this sense succeeds no more 
than it did before.  The trees are seen as being different distances away, and the visual field in the 
sense  argued  for  by  Peacocke  is  not  something  psychologically  manifest  in  experience,  or 
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introspection, but, as I argued in chapter 1 with regard to sense-data, an intellectual construct.1
Another of Peacocke's examples has fared much better in the literature, that of the Necker 
Cube and similar aspect-switch cases.2 According to the argument from aspect-switches, which is a 
variation on that from attention, there is an element of psychology which varies in experience and 
which according to the argument does not supervene on a representational difference.  The lines on 
the page remain seen as the same, represented as the same, and yet one can visually switch between 
the two ways in which the cube "points".  Other well-known variations on this are the duck-rabbit, 
the square/diamond and rows and columns of dots or numbers.  According to these arguments, the 
psychological variation involved in the switch cannot be explained by a difference in representation 
of the marks on the page for they do not change, and the subject's physical focus, i.e. eyes, remain  
fixed on a point (and their body does not move).  Only their mental attention changes, and this 
psychological change is then explained by a change in qualia.3  
The standard rebuttal is that the experience represents some property of the diagram that it 
does  not  in  fact  have,  e.g.  depth  and orientation  in  the  case  of  the  Necker  cube,  or  that  it  is  
orientated differently, as with the square/diamond.  One could play this game all day, especially if 
one subscribes to a conceptualist theory of experience with a high level of cognitive penetrability: 
there will always be some property more or less plausible to either party, especially a relational or  
orientation property, that one could interpret the psychological change in terms of the representation 
of, and it seems also plausible that the same type of explanation need not be given for every case.4 
Further, as the representationalist is allowed to hold that properties are illusorily represented of the 
diagram, there seems always to be a way out.  There is a detailed literature of claim and counter-
claim with regard to specific examples.  Unfortunately, I lack the space to go through this in detail.5 
Let me briefly make the argument, however, that aspect-switches may indeed provide an 
argument for representationalism.6  One way of characterising the representational theory is that 
experience  always  presents  an  interpreted  array  of  objects  and  properties:  experience  is 
interpretation.  The Necker-Cube type of example results in an experience which switches between 
1 Peacocke's (1983) conception of qualia look rather like sense-data, as they seem to be properties of a private sensed  
field.
2 Peacoke's example actually concerns a three-dimensional wire framework.
3 The idea here is again rather as if there is something like a given sensed field over which the subject can cast their  
mind's eye, only the claim is reversed: there is an interpreted field which stays fixed in interpretation, and the change 
in psychology therefore must be a change in a non-interpretative element.  Seen like this, one not inclined to accept  
that there is an uninterpreted sensed field which is interpreted as one casts one's attention over it, will not be inclined  
to accept the converse.
4 Macpherson  (2006)  presents  an  argument  against  non-conceptual representationalism,  and  I  am  defending 
conceptual representationalism.  With a high level of cognitive penetration, this point in favour of the conceptualist 
is  perhaps  even  stronger.   See  Macpherson  (2012)  and  Siegel  (forthcoming)  for  discussions  of  cognitive 
penetrability.
5 Macpherson (2006),  Nickel (2007), and Block (2007) and (2010) present arguments against representationalism 
based on examples like these, and Lycan (1996) and Tye (2010) present rebuttals.
6 See Craig (1976) for an early statement of this argument.
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one  interpretation  and  another.   It  is  impossible  to  experience  more  than  one  orientation 
simultaneously (including no orientation).  A change of attention is a change of interpretation, and 
thus a change in the way the object is experienced.  This may or may not be illusory. 7  Block (2010) 
argues that two experiences of different orientations of the Necker-Cube must both be veridical, but 
it seems to me that the representationalist need not accept this, and even if so, why this should be a 
problem.  After all, it is a representation of depth, and for an experience of this to be veridical is to  
take it as such a representation.  It merely has ''two aspects in one'' like a hologram only both can be 
seen from the same angle.
These diagrams are designed to "trick" the mind by playing on the way in which the sub-
personal systems interpret information and deliver this interpretation to experience.8  Perhaps, the 
lines themselves, i.e. their intrinsic properties, are seen veridically as they are on the page, and yet  
ascribed to them, and thus experienced, is a relational property that they do not have.9
One way to interpret the opponent is that there is a fixed "information stream", to put it in 
this  way,  which results in a fixed representational content,  and yet  the psychology can change. 
Hence,  there  is  a  difference  in  psychology  which  is  not  representational.   However,  the 
representationalist  rejects  this  picture  of  an  element  of  the  experience  which  is  logically 
independent  from the  conceptual  interpretation.   On  this  theory,  there  is  no  possibility  of  not 
interpreting  in  experience  for  there is  no uninterpreted element,  even if  there  is  some level  of 
information which feeds into the visual system which itself remains fixed.  Compare this to a switch 
in  attention between one side of  the room and another  with eyes  fixed.   The position that  the 
representationalist rejects is that there is a scene which can be uninterpreted before the subject, and 
that the subject in switching attention comes to interpret this  scene.   On the representationalist 
theory, the change in attention is a change in psychology because the content of experience has 
changed: in focusing attention on the other side of the room, the level of representation changes and 
thus  the  psychology  changes.   Focusing  attention  in  this  case  is  increasing  the  level  of 
representation.10
I unfortunately lack the space for more detail here as the literature enumerating each and 
every case is  extensive,  but  I  assume,  hopefully,  that  each of  the examples raised by the anti-
representationalist can be convincingly met.  I will instead go into more detail about a prominent 
7 Brewer (2004) and (2008) argues that the Necker Cube and Müller-Lyer are not illusions and the actual diagrams are 
always directly presented as they are, and the effect is described as an intellectual interpretative mistake.  Most find  
this  rather  unconvincing,  and  take  it  as  a  good argument  for  representationalism.   I  think that  this  is  correct,  
assuming Brewer does not take it that the illusion is a disjunctive hallucination.  This would be awkward, I think, as  
features in the world would be reliably causing hallucinations.
8 And perhaps they "trick" our learned or acquired expectations.  Apparently, the Müller-Lyer is far less convincing to 
people who have lived in places where the buildings are not constructed with right-angled corners.
9 Examples like these are more troublesome for the judgement-theory, and I discuss this further below.
10 See Tye (2010).  Also Chalmers (2004) makes this argument.  Campbell (2002) argues that the switch in attention 
makes directly manifest properties of the object that it in fact has.  These two claims are, on my theory, compatible.
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and related specific argument, that from blurry vision.  It is related for my answer to this problem 
can, pace Block (2010), be plausibly carried over into a number of attention-shift examples, as it is  
an argument that the change in psychology is a change in the level of specificity of representation.
One way to think of blurry vision would be that the content is the same in the sharp and 
blurry vision of the same scene, but that there are monadic qualia exemplified in the latter.   A 
rejoinder to this would be that the object is represented as blurry.  As has been pointed out, however, 
this is not so.  It is not that the experience represents anything as blurry; rather, it is more correctly 
put  that  things  are  "blurrily  represented".   Tye's  (2003)  response  to  blurry  vision  is  that  the 
experience 'comments inaccurately' on the object.11  In objecting to this, Crane objects more widely 
to transparency, with blurry vision but one example.
if we are ever aware directly of features of our experience which are not features of the objects of  
experience – or features which these objects are represented as having – then Tye's negative claim is 
false: we can be 'directly aware of qualities of experience'.12
The ''quality'' I claim which can be discerned of experience is that experience is a relation.  Further,  
I claim that the relation is the very same in each case: the difference is that the terms are different.  
Crane continues as follows.
When I  say 'everything seems blurry'  I  don't  mean that  it  seems as if  the things around me  are 
blurry ... What I mean is that I am experiencing things in a blurry way.  Isn't this a straightforward 
case of where one can be 'directly' aware of an aspect of one's experience?  It is natural to say that I  
am aware of blurriness; but I am not aware of blurriness by being aware of any other properties; and 
blurriness does not seem to be a property of objects of experience.13
The upshot of this observation, Crane argues, is that we are in the case of blurry vision directly 
aware of a property of experience,  and not a property of something that experience represents. 
Tye's formulation, that we become aware of phenomenal character  by attending to the objects of 
experience is false.  We are, in this case, directly aware of a quality of the experience.
Let's  accept  that  Tye  is  right  that  the  experience underspecifies  the  perceived environment.  The 
phenomenal upshot of this, everyone agrees, is that things are seen blurrily.  So blurriness does seem 
to be a property of some kind, which does seem to be instantiated somewhere.  Unlike when things 
11 See also Tye (2000).  Dretske (2003) employs the different tactic, holding that the object is represented as being  
blurry, but see the text for why I reject this.
12 Crane (2006) p. 130.  Smith (2008) makes a similar point.
13 Crane (2006) p. 130
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are seen as blurry, it doesn't seem to be instantiated by the objects of experience.  So what is wrong 
with saying that it is instantiated (in some way) in the experience itself?  Moreover, since I do not 
have  to  make  myself  aware  of  blurriness  by  first  making  myself  aware  of  other  things  -  the  
awareness  of  blurriness  comes  along  all  together  with  the  awareness  of  everything  else  -  
introspection of seeing blurrily does seem to  reveal a case of being 'directly aware of qualities of  
experience' in an uncontroversial sense  of that phrase.14
 
Ask a Moorean introspective question: Is my consciousness (speaking colloquially) when I blurrily 
see an object any different from that when I sharply see the object?  What I mean by this question is  
a little difficult to state clearly.  The best way to put it is that the substance (to use the Aristotelian  
without assenting to it) of consciousness is, as Moore argued, not different.  The "substance" of 
conscious  is,  as  I  am arguing,  intentional  or  representational:  differences  in  the "substance"  of 
consciousness are really differences in the content.15
Consider a hazy and a clear memory.  In both these cases what it is for the fact to be before  
my mind is the same, but in one case I remember in greater detail.  It seems incorrect to say that my 
consciousness of the fact, my remembering the fact, is in any way qualified differently.  The same, I 
think, for perception.  Moore's eventual answer to this question, that of the classical sense-data 
theory, is that the sense-datum is fuzzy in one case and sharp in the other, whereas the external 
perceived object  is  always  sharp.   The representational  theory can also provide an explanatory 
difference in relata, and not in relation or properties of the relation, or properties in addition to the 
relation.  The difference is that the representational content is different in the two cases.  This is the 
tactic employed by Tye (2000) and (2003).
There is in the literature an argument, one which features for example in Smith (2008), to 
the effect that the possibility of seeing as he puts it sharply a 'fuzzy' object, say, a cloud, or, better, 
of a recreation of the ''painterly eye'' view of a myopic visual experience which is indistinguishable 
from a myopic experience, combined with the possibility of hallucination and illusion poses some 
specific problem for a representationalist theory.  While there is perhaps intuitive pull for the idea 
that  some  particular  combination  of  elements  here  would  create  a  particular  problem,  if  a 
representational analysis of “s ... experiences ...” can be adduced for each basic case,16 and none of 
the other analysanda feature in the anylsans then no combination can provide a novel difficulty that 
cannot be handled by the combinations of the atomic analyses.
There are two anti-representational conclusions that once could draw from blurry vision: 
either the  analysans of “s undergoes a blurry experience of an F” is (1) or (2).
14 Crane (2006) p. 131
15 Or at least I am arguing this with specific reference to experience as compared to thought, and not here for the 
mental in general, even though I think that this is defensible and likely true.
16 At least blurry and sharp vision, sharp and fuzzy objects, veridical and non-veridical experiences. 
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(1) s bears a ''blurry conscious relation'' to p, i.e. an instance of R which is "blurrily 
qualified" to p.
(2) s bears an unqualified instance of R to p, and s exemplifies some other quale.
The representational theory requires a difference in content which explains psychological difference 
between  ''s undergoes a blurry experience of F'' and ''s undergoes a sharp experience of F'', where 
we take  F to be a shape property or any other property affected by myopic vision. The ''loss of 
information''  response employed by Tye seems to me to be a sufficient answer to the problem. 
Consider  peripheral  vision.17  My  experience  "comments"  very  sharply  on  the  location  and 
properties of the edges of the keys in the centre of the keyboard at the moment.  This is less true of  
my perception of the number pad, and things deteriorate further from there.  There is a very good 
physical  explanation of this  concerning the ability of the eye and visual  system to take in  and 
process differing levels of detail and complexity in information from different angles.18
The difference in the content is, I suggest, the difference in the specificity of detail in the 
representational  content.    Considering  this  from  the  standpoint  of  physical  explanation,  this 
difference in specificity is presumably a function of the difference in degree and complexity of 
information processed, or a difference in degree and specificity of information that is brought into 
experience.  These may diverge, as attention-shifts perhaps show.19
17 Smith  argues  that  peripheral  and  blurry  vision  do  not  have  the  same  psychology,  and  both  must  be  treated 
equivalently  on  the  ''loss  of  information''  response.    Peripheral  vision  does  seem to  me  to  have  a  different  
psychology, but in that the way in which the object is under-specified is different.  I am not quite sure exactly how to 
put this, but there is a difference.  If  pressed, I would say that the shapes of objects in the peripheral field are  
underspecified in a manner which does not underspecify the relative locations of the boundaries of the object to each 
other.  I admit, though, that this is not a very satisfactorily clear statement.
18 This is why, I would say, subjects cannot identify in detail all of the objects experienced at a moment, and yet they  
are aware of the other objects.  They are aware of these objects to a lesser degree.  The level of predication is less  
specific as  regards  the properties of the objects and even specific numbers  of objects.   See,  for example,  the  
Sperling experiment, where the subject cannot name all of the letters in a grid, even though they can seem them all.  
This is plausibly because the shape ascribed to the letter is not specific enough to allow it to be discerned as a  
specific letter.  Or why, for example, when keep my eye on the keyboard, I cannot discern with very much detail 
what kind of bird is sitting on the windowsill even if I focus (mentally) on it.  This extends, as with the Sperling 
experiment, to counting the number of object experienced.  I see ''bunches''  of objects.  See Tye (2009c) for a  
discussion similar to this.
19 It cannot be denied that the brain and sensory system take in more information than is presented in experience, but  
this does not imply that there is a difference between the information that is merely brought into A-consciousness 
and that over which the light of P-consciousness is also thrown, so to speak.  Consider, for example, a subject 
affected by subliminal messages in a film. This information was taken in through the eye, and it affected the subject,  
but it was not seen.  Note that this is a different case as compared to, for example, my looking for my keys and not 
finding them but, in retrospect, realising that I did in fact see them.  Here, I saw my keys, but I did not see them as 
my keys. Later, I remember those things that I saw as, say, just another in the collection of jumble in the drawer,  
were in fact my keys.  I may or may not come to realise that I have seen an F as a G.  For example, there must have 
been countless times where I saw an insect as a part of a leaf, and I will never come to realise my mistake – indeed,  
maybe I could never come to realise my mistake without my being told of it.  That I saw my keys in the drawer as, 
say, a bunch of old keys that I do not need any more obviously does not imply that I cannot later in retrospect come 
to notice that those were my keys.  Can I see my keys  as those keys, and on the basis of this  only, i.e. without 
background inference, come later to realise that those were my keys?  This is an interesting question, to which I 
think that the answer is no, as any representationalist will, I think, have to say.
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The content which brings the object before the mind can be more or less determinate, or 
specific.   Consider as an example a three-dimensional Cartesian space,  and two objects located 
somewhere in the space.  Now consider definite descriptions of the objects that identify them with 
reference to their locations in the space.   These descriptions can be more or less specific.  For 
example, the object can be identified as the object whose boundaries lie inside a section of the 
Cartesian space which is specified by reference to a range points.  Widening or narrowing the range 
of points will not result in a change in the object determined by the description which features these 
ranges of points.  
This way of characterising the difference in the blurry or sharp experience of a particular 
object can thus supply the ''difference maker''  for the relevant analysans on the representational 
theory.  As a formal answer, this answer suffices.  Is it convincing?  The demand is not only for a  
sufficient  representational  difference,  which  the  suggestion  looks  to  supply,  but  the  further 
condition of compatibility with transparency is met.  Smith argues as follows.
[An account of the type suggested by Tye] treats the problem of blur as if it were simply a challenge 
to  the  representationalist  project  of  showing  that  the  phenomenal  character  of  an  experience 
supervenes on, or is determined by, that experience's representational content,  and as if defending 
such supervenience would in and of itself constitute a vindication of the  Transparency Thesis.  This, 
however,  is  not  the  case.   For  suppose  that  representational   content  does  fix  the  phenomenal 
character of experience.  It remains a possibility that there  are, as against the Transparency Thesis,  
aspects of phenomenal character that are not  captured by specifying the  apparent features of the 
ostensible  objects  of  experience.   This  possibility  can  be  excluded  only  by  showing  that 
representational content determines  phenomenal character just by determining such features.20
But the response is that blurry vision is a lack of specificity, a lack of accurate information about the 
experienced  object.   A lack  of  information  is  not  equivalent  to  erroneous  information  or  no 
information.  If I tell you that the envelope is in one of the desk drawers, as opposed to the right-
hand drawer, when it is in fact in the centre drawer, I have identified its location with a lack of  
specificity although not erroneously.  Smith says that blurry vision is not an illusion because 'it is 
not the case that the world seems to be a certain way in virtue of blur.  It is, rather, that within 
certain limits there isn't a way the world seems to be at all'.21  But the (myopically seen) edge of the 
cup appears to be within a certain range.  It is sharply within this range, only the range itself is not 
sharp in the sense of determinate.  It is not indeterminate which range the edge falls between, but as  
the range is extended, the range itself is in this way "indeterminate".  Likewise, it is indeterminate 
20 Smith (2008) p. 208
21 Smith (2008) p. 209
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for the myopic subject where the edge of the object lies.  But it is determinate that it is within a  
certain range.  Within this range, the world is such that the edge of the cup is at one of the points.  
That it is not determinate for each point whether or not the edge of the cup is there, does not imply 
that there is 'no way the world seems to be at all'.  As Smith says, 'it is not true that blurred vision 
even involves the representation of an object as being indeterminate'.22  It does not: it involves a 
determinate  object  determinately  being  at  one  location  within  a  determinate  range,  only 
indeterminate with respect to which location.  This, in turn, undercuts Smith's following further 
objection.
there are no correctness conditions for a blurred vision of something (in so far as it is  blurred).  How 
on earth would an object have to be for a blurred experience to be correct? ...  It is not that blurred 
vision lays down a condition for the world to meet that the world cannot possibly meet: it just does  
not lay down such a condition at all.  Blurred vision is not a sort  of illusion.  And this is because it is 
not the case that the world seems to be a certain way in  virtue of blur.  It is, rather, that within  
certain limits there isn't a way in which the world seems to be at all.23
The correctness conditions of a sharp experience make reference to a specific location, i.e. not to a 
range of specific locations, of the edge of an object as with blurry vision.  In this way, it can be said 
that the representation is indeterminate.  Its content is indeterminate in the way that there are a 
number of ways that the object can be, but this is not because the object is represented as itself 
being indeterminate between these ways, but that it is represented as determinately falling within 
this range.
I conclude that the argument from blurry-vision, and also the arguments from aspect and 
attention switches can be resisted.24
3  Representationalism, Perceptual Modality, and Attitudes
Let  me  note  now  a  commitment  that  one  might  think  that  anyone  who  defends  reductive 
representationalism  has.   In  chapter  2,  I  argued  that  the  difference  between  experience  and 
introspection  is  the  difference  in  content  between  (1)  and  (2),  where  these  are  the  respective 
contents, a proposition (which, of course, may or may not be true) and the content that this content 
is the content of the experience.
22 Smith (2008) p. 210
23 Smith (2008) p. 209
24 Although I would have like to discuss aspect and attention switching in more detail.
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(1) p.
(2) I experience that p.
Take visual experience.  In the experience, I see that p, and in introspection I introspect that I am 
seeing that p.  But is this not to hold that there is something that can be introspected which outstrips 
p, namely the seeing that p?  Siewert, for example, presses this point.
When something looks blue or square to me ... and I attend to how it looks to me, I do not  attend just 
to blueness or squareness, without attending to its  looking blue or square to me … The figure, its 
properties, and its appearing to me, all come together as a package, as far as  this act of attention is  
concerned.  I may only look at the blue square - I certainly don't look  at my visual experience of it.  
However, I can, while looking at the blue square, attend to its  looking to me as it does ... what I have  
just said seems to commit me to holding that I can attend not just to 'external qualities and objects'  
but to my experience of them as well.25
This enforces on the reductive representationalist an intermodal representationalism, as opposed to 
a  merely  intramodal  representationalism.   Intermodal  representationalism  holds  that  the 
psychological difference between perceptual modalities is a difference between content.  One could 
put this that modalities are individuated by content.26  Mere intramodal representationalism holds 
that psychological differences between different perceptual modalities supervene partly on some 
intrinsic phenomenal quality of that modality.27
Treating modalities as attitudes, we can say that the question is whether attitudes have their 
own  intrinsic  qualitative  phenomenal  character.   In  terms  of  attitudes,  this  is  what  anti-
representationalists  hold of the difference between experiences and thoughts.   Another question 
arises from this, namely are all mental acts of any and every kind intentional?
Are modalities individuated partially functionally?  This is a deep question, into which I lack 
the space to enquire here.  However, a purely functional difference would not refute unrestricted 
representationalism in an important sense: there are no  qualia involved in a difference between 
desiring that p and believing that p, and this is because this is a purely functional difference.  If the 
psychological  difference  between  mental  acts  M and  N is  purely  functional,  then  there  is  no 
difference in qualia.  Otherwise, there would be a difference between desiring that p and believing 
25 Siewert (2004) p. 20
26 And likely also functional features.
27 Intermodal representationalists include Dretske (1995), and Tye (1995) and (2000) and presumably anyone who 
holds intramodal representationalism combined with a functional analysis of the difference in modalities.  Crane 
(2003) defends intramodal representationalism against intermodal representationalism.
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that p which is a difference in qualia.28
Some  hold  that  for  representationalism  to  be  convincing,  it  has  to  be  unrestricted 
representationalism in that it holds of all of the mental.29  If this is so, then if examples are adduced 
which  refute  unrestricted  representationalism,  then  one  may  wonder  as  to  why  restricted 
representationalism is worth defending.  This is an argument rather like Russell's (1997) argument 
for universals: if you allow the similarity universal (which you must), you might as well allow them 
all.  After all, it is being a universal that is contentious, not how many there are.  Likewise with 
qualia: if you allow the orgasm-quale, and the depression-quale, then why not experiential qualia?  I  
lack the space to enquire into this in detail here.  My focus in on the difference between experiences 
and thought.30  However, experiential qualia are different from non-experiential qualia, and so it is 
not immediately clear that if there were orgasm-qualia and depression-qualia, that there would be 
any implication from this to, say, pain qualia, and then to experiential qualia.
If  there  are  properties  intrinsic  to  different  perceptual  modalities  such  that  these  are 
psychologically  manifest  and  do  not  supervene  solely  on  the  content,  then  intermodal 
representationalism will be refuted.  Recall the quoted passage from Siewert above: we seem to be 
able  to  introspect  the  qualitative  "visualness"  of  seeing,  the  tactility  of  touching,  and  so  on. 
However, this will only resist a representational analysis if there is not a difference in content in 
terms of which this can be analysed.  But there is a difference in content, namely that different 
perceptual modalities make different properties available.  I cannot hear red, or touch yellow, and I 
cannot see sounds.  
Let it be that all experiences are conceptually articulated, that s sees the corner of a square 
while  touching  it,  and  that  the  contents  of  these  two  experiences  both  features  the  concept 
SQUARE.31 The tactile experience has a content which pertains to the tactile qualities of the corner, 
and the visual experience to the visual qualities.  Even if some of the same concepts are applied, and 
thus  the  contents  of  the  experiences  share  some  elements,  the  overall  contents  will  not  be 
28 Recall that qualia are defined as non-functional.
29 See, for example, Byrne (2001) and Kind (2007) for discussion.  I am interested here in defending only a judgement-
theory of perception and so, aside from the remarks made here, I set aside this further question.
30 Nevertheless, I do not think that qualia, unlike functional differences, will be required.  Common examples which 
are  purportedly  intractable  are  orgasms  and  moods.   These  are  Block's  favourite  examples.   Pains  are  now 
commonly treated as representational, although this is controversial.  See, e.g., Tye (1997), Harman (1997), and 
Bain (2003).   This is  not  strictly central  to my task here as my task is to argue for a reduction of perceptual  
experience not of the body but of things distinct from the body (although in experiences of, say, after-images, there  
may be room to make trouble here with unclear cases if an after-image, for example, is a property of the brain or 
eye) to thought.  Pains, moods, and emotions are not experiences in this sense, although they may be experience-
like, or experiences of the body.  An early version of this view with respect to pains is Pitcher (1970).  I do think that  
it can be plausibly argued that an experience of a pain is an experience of a property (purportedly) of a part of the  
body.   Once pain has been analysed in this way, it seems to me that an analysis of the physical qualities of moods 
and emotions can be equivalently given.  The remaining functional and dispositional aspects of moods and emotions 
which are, I think, plausibly logically independent from the felt qualities of the body, will not involve qualia, and 
thus moods and emotions are apt for a representational analysis.  This is, for example, Armstrong's (1968) view. 
However, to enquire into this in any detail would be to stray far from the matter at hand.
31 This could be non-conceptual with respect to the present argument, nothing turns on this.
70
equivalent.  Hence, there will always be a difference in content in terms of which to analyse the 
visualness of seeing, and the tactility of touching, even if the contents share some elements. When I 
introspect my seeing that  p and my touching that  q,  p and q will always be different.  This point 
secures, I think, that intermodal representationalism can be convincingly argued for.
This is, unfortunately, an unsatisfactorily short treatment of this matter due to lack of space, 
but it is necessary to note the commitments that one may have to take on. For example, I have not  
broached the relation between, for example, my awareness of my fingertip and my awareness via 
my  fingertip  of  the  qualities  of  my  keyboard.   However,  a  full-dress  defence  of  intermodal 
representationalism,  let  alone  complete  representationalism  for  all  of  the  mental  were  that 
necessary, would far exceed the scope of this thesis.  I shall just have to express my confidence that 
this can be defended, and that the psychological difference between the modalities is a difference 
analysable in terms of content (plus, perhaps, functional role).
4  The Inverted Spectrum, Mental Paint, and Representationalism
Another  argument  adduced  against  the  representationalist  theory  is  the  inverted  spectrum,  and 
associated arguments.  This argument is a central argument against representationalism, and so it is 
necessary to show that it can be rebutted.  Furthermore, it will help to make more clear the central  
phenomenal notions being invoked.  Before tackling the inverted spectrum and related arguments, 
consider Byrne's  (2001) argument for representationalism,  for this  will  serve to make clear  the 
strength of the representationalist's position.
Byrne argues that the core of the representational theory need take no stand on anything over 
and  above  the  supervenience  of  psychology  on  content.  Byrne's  argument  for  this  minimal 
representationalism concerns the example of a subject presented with coloured chips.  The first two 
are blue, and the third is red.  The phenomenal character of the first two experiences are called B-
character, and the third R-character.
[The] subject is shown a blue chip, and he classifies his experience as having a B- character.  But this 
time [the first subject answered ''correctly''] the chip is not replaced.  The  subject reports that there is 
no change in the chip, or in anything else: the world continues to  appear exactly the same to him.  
''However'', he sincerely continues, ''something weird has  happened – the phenomenal character of 
my experience has suddenly changed.  It now has  the R-character''.  Surely he has not understood  
our patient instruction in philosophical  terminology.  No five dollars for him!32
32 Byrne (2001) p.  207.  Byrne's subject is  idealised, possessed of perfect  memory for example.   However,  these 
idealisations are innocent.  
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Our subject gains knowledge of the phenomenal character of her experience by reusing her  ability to 
make judgements about the world – and in her circumstances she cannot gain  knowledge by any 
other method.  She goes through exactly the same procedure that she  would go through is she were  
trying to make a judgement about the quality of the object that she perceives.33
The crucial claim that Byrne makes is that the experiences need not be experiences of 'external' 
objects.  Indeed, they need not be experiences that present their objects as external at all.  Byrne 
argues, correctly in my view, that the above example can be recast with after-images instead of 
chips:  the after-image functions in exactly the same manner as does the chip.34
Is Byrne's argument successful?  I think that it is.  As he says of two experiences with the 
same content, the introspecting subject 'will not notice a change in 'phenomenal character', because 
she has 'no basis for noticing one'.  As the subject exercises the very same abilities that are used in  
undergoing the experience in subsequently determining the phenomenal character, if there is no 
change in experience there will be no basis for an introspective difference.  As Byrne extends this to 
any properties, not merely 'external' properties, how could there be?  How could it seem within the 
experience that p, where p here covers everything that is in principle psychologically manifest, and 
yet it still seem that p after a change in phenomenal character?  And how could it seem that p within 
the experience and it seem that q where there is no change in phenomenal character?  How could 
any psychological element of experience vary with respect to the way in which things seem?
Byrne's argument here, as I interpret it, is as an argument about how we are entitled to use 
''seems''.  Lycan refers to Block's (1996) distinction between the two ways that things can ''look'' as 
a distinction that can be carried over into the analysis of ''seems''.35  Does Byrne equivocate on 
''seem'' here? I think not.  This charge could be turned around, and it can be claimed that the appeal 
to Block's distinction uses a notion of ''seem'' to which the proponent is not entitled.  The argument 
can be interpreted as an argument about the semantics of ''seems'', as an argument that ''seems'' and 
cognate notions in terms of which the psychology of experience are analysed are all rendered on the 
representational theory as seeming-that, or can be paraphrased into seemings-that36:
Byrne's  argument  for  representationalism  is  somewhat  reminiscent  of  the  sense-data 
proposal for the phenomenal principle.  This principle concerned how things are sensed.  Byrne's 
33 Byrne (2001) pp. 210-211.  Recall from chapter 2 my puzzlement at the idea that one can come by knowledge of the 
phenomenal character of experiences by looking at the objects of the experience.  However, set this aside.
34 This is because the after-image is the object of the experience.  The experience is an experience of the after-image,  
in the way that the object of the experience of the chip is the chip.  This extends, I think, to phosphenes and other 
visual phenomena, and also phenomena such as pins and needles or ringing in the ears.  These objects, be they  
presented as a property of a part of the body as with pins and needles or not, are the objects of these experiences.
35 See Lycan (2006) Part 3 Section 4.
36 This is not meant to imply that the 'seeming-that' takes a conceptually articulated proposition.
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argument concerns how thing seem.37  The arguments are somewhat similar, in that Byrne argues 
that there seems to be no escape from the fact that a change in qualitative psychology will go hand 
in hand with a change in the way that things seem, and vice-versa.  Even if there were "qualified 
consciousness", sense-data, monadic phenomenist qualia, mental paint, etc., these are all objects of 
seemings-that in the same way that for a proponent of sense-data, they would all be properties of the 
sense-datum.38
Now, let me turn to the inverted spectrum and related arguments.  This is an argument for 
what Block calls 'mental paint'.  He distinguishes between what he calls 'mental paint' and 'mental  
oil'.  Block (2003) begins with the following standard characterisation of the debate:
The  recent  focus  of  disagreement  is  on  whether  the  phenomenal  character  of  an  experience  is 
exhausted by such representational contents [of experience].  I say no.  Don't get me wrong.  I think 
that sensations – almost always – perhaps even always – have representational contents in addition to 
their phenomenal character. What's more, I think that  it is often the phenomenal character itself that  
has the representational content.39
Block then goes on to distinguish three introspectible features of perception:
The intentional content of an experience.  I am currently looking at a tomato and my experience 
represents the tomato as red.
Mental properties of the experience that represents the redness of the tomato.  This is mental  paint.  
According to me, the phenomenal character of the experience is such a mental property: it represents 
the tomato as red.  According to me, one can attend to this phenomenal character and be aware of it 
even when one is not attending to it.   Representationists [representationalists] would deny both.
Mental properties of the experience that don't represent anything.  This is mental oil.  I don't know 
37 Compare this to the way in which I argued against the sense-data theory, and its motivating phenomenal use of  
''looks'' as opposed to the epistemic use.  Things seem that p: a propositional seeming, like the propositional notion 
of an epistemic look.  The epistemic ''look'' is stronger, as Jackson presents it, as this is a belief-related notion.
38 Byrne's  argument may look like it  just  rules monadic elements of  experience out of court  by insisting that  all 
psychological elements be analysable in terms of 'seems', which is tantamount to asserting that they are analysable  
as looks-reports.  However, Byrne's argument seems a good one to me, for how else would one account for a strange  
experience which the proponent of qualia would analyses in terms of monadic qualia other than that "it seems to me 
that ...".  The looks-report version of this is "it looks to me that …”. Common examples against the acceptability of  
this, e.g. after-images and phosphenes, are in my opinion very weak as "it looks to me that there is an after-image",  
or "it looks to me that there are phosphenes'' seem perfectly acceptable.  Even if, say, the whole visual field could  
be, say, turned yellow, it would "look to me that there is a yellow patch across my visual field".  The representational 
theory is not so far from the sense-data theory in this respect as, at least I am arguing for this interpretation, the  
sense-data theory's claim that the experiential relation is sensing which itself is related (or the object thereof) by an 
objective relation to the perceived object, is replaced by an analysis in terms of a single relation to a proposition 
which determines an object under that content.
39 Block (2003) p. 165
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whether there are any such properties in the case of a normal experience of a tomato, but I do claim 
that such properties are involved in orgasm-experience, pain and other bodily sensations.40
Block here distinguishes three elements.  One, the content.  Two, the 'mental paint'.  Three, the 
'mental oil'.  The difference between mental paint and mental oil is that  the mental paint itself 
'represents the redness of the tomato'.  The mental oil,  in contrast,  does not represent anything. 
Block's examples here are the experienced redness of a tomato, and the experienced quality of a 
bodily sensation, for example the numbness in my leg or the pain in my foot.  Block (2010) makes 
the following standard introduction to the matter.
Are the phenomenological characters of perception – e.g. what it is like to experience redness or  
roundness  – philosophically reducible to the redness  or  roundness  of  the  objects  one sees  or to  
representations of redness or roundness?  If there is no such reduction, then there can be said to be  
mental paint.41
However, in a footnote to this, Block adds the following.
I  am  not  assuming  that  if  there  is  mental  paint,  it  is  non-relational  (''intrinsic'')  or  has  no 
representational aspect.  Since I favour physicalism, I allow that mental paint may be a  relational 
neural property.  To avoid misunderstanding, I do not claim that there is anything  red or round in the  
head when one veridically sees a red or round thing in the world as when  red pigment in a painting 
represents a red barn.42
Mental  paint  may  be,  as  it  is  put,  a  vehicle  of  representation.   The  mental  paint,  which  is 
psychologically manifest to me, itself represents, say, the red of a tomato.  Mental oil is different, 
mental oil does not represent anything to me, like, as Block would argue, the blur in blurry vision.
It is important to approach the representational theory on its own terms, namely that the 
objects  presented in experience are the representata of the representation that the experience is. 
These properties are fixed by the representational content, and the theory asserts that these cannot 
vary without the content varying.   And, unlike with the sense-data theory, the representata need not  
actually exemplify the properties they are (re)presented as having.43 
40 Block (2003) pp. 173-174
41 Block (2010) p. 25
42 Block (2010) note 2
43 For example, in recanting the sense-data theory, Jackson puts this as follows.  'It is true that I can represent how I am 
representing something to be by using the actual way something is.  For example, I might represent to you the colour 
I remember the murderer's coat to be by holding up an actual sample of the colour ... [but] I could be using the  
sample to represent the one colour I do not think the murderer's coat to be.  Or I could be following the convention 
of holding up a sample with the colour complementary to that I remember the murderer's coat to be.  In the same 
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Consider  again  the  sense-data  theory,  and  take,  for  example,  the  sense-data  theories 
proposed by Price (1932) and Broad (1925).  Taking a label from Smith (2002), call these theories  
''dual-component'' theories.  On a dual-component theory, perception is a complex act containing 
two elements.  The first element is purely phenomenal or qualitative.  On the theories of Price and 
Broad this is the sensing of a sense-datum.  The other component is a more intellectual act, related 
in some way to the act of judgement, although it is not itself a judgement on these two theories.  In 
his discussion of this relation, Maund quotes Thomas Reid who held a similar theory.
Sensation, by itself, implies neither the conception nor belief of any external object.  It supposes a 
sentient  being,  and  a  certain  manner  in  which  that  being  is  affected;  but  it  supposes  no  more. 
Perception implies a conviction and belief of something external – something different from both the 
mind  that  perceives  and  the  act  of  perception.   Things  so  different  in  nature  ought  to  be 
distinguished.44
That the act of sensation is not related in any constitutive way to 'conviction'  or 'belief'  can be 
rephrased as: that the act of sensation is not intentionally directed towards, or represents, any object. 
On the sense-data theory,  it  may be put that the sense-datum itself is not intentionally directed, 
whereas the relation of sensing is intentionally directed in that the subject when standing in the 
relation is aware of the sense-datum.  This, however, is not quite what is meant by the experience 
being intentionally directed, for the experience is not, on the sense-data theory,  about the sense-
datum.
According to Reid,  the sensation causes the perception,  a mental act  individuated by its 
epistemological qualities.  Reid's theory is in contrast to the theories proposed by, for example, 
Price and Broad.  On  the Price/Broad theory, the two elements form a simultaneous complex.  It is 
clear on Reid's model how the sensation and the intentional act are connected: the former causes the 
latter.  It is not clear on the Price-Broad model how the two component of the complex are linked. 
But to accept transparency is to accept that experience concerns  those objects, namely the sense-
data  as  Price  and  Broad  would  have  called  them,  and  nothing  more,  for  nothing  else  is 
psychologically manifest.  Those are the representata or the intentional objects, and the properties 
which are psychologically manifest  are the properties which I represent them as having, or the 
properties that would be mentioned in the intensional, with an "s", context of the looks-report (those 
way, standing in a certain direct-awareness relationship to a mental item with such and such properties says nothing, 
represents nothing per se, about how the world is … The extraordinary (as I now think) failing of the sense datum 
theory is that it does not start to address the representational nature of perceptual experience.  It somehow manages  
to leave out the most important part of the story.  The obvious repair is to replace the sense datum theory's positing  
of a direct awareness relation to something red by a representing that there is something red; this transforms the 
sense datum theory into representationalism.'  Jackson (2004a) p. 108.  See also Jackson (2004b).
44 Quoted in Maund (2003) p. 59.
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which I can conceptualise).
The representational claim is that the psychology of the experience is what is represented to 
the subject.  What is represented to the subject is in this sense, that p.  The psychological content of 
the experience is exhausted by the articulation of p, regardless of any properties of the object seen 
by p but not represented in the articulation of p.
Block describes mental paint in contrast  with the properties of the intentional objects of 
experience.
Are the phenomenological characters of perception – e.g. what it is like to experience redness or  
roundness  – philosophically reducible to the redness  or  roundness  of  the  objects  one sees  or to  
representations of redness or roundness?  If there is no such reduction, then there can be said to be  
mental paint.45
However, this cannot be quite correct for 'what it is like' to experience something red is not identical 
to this property experienced, but to a representation of this property (on the sense-data theory, a 
sensing of a phenomenal correlate of the visual property).  From the subject's point of view, i.e. the 
subjective element of the experience, this is the featuring of the property red in some way in the 
representational content.  In a footnote, Block continues.46
I  am  not  assuming  that  if  there  is  mental  paint,  it  is  non-relational  (“intrinsic”)  or  has  no 
representational aspect.  Since I favour physicalism, I allow that mental paint may be a relational 
neural property.  To avoid misunderstanding, I do not claim that there is anything red or round in the  
head when one veridically sees a red or round thing in the world as when red pigment in a painting 
represents a red barn.47
Sense-data could become mental paint if their properties when experienced by s represent to s other 
properties.  Mental paint could also be monadic properties: structured adverbial modifications as 
mental paint.48   Judgement is transparent in that in judgement the vehicle of representation and its 
properties are transparent, i.e. not psychologically manifest.  In perceptual experience, according to 
a proponent of the position like Block's, this is not so.  
Assuming for exposition Peacocke's primed-property sense-data language, on the one hand s 
45 Block (2010) p. 23
46 The phenomenal character is a property of the experience, or is an element of the experience, and so cannot literally 
be identical  to the properties  of  relata,  otherwise the experience itself  would have the properties  of  the relata.  
Rather, the phenomenal character, the psychology, is the relation between the subject and the object experienced.
47 Block (2010) note 2
48 Elsewhere, Block says that 'P-conscious contents can be representational.  Consider a perceptual state of seeing a 
square.   This  state  has  a  P-conscious  content  that  represents  something,  a  square,  and thus it  is  a  state  of  P-
consciousness of a square'. Block (1997) p. 384
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is sensationally presented with, say, a red` square`, and it is represented to  s that there is a red 
square via this presentation.  The red` square` sense-datum itself represents to s that there is a red 
square.  It may be that the red` and the square` properties represent the external properties red and 
square, or it may be that they represent other properties.  The red` and the squareness`  function 
rather  like  the  printed  words  in  sentences,  as  they  are  sensuous,  or  qualitative,  vehicles  of 
representation which are themselves experienced.  The red` square` sense-datum would function 
like  a  sensuous sentence  in  that  the red` represented,  intended,  or  pointed  to,  some property.49 
Likewise for equivalent monadic theories.  If the red` square` does not itself represent some further 
properties, then the red ` square` is mental oil.50
But consider introspection and transparency.  When I look at a red patch, does the red patch 
of which I am directly aware itself represent that there is some property other than this instance of  
red?  It seems, at least to me, that this is not so.  Does the red patch I am experiencing represent this  
of itself?  Again, it seems to me that this is not so: the red square does not represent, or intend,  
itself.  Is it that the red (red`) is a property of the vehicle of representation, in that it qualitatively is 
present as my representing red, and not as the property experienced?  Again, no.  It seems to me that 
the experience represents the red square.  The red square itself, the red` square`, seems to me to be 
the representatum of the experience, or the intentional object.
Consider the paint on my garden shed, and a painting of my garden shed.  The paint on the 
garden shed is like mental oil in an experience: my pain experience (on Block's view), for example,  
is  partly  comprised of  an  instance  of  a  qualitative  property in  the  way that  the  shed is  partly 
comprised  of  non-representational  paint.   The  painting  of  my  shed,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
representation of my shed.
Compare this to Block's options.  My experience of the red patch is like a relation to the 
paint in the painting, and by being related to the red patch something further is represented to me. 
Or, my experience of the red patch is not a relation to the red patch in virtue of which something 
else is represented to me, but merely accompanied by it, but this would not be mental paint but  
mental oil  Alternatively, my experience has the monadic property which I mistake for being the  
property of a relatum, and in virtue of having this property my experiences represents some further 
property, or my experience merely has this property as an accompaniment.
Block argues that there is no relation of superveneince, in either direction, between these 
49 Robinson (1994) Chapter I Section 7 interprets the 'percepts' of the percept theory, e.g. Firth (1949), as being like a 
classical  sense-data in  that  it  is  logically private non-physical  object  of  awareness,  but  one which at  least  has 
intentional directedness and may actually possess the properties it appears to have.  Block's theory looks rather like 
the  percept  theory  in  that  percepts  which  themselves  represent  or  intend  further  objects  or  properties  or  are 
representations  of  themselves  in  some  way.   Firth's  (1949)  theory  is  a  forerunner  of  the  non-reductive 
representational theory, I think, although this is not the place to enquire into this.
50 Compare this to Firth's (1949) discussion of the sense-data and percept theories.  Firth criticises the sense-data and 
adverbial theories for holding that there are two psychological relations in experience. 
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mental properties and the properties that they may come to represent.  The mental properties are 
rather like the paint still in the pot (or on the tip of their brush waiting to be applied): the painter can 
choose what to represent by using the paint, but it may also not represent anything if it stays in the 
pot.
In order that this be resisted, it must be argued that the two cannot diverge, and one way to 
argue this is to argue that the "qualia inversion" scenarios which are invoked in order to drive them 
apart  lead  systematically  to  misrepresentation and  result  in  no  variation  between  content  and 
psychology.51  The two common scenarios invoked here are simple spectrum-inversion, and Block's 
inverted-earth example.
The following passage from Wittgenstein is often quoted as an introduction to the inverted 
spectrum.
Consider this case: someone says “it’s queer/I can’t understand it/, I see everything red blue today 
and vice versa.” We answer “it must look queer!’” He says it does and, e.g., goes on to  say how cold 
the glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar  
circumst[ances] be incl[ined] to say that he saw red what we saw [blue].  And again we should say 
that we know that he means by the words ‘blue’ and ‘red’ what we do as he has always used them as 
we do.52
Note two elements of this scenario. The first is that 'he saw red what we saw blue', i.e. those objects  
seen red one day are seen blue (strictly speaking, this should be green but nothing turns on this)  the 
next, and the second is that the meanings of 'red' and 'blue' do not change.  
That the meanings of the words are fixed means that that the concepts expressed by the 
words are fixed.53  When the sky "looks red", the inverted subject is applying the same concept as 
applied previously in the experience of the coal "looking red" when he tells us this.  The second key 
element is that what "looked blue" yesterday now "looks red".  So y "looked red" yesterday to s, and 
now y "looks blue".  That 'those very things' are seen red one day and blue the next is that the very 
same objects are represented as blue one day and represented as red the next.  If this means that the 
representational content picks out the same object and the same properties on both occasions, but 
the look in a phenomenal sense, is different, then this look does not supervene on the content and 
51 See Speaks (forthcoming) for a comprehensive discussion of this.  Shoemaker (1994) and elsewhere has a different 
way out: experiences are the representations of two kinds of properties, appearance properties, in terms of which the 
phenomenal character is analysed, and external properties, in terms of which the object that appears the way the 
appearance properties account for, is characterised.  This is, to my mind, at least very close to an acceptance of 
qualia.  See Kind (2001).
52 Quoted  in  Block (2010) p.  25.   I  will  not  discuss  the question of  moving from this  intrapersonal  scenario to  
interpersonal scenarios.  See, e.g.,  Shoemaker (1996).  A shifted spectrum will also suffice.  See, .e.g, Nida-Rumelin 
(1996) for discussion of what are perhaps actual cases of this.
53 The concepts that would be formed on the basis of the experience.
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hence  representationalism is  false.   Hence,  one  of  them must  be  misperceiving,  i.e.  the  latter 
experience must have a false content, if representationalism is not refuted.
On Block's (1990) inverted earth scenario, things look the same, in the phenomenal sense, as 
they did on earth, but actually they are inverted.  Imagine that I am whisked to inverted earth where 
every  colour  has  its  complement,  but  I  (secretly)  have  inverting  lenses  installed,  and  so  the 
inversion is corrected.  I look at the sky, and it "looks blue".  But the sky is yellow.   After a while  
the experiences come to represent yellow, but are still  'blue feeling'  (the contents are externally 
individuated, on this argument and so change after embedding in a different environment).54  Hence, 
the phenomenal character has remained fixed and the representational content has changed.
Focus on the transparency claim and the representationalist theory.  If both are accepted, the 
object  of  the  experience  is  determined  by  the  representational  content  and  the  experience  is 
transparent to the objects.  To make a familiar point, imagine a room with only a tight path between 
electrically charged metal cubes.  I am tricked into putting on some hi-tech glasses which create a  
perfect image of a room with exactly the same layout, only the metal cubes have their places taken 
by tables stacked precariously with priceless porcelain vases, and this takes me in.  My task is to get 
to the other side, without ''breaking a vase''.  What did my experience represent?  It represented the 
images on the glasses, and not either of the two rooms or their contents.  The images represented 
this, but not my experience.  More accurately, my experience represented the representations, but 
not their representata.  My experience represented, erroneously, the table-representations as tables. 
It did not represent their content, and nor did it represent them as images or representations.
Consider now Wittgenstein's scenario.  The coal is red, it exemplifies the universal  red.  I 
look at the coal and I see it, veridically, as red.  The represented red inheres in the coal.  I suffer 
inversion.  Now, my experience is as of something blue in the sense that I would say that things 
''looked blue''.  But does my experience represent blue or red?  It "feels" blue, for if we adopted a  
sense-data  theory  the  sense-datum  would  be  blue.   The  sky  on  inverted  earth  is  yellow,  it  
exemplifies the universal  yellow.  The sky on earth is blue, it exemplifies the universal  blue.  On 
earth, I look at the sky, and my experience represents blue and  has a blue "feel", for if we were to  
adopt a sense-data theory, then the sense-datum would be blue.  On inverted earth, I look at the sky 
and my experience is as-of blue.  It has a blue "feel", in that if we adopted a sense-data theory the 
sense-datum would be blue.
My experience has a "blue feel" in the sense that things look blue in the phenomenal sense. 
But what does this mean?  On the sense-data theory, it means that the sense-datum is blue.  On the 
representational theory, it must mean that the representational content features the property  blue. 
What is it for an experience to feature the property blue in the content?  This is for the experience to 
54 'Blue feeling' means an experience with the qualitative element captured by the sensing of a blue sense-datum on the 
sense-data theory.  This terminology comes from Byrne and Hilbert (1997).
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represent a blue representatum (which may or may not be actually blue).
I am sent to inverted earth and have my inverting lenses installed.  I look at the sky and it  
"looks blue".  The representational analysis of this is that the representatum is represented as blue. 
My brain has the ability to represent the property blue for (presumably) some reason to do with the 
fact that there are blue things on earth, and we assume that it still has this function and that this is 
triggered on inverted earth.  Maybe I was swapped with my inverted earth doppelgänger, and he is 
now resident on earth.  He has the ability to represent the property  blue  because there are blue 
things on inverted earth.  He looks at a lemon, and it "looks yellow" in inverted language (i.e. blue).  
The representational analysis of this is that the representatum is represented as blue.
Are the representata the sky and the lemon?  More specifically, is the blue patch of which I  
am aware identical in terms of the colour it has as the actual sky on inverted earth?  And is the blue 
("yellow" in inverted-language) patch of which my doppelgänger aware of a property of the lemon? 
The answer here is very plausibly that they are not, any more than I was aware of the electric cubes  
in the example above in that the representata of my experience as of tables and vases represented to  
me the cubes, or that my experience represented to me the electric squares and not the tables and 
vases.
The inverted sky is yellow, and the inverted lemon is blue.  If the object of my awareness on 
twin earth is represented to me as blue, in that the patch which I am by hypothesis aware of if it 
were a sense-datum would be blue,  then this representatum cannot be the colour of the sky on 
inverted-earth, for that is yellow.  Likewise for the lemon.  The lemon is yellow, it exemplifies the 
universal yellow; indeed it exemplifies the very same universal as does the sky on twin earth.  What 
happens when I go back to earth, and I have my lenses removed?  The sky "looks blue".  This is a 
veridical experience: the sky is blue, and it looks blue.  This time the representatum is identical to 
an external object, whereas this was not so on inverted earth.55  
For an experience to be veridical is for that experience to represent properties which are 
actually exemplified by external objects: i.e. the representatum must be represented as having the 
same property as an object exemplifies; on a direct theory, these must be the very same instance.  If 
my experience represents a property that an object does not have, then that object cannot be the 
object of the experience.  
For an object to appear the way it is, is obviously different from the object of the appearance 
appearing the way it appears in the appearance.  On the sense-data theory, for example, there is no 
55 On the representational theory, the qualitative properties are represented as being properties of the  representatum. 
They may or may not be exemplified by the representatum.  If a child believes that there is a monster under the bed,  
assuming for the moment that this cannot be analysed out, the representatum "has" the property monster.  There is no 
monster:  nothing exemplifies the property  monster.   But  for something to be represented as a  monster,  for  the 
property monster to be represented as a property of a representatum is not for that property to be exemplified.  It is 
(relevantly) exemplified if the representatum actually is a monster.  Likewise for the current scenarios.  See, e.g.,  
Harman (1997) and Lycan (1996), and Dretske (2003) for this argument.
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appearance/is distinction within the sensing.  Likewise on the representational theory there is no 
appearance/is distinction within the representation, for the representation is the appearance (in this 
sense)  of  the  object.   The  appearance/is  distinction  is  between  the  way things  are,  i.e.  which 
properties  are  exemplified,  and the way things appear  to be,  i.e.  the way in which the content 
determines them to be, and which properties the representatum is therefore represented as having.
Compare this now to Wittgenstein's scenario.  The coals now look blue to s.  What does this 
mean?  It means that it looks to s that p in M, where p is the way in which some y is bought before 
s's mind.  The colour of y which is represented in M and thus brought before s's mind is the colour 
blue: it has to be, for were we to adopt a sense-data theory, the sense-datum would be blue.  But this  
is not a sense-data theory.  By hypothesis, the coal does not have colour blue: it exemplifies the  
property red.  p is false: there is nothing blue in the fire.  p might be partially true: there are some 
things of the shapes represented in p, and at those locations in the fire.  Hence, as p is partially true, 
and partially false, M is partially veridical and partially non-veridical; i.e. it is an illusion.
Assuming that nothing can be blue and red all over, or at any rate that nothing like this coal 
can be blue and red all over, one conclusion that can be drawn from this possible experience M is 
that s cannot see the colour of the coal in M.
If I am looking at a white wall, and suddenly my experience starts to cycle randomly for 
some internal reason through a rainbow of colours, there is a very good question to be asked about 
whether or not I am still seeing the wall.  Perhaps I am still seeing the shape and position of the 
wall, but am I not seeing the colour of the wall.56  The experience of these colours which the wall 
does not have "screens off" my experience of the actual colour of the wall.  In contrast, for example, 
the water does not screen off the colour of the submerged stick.  I see the colour of the stick through 
the water.  Mouches volantes do not screen off the colour of the sky when I "look through" them. 
But it looks plausible at least that in this scenario that the colour kaleidoscope would screen off the 
colour of the wall, in which case I would not be seeing the colour of the wall, but rather merely 
experiencing the "colour show".57
The answer to Maund's question about the simultaneous-complex theory of Price and Broad 
is the answer that the representationalist gives, namely that the interpretation, p, is an interpretation 
of the object manifest in experience: what Price and Broad would have called the sense-datum. 
This is independent of the veridicality of experience, for the psychology of an experience is a matter 
56 Here, Jackson's (1977) answer is best.  The wall is white, and so I am only seeing the colour of the wall when I  
''phenomenally ''see the whiteness of the wall.  Of course, if I put on blue glasses, things are surely different, for 
what I am seeing is the wall behind the glasses.  There is perhaps a tricky problem here of why ''faulty brain wiring''  
behaves  differently  from  the  glasses.   Indeed,  why  should  inverting  lenses  behave  differently  from  glasses? 
However, I lack the space to go into this here.  But I do note it as a looming difficulty.
57 This is different from a case where a kaleidescope of lights are shone on the wall.  In this case, the experience would 
be veridical, for the wall does change colour in this case.  At least I would argue this if I had the space to enquire 
into the metaphysics of colours.
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of the subjective element of experience, how things are for the subject.58
The content of experience is the subjective content, what the subject could glean from the 
experience.  Consider a non-conceptual theory of content.  On this theory, the content of experience 
is what the subject can conceptualise directly from the experience.  On a conceptualist account of 
perception,  the  contents  of  perception  are  identical  to  the  conceptual  articulation  of  the 
propositional content.  In the example of the room above, the content of my experience would not  
have involved the concept CUBE.  Likewise, on inverted earth, the property  yellow, the property 
exemplified by the sky was not represented to me as the concept YELLOW was not involved in the 
experience.  And it seems equally mysterious to me how an application of YELLOW in experience 
could give rise to a representation of (an instance of) the property blue as it could be that a blue 
sense-datum could be sensed as yellow.59
Consider the following (slightly silly but hopefully illustrative) scenario to make this old 
point about the relation between our concepts and the experiences on which their acquisition rests. 
There is a tube into which balls are dropped.  At the bottom, the balls are collected in a basket, and 
these are inspected by some people whose task it is to note down the properties of the balls, the  
"qualia".  At the top of the tube are the "external balls".  If one is dropped into the tube and then 
collected in the basket, this is a "veridical experience".  What if the tube is adjusted such that for 
every red ball dropped from the top there is a chamber through which it passes and in this chamber 
the red ball is swapped for a blue ball.  Is this veridical?  It is not, for the ''quale'' exemplified by the 
ball in the basket is not the quale exemplified by the ball that was dropped into the top.  The ball 
that reaches the basket is not the ball that was dropped.  Even if it is systematic that for every red 
ball dropped a blue ball reaches the basket, it is not veridical in the sense that the ball in the basket 
is identical with the dropped ball.
Now adopt a bundle-theory of objects and let the balls be dropped into another tube which 
decomposes the objects into their constitutent properties and then reassembles new bundles, i.e. new 
objects, from properties of the original objects and, perhaps, new properties that appear ex nihilo in 
the chamber,  and then deposits these into the basket.60  Some of these bundles are the original 
bundles and, perhaps, some not.  There are some rules.  Each bundle can only have one shape, 
perhaps.  Perhaps there are other rules, but these are mysterious.  None of those at the bottom can 
see the balls as they drop into the top, and no one can directly inspect the workings of the machine.
Someone comes along and notes down the qualia, i.e. all of the properties of the balls in the 
58 See Siegel's (2007) discussion of the 'method of phenomenal contrast' for ascertaining the contents of experience for 
a comprehensive discussion of this.
59 Experienced  colours  and  colour  concepts  are  one-to-one  in  this  sense  (excepting  the  determinate-determinable 
dimension).  I do not think that this is a controversial position.  Certainly, I can represent the colour yellow with ''the 
colour of lemons'', but this is not like the content of an experience.
60 And do not not worry too much about any metaphysical problems inherent in this illustrative example!
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basket.  Are these "qualia" properties of objects that were dropped into the tube or not?  This person 
does not know.  But they do know if the ball is red or blue, for it ''being red or blue'' in this analogy 
is for it to be appearing red or blue.  
When I introspect my experience, as the qualia of the balls are inspected, it is not possible 
that the object that appears in my experience could  appear to be any way other than it is in the 
experience, for my experience is its appearing.  To hold otherwise would be equivalent to holding 
that a red sense-datum can be sensed as yellow.  This would be to reintroduce another level of 
sense-data  as  the  sense-data  are  introduced  to  account  for  the  appearance/is  distinction,  and a 
regress would follow.
The spectrum inversion and inverted-earth examples get their purchase from the claim that 
the inverted-experience, say, of the coal still represents the red of the coal, only via a ''blue feeling'' 
experience, and that the inverted-earth experience of the sky represents at first the yellow of the sky 
with a 'blue feeling'  experience,  and then perhaps that this  content switches and the experience 
comes to represent yellow.  These conclusions are incompatible with representationalism (that is not 
Shoemaker's).   However,  as I  have argued,  these scenarios  do not in themselves show that  the 
representational theory is false, for the inversion scenarios only in themselves show that there will  
be misrepresentation when inversion occurs.  The representational thesis can be preserved.  As per 
transparency and Byrne's argument, the properties manifest in experience are the representata of the 
experience and if the representata change it is because the way in which the representation presents 
representata has changed, i.e. the content has changed.
The qualia externalist,  holds that the represented qualitative properties in experience are 
properties of external objects when experiences are veridical.  On regular earth, an inverted subject 
is misrepresenting.  On inverted earth, if I direct my gaze towards the sky and I come to have an 
experience  which  is  internally  indistinguishable  from experiences  on earth,  then  I  will  also  be 
misrepresenting.   If  the  contents  of  the  experience  comes  to  change,  then  the  sky will  appear 
yellow:  the  representatum  will  be  yellow,  and  I  will  have  an  experience  with  "yellow 
phenomenology".61  This does not render the past experience a representation of the blue of the sky 
with a yellow phenomenology: where there was previously a relation to a blue representatum, there 
is  now a  relation  to  a  yellow representatum.   The property  yellow was  not  represented  in  the 
experience previously,  because it was not represented  to me in the sense described above.  My 
experience,  if  it  is  analysed  in  purely  physical  notions,  represents,  in  Grice's  sense  of  natural 
menaing, a host of things none of which are semantically represented to me in the experience.
Inversion scenarios get their anti-representational purchase from a combination with content 
externalism,  representationalism  and  the  assumption  of  qualia  internalism,  i.e.  that  the  qualia 
61 Rather it will appear that the sky is yellow; it will only appear of the sky that it is yellow if the experience is an 
illusory experience of the sky with respect to its colour.
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supervene on the internal state of the subject.  These three these are mutually inconsistent, and one 
of them has to be rejected.  To reject qualia internalism is to reject that the qualia in experience, or 
the phenomenal character of experience, supervene on the internal state of the subject.  As content 
externalism  for  thoughts  is  widely  accepted,62 it  seems  natural  to  accept  the  same  thesis  for 
experiences.   This  is  so even more on a  representationalist  theory.   Qualia  internalism gets  its 
purchase  from  intuition  and  difficulties  arising  thereof  with  respect  to  the  inverted 
spectrum/inverted earth.
These difficulties arise with the question over whether the contents of experiences change on 
inverted earth, whether the contents of thoughts change, whether the qualia change, and how to 
integrate  these  three  dimensions  of  possible  change.   As  I  am defending  a  judgement  theory, 
whereby  experience  is  conceptually  articulated  and  the  very  same  concepts  are  applied  in 
experience  as  are  applied  in  thought,  there  is  no  real  possibility  that  a  concept  as  applied  in 
experience and judgement could alter in its content in one attitude but not the other.  Thus, there is a 
neat reduction here from three possible dimensions of change to two.  Now, one might hold that as  
there are strong intuitions here regarding the possibility of deviation here that this is a point against 
this position.  However, this intuition does not seem to me compelling.  The other intuition is qualia 
internalism, which can be very neatly explicated as a position that bears a very close resemblance to 
a theory on which a brain state, call it B, is identical to, or sufficent for, a sensing of a sense-datum 
with fixed properties.  On this position, fixing  B in  s will result in  s sensing, say, a blue sense-
datum.  This part of the argument is very close to the causal argument from hallucination for sense-
data.  Indeed, as sensing a sense-datum is one type of quale, a relational quale, then the causal 
argument form hallucination for sense-data is but one variation of a general argument of this type.  
However,  should  one  reject  sense-data  and  adverbial  modifications  (which  one  can  for  good 
independent reasons), then it is unclear to me why one should accept this for qualia of any kind.
Note that this position would not be accepted by a proponent of the theory of appearing, for 
a quale on this theory is identified with the appearing relation (on this theory, a quale is a property 
of this  relation).   This generalises to any externalist  theory.   Exactly how a general externalist 
semantical theory is to be cashed out is an enourmous question that I obviously cannot engage with 
here.  Further, I have not engaged with the question of how the inverted earth scenario cashes out 
with  respect  to  a  change in  memory which  accompanies  a  change in  representational  content. 
However, space-constraints mean that I must leave this discussion here.63
62 Although not exclusively accepted.  The externalism to which I am referring is the classic externalism advanved in 
Putnam (1975) and Burge (1986).
63 Tye (1995) and (2000), for example, argues for a causal co-variation account with reference to optimal conditions. 
Dretske (1995) argues for a teleological indicator semantics.  Both of these are subject to general difficulties.   One 
of these, which I do not discuss here is the problem of ''swampan'', a physical duplicate of, say, me, who according  
to (at least many) externalist theories of content would have no intentional states.  I have to say that I do not find 
swampman  a  terribly  troublesome  intuitive  problem.   Indeed,  I  have  no  intuitions at  all  about  swampmen, 
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The threat that these scenarios pose to the representational theory is that they purport to 
cleave apart the dimensions of content and psychology in experience.  In order to do this, it  is  
required that the psychology diverge from the content.  But I have argued that these examples do 
not show this, for the proponent of the representational theory for the representationalist can rebut 
these arguments.
5  Conclusion
I have argued against the above arguments that a phenomenal element, that which is captured on the 
sense-data theory by the sensing of a sense-datum, can deviate from the representational content.  I 
now move on, in chapter 4, to discuss the phenomenal aspect of experience in light of this.  I argue 
that, given that the anti-representational arguments can be resisted, and that there is no element of 
the psychology of experience which deviates from the content leaves the representationalist in the 
position of being able to analyse out the phenomenal notion.  This is achieved by the fact that there 
is no logical difference between experience and thought in respect of introspection.  From there, if a 
content  can  be  given which  explains  the  difference  between experience  and thought,  then  this 
content is the psychological component of experience.  Hence, ''what it is like'' can be identified 
with the representational content.
disembodied brains and the like, and those that I do have are rather externalist.  See, for example, Tye (forthcoming) 
for a recent discussion of this.  That these theories face problems is of course clear, however, as Byrne and Tye 
(2006) point out, because it is not clear which exact general externalist semantical theory we should adopt, it does  
not follow that we should adopt internalism instead.  In respect of inverted-earth, in Block's original inverted-earth  
example, the subject's thought contents come to change as a result of the dominant linguistic community.  However, 
the phenomenal character stays fixed: hence there is a change which is impossible according to representationalism. 
According to Block, if the qualia also changed, the subject would come to notice.  However, the representationalist  
can respond that the memory is also inverted.  See, e.g., Tye (1998) for a discussion of this.  In her discussion of  
these  matters,  Macpherson  (2005)  reaches  the  conclusion that  to  avoid the  traveller  being mistaken  about  the  
contents  of  their  experiences,  the  externalist  should  only  adopt  content  externalism  for  thoughts  based  on 
externalism about experiential content.  Restricted to contents in experience and based on experience, thoughts have 
externalist content, because the experiential content is externalist.  This is to set aside the classic Burge-Putnam  
externalism based (partly) on language community.   However, I am sympathetic to this.  See my discussion of  
Mary's  Room  below,  and  also  the  thrust  of  chapters  5  and  6  is  very  strongly  inclined  to  such  empiricism.  
Macpherson's conclusion is pertinent as regards the theory that I am defending, as she concludes that the externalist  
about experiences should be an externalist about thought contents, which of course are experiential contents for me, 
only if the contents of experiences are external.  If Macpherson's conclusion is correct, that would tie in very neatly  
with my judgement-theory.
85
Chapter 4  ''What it is Like''
1  Introduction
I have argued against sense-data, the adverbial theory, the appearing theory, against the arguments 
that the phenomenal element of experience can deviate from the representational content, from the 
way in which things seem to us, or how things look, transparently in experience.  I have accepted 
transparency, and defended the representational theory. 
Let  me  move  on  now  to  reductive  representationalism,  the  thesis  that  the  phenomenal 
character  is  identical  to  the  representational  content.   Recall,  the  matter  at  hand  is  whether 
experiences have any phenomenal psychological elements which constitutively individuate them as 
a different mode of the mental from judgements.
This brings me to a very tricky exegetical as well as philosophical matter, namely exactly 
what  is  meant  by  terms  such  as  'qualia'  and  'phenomenal  character',  when  the  non-reductive 
representational theory is adhered to.  If it is accepted that the above arguments for the position that 
the psychology of experience can diverge from the representational content can be rejected, then 
what is left of the notion of phenomenal character?  Why think that there is a different supervening 
but not identical property involved?  There are reasons, of course, but in this section I would like to 
question  whether  they are  compelling  ones.   The resulting  position  is  that  experiences  have  a 
content  p  (it  does matter as to the conceptual nature of  p,  but not yet),  and the psychology of 
experience does not deviate from p but the psychology is phenomenal in a way that thinking that p 
is not: the psychology does not diverge from p, but it is not exhausted by it either.
To rehearse the point I quoted Langsam making above, consider an experience with content 
p, and consider a thought that  p.  On this line of thought, one could see (mutatis mutandis other 
modalities)  that  p and  also  judge that  p  (we will  see  that  this  is  only true  on  one  account  of 
experiences,  but  the  intuitive  point  is  what  matters).   In  the  seeing  but  not  thought,  there  is 
''phenomenal character''.  Levine, for example, argues the following about the 'qualitative character'.
Qualitative  character  concerns  the  "what  it  is  like"  for  me:  reddish  or  greenish,  painful  or 
pleasurable,  and the like.   From within the subjective point  of  view I  am presented with these  
qualitative features of experience, or "qualia", as they are called in the literature. Reddishness, for  
instance, is a feature of my experience when I look at my red diskette case.1
1 Levine (2001) p. 7
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So, according to Levine, I can discern the 'reddishness' of my experience of something red.  I am 
focusing here on the difference between experience and thought, the 'phenomenal' difference, and I 
would like to argue that there is no such things as 'reddishness', that there is no such qualitative 
element to experience which differs from thought.2  However, this way of looking at experiences 
faces opposition from the very way in which matters are initially conceived.3  Something  has to 
have been left out.  Here, for example, is Chalmers again.
Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to  very 
different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to  
have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content.4
Consider  representationalism as  defended  so  far.   An  experience  of  a  red  square  is  a  relation 
between s, a content p, and a represented red square.  The visual properties, i.e. red and squareness, 
are properties of the representatum (which may or may not be exemplified).  The psychological 
element is  p:  (loosely) that there is a red square there,  or that that red square is there.5  If the 
proponent of phenomenal character is claiming that phenomenal character is solely the property that 
experiences have and that thoughts lack of making, for example, colours manifest in experience in a 
way that they are not in thought, then once the anti-representational arguments have been rebutted,  
all  that  remains  is  this  different  property  of  experiences,  but  this  is  not  to  invoke  qualia, 
reddishness, etc., in the sense in which this notion is invoked by its proponents as properties of the 
experience  which  are  psychologically  manifest  in  experience.   However,  Kriegel,  for  example, 
begins a recent paper with the following passage.
When you look at the sky, you have what we may call for now a 'blue experience' ... On the one 
hand, the experience is of blueness, in that it  represents something blue. On the other hand, the 
experience feels bluely, if you will, in that there is a distinctive way it is like – from the inside, as it  
were – to undergo experiences of its type; this bluely way-it-is-like is how the experience presents  
itself to introspection. We can call the former aspect of experience its representational content, and 
the latter its phenomenal character.6
Kriegel then says of (reductive) representational theories the following.
2 One way, which I obviously reject, of perhaps arguing for this would be to hold that phenomenal character is just  
one kind of a general such conscious character, a determinate of a determinable for example.  However, even the 
proponents of this position usually hold that there is an equivalent difference between experience and thought, only 
this is a difference in the type of phenomenal character.  See below.
3 Recall many of the passages quoted above.
4 Chalmers (2003) p. 220
5 Of course, most hold this to be non-conceptual below.
6 Kriegel (2002a) p. 175
87
representational  accounts  persistently  give  rise  –  everything  said  and  done  –  to  a  feeling  that  
something essential has been left out in the process of their theorization of conscious  experience; 
indeed, that it is the very experientiality of experience, if you will, that is  missing.7
This is an in principle claim that the 'bluely feel', the experientiality' of experience, must be absent 
in principle on such theories.  This 'bluely feel' is the same as Levine's reddishness' and the same as  
Chalmers'  'phenomenal what it is like',  and Loar's *-properties.  Elsewhere, in response to Tye,  
Kriegel makes it clear that this is indeed so, at least insofar as he is concerned.
there are a priori reasons to suspect that no representational theory could account for the difference 
between phenomenal  and  non-phenomenal  states.  A representational  theory must  claim that  the 
difference  between phenomenal  and  non-phenomenal  states  is  a  difference  in  what  those states  
represent.  Therefore, a representational theory would have to identify certain environmental features  
that all and only phenomenal states represent. But prima facie it seems that every environmental  
feature can be represented either consciously or non- consciously. To suppose otherwise is to affirm 
the existence of environmental features which only lend themselves to conscious representation. It is  
implausible that the world should happen to contain such features.8
However, the first claim here is ambiguous between contents picking out different properties in 
experience and thought, and the content picking out the same properties under a different range of 
contents.9  This difference in range of contents can then be identified as the difference between 
experience and thought, and so the latter claim does not follow.  Nevertheless, something a priori, 
or an "immediately plain fact", or something "obvious",  to some degree underwrites opposition to 
this position.10  The difference between seeing the blue of the sky and thinking about the sky is, it 
seems, an introspectible difference in kind between at least one type of property which thoughts 
lack and which experience have: a specific phenomenal property.  But once the actual examples of 
alleged scenarios in which the content and the phenomenal character diverge have been rebutted,11 
7 Kriegel (2002a) p. 176
8 Kriegel (2002b) p. 56.  This mirrors the point made with respect to physicalism and functionalism that there is an  
essential quality to the mental, especially experience, which these accounts must leave out, only the concern is with  
the  representationalism..   Reductive  representationalism,and functionalism which  is  closely related,  are  usually 
offered as a first step in a physical  account of the mind (e.g., Dretske, Lycan, Harman, Tye) and the attack on 
reductive representationalism is  often an attack on the first  step  in  this  argument.   This  is  not  necessarily so, 
however, as Block, for example, espouses physicalism.
9 See, for example, the debate surrounding Jackson's Mary's Room argument.  I discuss this below.
10 Of course, this is not to say that proponents of the opposing position just point and say "Look!  There they are, and 
that's it.  End of discussion''.  Nevertheless, I think that this is often a case of ingeniously defending an intuition that  
many would not give up no matter what.  See Dennett (1997) for a similar thought.  Qualia, experiential properties,  
something over A-consciousness, etc., seems to be necessary, so this line goes, to avoid the ''hollowing out of the 
mental'', or somesuch less than clear notion, I suspect.
11 Of course, it is rather unlikely proponents of this position will accept these rebuttals.  However, following on from 
the previous note, I wonder if this is because, in part at least, they find these rebuttals implausible because they are 
convinced at the outset of this.  See, e.g., Dretske's (1996) discussion of qualia internalism.
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why think this?  Let me now ask this question in detail.
In §2, I explore the intuition behind the thought that there is ''something that it is like'' which 
experiences have and thoughts lack, some phenomenal element.  I argue that this can be rejected, 
and in §3 and §4 I describe how this can be carried out.
2  The Intuition  
An experience of a red square has the following elements: an object, a relation of some sort between 
the subject and the object, and the subjective psychological element of the experience.  On the 
representational theory of experiences as applied to an experience of a red square, the red square is 
the former, the representation relation the second, and the content the latter.  What has been left out 
if the subjective element of this relation is taken to be psychologically exhausted by the content? 
Consider the following passage from Lycan regarding two distinct meanings of the locutions 'what 
it is like' and 'qualitative character'.
both  expressions,  "qualitative  character"  and  "what  it  is  like"  (as  well  as  "phenomenal  
character/property"), are now ambiguous and in just the same way.  Each has been used to mean the  
sort of qualitative property that characteristically figures in a sensory experience, such as yellow-
orangeness, pitch, or the smell – call these "Q properties".  Each has also been used to mean the 
higher-order property of "what it is like" for the subject to experience the relevant Q-property.  To  
see that these are quite distinct, notice: (i) The higher-order "what it's like" property is higher-order;  
it is a property of the relevant Q-property.  (ii) A Q- property is normally described in one's public  
natural language, while what it is like to experience that Q-property seems to be ineffable.  Suppose 
you are having a yellowy-orange  after-image and Jack asks you, "How, exactly, does the after-image 
look to you as regards color?"  You reply, "It looks yellowy-orange".  "But", persists Jack, "can you  
tell me, descriptively rather than comparatively or demonstratively, what it's like to experience that 
'yellow-orange' look?"  At this point, if you are like me, words fail you; all you can say is, "It's like ...  
this; I can't put it into words".  Thus, the Q-property, the subjective color itself, can be specified in 
ordinary English, but what it is like to experience that Q-property cannot be.12
This passage neatly illustrates an ambiguity.  On the one hand there are what Lycan calls the Q-
properties.  These are the properties of the representata.  On the other hand there is 'what it is like'  
to represent a Q-property.  The former is the 'look' in the sense of a visual property, and the latter an 
element  of the psychological,  subjective look.   The latter  look appears to  be a property of the 
12 Lycan (2004) pp. 98-99
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representation, some sort of property of the experience which supervenes on its terms (setting aside 
phenomenist qualia), one of Loar's supervening *-properties.
So, according to Lycan, the Q-properties, first-order qualia, are properties experienced, i.e. 
properties of the representata.  To ask what a Q-property, i.e. a represented property, is, or what a Q-
property is like, is to ask what, say, red or yellow things are  like.  That is to ask after what is  
experienced.   To  ask  what  is  it  like  to  experience that  property  is  a  question  that  cannot  be 
answered, for it is ineffable, and is not identical to the Q-property or representing the Q-property. 
Lycan puts this that is is a property of the Q-property.  But as experiences are representations of 
properties such as yellow and red, the higher-order property must surely be a higher-order property 
of this relation, and not a higher-order property of the Q-property in itself (otherwise this property is 
a  disposition to  be experienced and that  for that  experience to be the object  of a  higher-order  
thought).  A Q-property is a property like red, and the only higher-order property of red that could 
play this role is that of red (or rather something red) being a Q-property, i.e. its being experienced; 
or, to return to the terminology I quoted Lycan as using in chapter 1, it is for it to be a quale.  But,  
then, this is just to say that in experience red is a quale and in thought it is not.  And what could this 
mean over and above that in experience I represent red differently than I do in thought?  However,  
set this aside temporarily, for there is a matter of exegesis that requires untangling, namely whether 
or not everyone really means the same thing, and, if not, what then do they mean.
Lycan  defends  a  higher-order  theory  of  consciousness  in  general,  but  experiences  are 
different from thoughts in that when they are conscious, i.e. when they are the object of a higher-
order thought, they have a  phenomenal character as opposed to other first-order representations, 
such as my representation of Aristotle.13  Another proponent of this position is Carruthers (2000), 
where  an  equivalent  distinction  is  drawn  between  'worldly  subjectivity'  and  'experiential 
subjectivity'.  Worldly subjectivity and first-order qualia are the same: representations of properties 
and objects.  Experiential subjectivity and first-order qualia are 'what the world is like', i.e. how 
things are represented as being.  For example, reddish-orange.  Lycan and Carruthers hold that an 
experience can have the very same content, and there be something that it is like (namely that  p) 
without there being anything that it is like for the subject.  This requires a higher-order thought, and 
the higher-order thought being directed at the first-order experience is what it is for an experience to 
have a conscious phenomenal character.  The content of the first-order thought is still "doing the 
work", so to speak, but it is not sufficient.14
13 There is an internecine debate between proponents of higher-order theories of consciousness regarding whether or 
not it  ought to be an inner quasi-perception, for example Armstrong (1968) and Lycan (1996), or  thought, for  
example Rosenthal (1985) and (2005).  I will elide this distinction and talk only of higher-order thoughts.
14 Higher-order theories of consciousness in general are not the subject here, but this discussion is central to the way 
that matters are conceived in some of the central literature.  As I leave consciousness in general unanalysed, I need  
not  take  a  stand  on  a  general  theory of  consciousness.   However,  it  must  be  noted  that  it  could  not  be  that  
unconscious  experiences,  if  there  are  such  things,  are  unconscious  judgements  as  there  are  no  such  things  as 
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Matters now become extremely tricky, for it is not always clear as to which theory pertains 
to  which  feature,  or  which  alleged  feature,  of  experiences.   The  first  distinction  is  between 
representationalists  and  phenomenists  about  experiences.   Set  aside  phenomenism  about 
experiences, and focus on the representationalist's two-way supervenience claim, i.e. psychology on 
content and vice-versa.  The supervenience of psychology on content is the standard claim: there 
could be no 'phenomenal' difference without a difference in content.  The opposite direction is also 
required for the judgement-theory: there could be no difference in content without a phenomenal 
difference.  However, my argument here is that once the former supervenience claim is accepted, it 
is  not  clear  that  there  really  is  any notion  of  phenomenal  character  left  that  could  serve  as  a 
supervenience base for the representational content.
According to the representationalist, the red in an experience of a red square is the red of the 
representatum, the red of the red square.  As with Lycan, a quale is an experientially represented 
property.  That an experience has phenomenal character is that it is particular type of representation 
of a property.  So, expressing the content as p, how it seem is: p.  The properties determined of an 
object by p are the qualia: e.g., in Lycan's first-order terms, red and square,  Thus, these qualia are 
not  really  properties  of  the  experience,  but  properties  of  the  representata.   To  ask  how  the 
experience 'feels' is really to ask what the content is.  The experience ''feels like'' that p.  Thus, it 
seems to me that there is not really a robust notion of there being some feel, or something that it is  
like.  Contrast this with, say, Block's theory.  On Block's theory, spectrum inversion is accepted and 
something that looks structurally to me to be very much like the sense-data theory is inferred.  The 
properties manifest in experience are not properties of the representata, but mental paint or mental  
oil, something which has at least some qualitative element.  
There is a ''feel'' to experience, a phenomenal character, in the sense that there are properties 
exemplified, or objects sensed (although Block does not say this) which have qualitative properties, 
and this is defined in direct opposition to thought.15  
The  notion  of  the  experiential  'phenomenal'  is  defined  in  direct  contrast  to  thought. 
However, just as it does not immediately follow from the difference between experience and non-
experiential thought that there is a sensing relation to sense-data, it likewise does not immediately 
follow that there are other qualia either.  Consider this argument.  The sense-data theory assumes 
unconscious judgements.  Recourse to a higher-order theory of consciousness would only be necessary if there was a 
persuasive argument to the effect that there is some problem which a first-order theory of consciousness in general 
cannot handle.  I do not think that there is, but to argue for this would exceed the scope of the thesis as it pertains to  
perception.  The distinction, used by Levine above of there being a difference between what the object of experience 
is like and what it is like for the subject, if taken to enforce a distinction in elements of experience which supports a  
higher-order theory in general, is not one that seem to me to be persuasive.  The argument here is that p characterises 
how things are, but not how things are for me: this is a separate subjective element.  However, if s judges or sees that 
p, then how things are for s is that p, and this covers both elements as p is the content of s's judgement or experience. 
See, for example, Byrne's (2004) Section 4 Part 1 discussion of Rosenthal's (2002) use of this distinction.
15 This is in fact the way in which Lewis (1929) introduces the word 'quale', as a property of 'the given'.  This is very  
close to a sense-data theory on which qualia are properties of sense-data and experiences are sensings of sense-data.
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(on  the  basis  of,  to  my mind  at  least,  a  rather  unsound  set  of  observations)  the  phenomenal 
principle, the sensing relation and sense-data.  The reason that I rejected  this apparatus is that I 
found that there are good arguments against it, and these good arguments turn on the rejection of the 
phenomenal principle in favour of an understanding of ''looks'' which is, or is closely related to, 
Jackson's epistemic use.  This use of looks is actually an analysis of the relation that the proponent 
of sense-data (mistakenly) analyses as the sensing relation.  If the use is genuinely epistemic, then 
there  are  no  more  sense-data,  or  relational  qualia,  in  experience  as  there  are  in  thought,  the 
canonical example of an epistemic attitude.  Once one finds oneself unpersuaded by the arguments 
that there are psychological elements which can deviate from the content, although one may find 
difficulty  with  further  features  of,  for  example,  Dretske  and  Tye's  theories,  should  one  of  the 
difficulties be that they have failed to account in some way for some psychological element of 
phenomenal character or qualia?
Lycan  is  in  agreement  with  Tye  and Dretske  that  the  problems posed by,  for  example, 
Block's  inversion scenarios  do not  validate  the anti-representationalist  claim that  there is  some 
psychological element that does not supervene on the content.  He is in agreement with Tye and 
Dretske that experience, as opposed to thought, need not be partially analysed in terms of (for the 
sake of argument) monadic experiential qualia.  Tye and Dretske still think that experience is not 
just thought, and Lycan agrees.  Here, however, there is a parting of opinion.  Tye and Dretske hold 
that  experiences  are  phenomenal  mental  acts  because  of  their  content,  specifically  the  type  of 
content,  and the  functional  role  of  experience,  and Lycan because  they are  also the  objects  of 
higher-order thought.  According to Lycan, the higher-order quale is the first-order experience being 
the representatum of a higher-order mental act. 
According  to  Lycan  and  also  Carruthers,16 an  experience  could  have  the  same  content 
whether or not the subject was phenomenally conscious of the experience.17  Consider Armstong's 
(1981)  sleepy  lorry-driver  who  suddenly  "comes-to"  after  a  long  period  of  driving  unawares. 
Presumably, he managed to navigate the road for an extended period of time through something 
other  than  mere  chance  when  he  "switched  off".   Speaking  with  the  lack  of  care  inherent  in 
everyday talk, the driver "saw the road but wasn't conscious of it".  We can perhaps draw from this 
that it is possible to see y and not be aware of y or conscious of y, or to see y but not be aware or 
16 And also Rosenthal, who puts forward this position even with regard to a Blockian phenomenist quale!
17 This is not a very helpful use of the word ''experience'' as some experiences are non-conscious.  ''Experience'' could 
be replaced by "representational state with a certain content".  This makes Lycan's and Carruthers' first-order states 
look rather like sub-personal states.  Maund (2002) makes this point specifically with respect to Tye and Dretske's 
non-conceptual content (non-epistemic seeing), and mentions, at p. 38, that Heil also raises the same question as 
Dretske.  Of course,  Heil  (1983) defends a theory similar to the theory that  I  am defending here,  and anyone 
sympathetic to a conceptualism about experiences will wonder whether or not non-conceptual content is really sub-
personal content.  There is a problem of interpretation with regard to Evans (1982) concerning this, where the notion 
is introduced.
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conscious of seeing it, and that one can experience that  p unconsciously.18 Lycan and Carruthers 
explicitly  draw  from  examples  like  this  that  there  is  level  of  first-order  qualia  or  worldly 
subjectivity which is not in itself intrinsically phenomenally conscious, although it is phenomenal, 
and  a  level  of  higher-order  qualia  or  experiential  subjectivity,  whereby  the  former  becomes 
phenomenally  conscious.  Thus, the very same distinction between non-phenomenal thought and 
phenomenal experience is maintained, only it is made with respect to an independent difference: the 
first-order experiential content requires supplementation by a higher-order thought in order for there 
to be a phenomenally conscious experience, but this phenomenal consciousness is still a feature of 
experiences but not thought.19
The  central  contention  that  I  am rebutting  here  is  that  typified  in  many of  the  quoted 
passages, namely that there is a quality to experience which will always be lacking on a judgement-
theory.  I am in agreement with Lycan that the locution “what it is like” is not useful, despite its 
ubiquity.  However, it seems to me not to be useful not because it is ambiguous, but because it is not 
clear that it is at all required.  There seems to me be nothing that a judgement-theory will leave out,  
if, that is, representationalism is accepted.20
18 Neither of these are linguistically very pleasing.  Note that this is different from a case where, for example, I see a  
white rabbit in a snowy field, but I see it as a patch of snow.  In this case, I definitely did see the rabbit, and I was  
conscious and aware of this, only I saw the rabbit as a patch of snow.
19 So,  Block's  view,  as  I  understand  it,  is  that  experiences  are  representational,  but  the  phenomenal character  is 
identified with the exemplification of P-consciousness properties, mental paint (and maybe mental oil).  Strip away 
this mental paint and, (unless some version of inverse-representationalism is adopted) the content could remain the 
same but the "phenomenological light" would go out: there would be nothing that it is ''like'' in the phenomenal  
sense.  There would still be some conscious occurrent mental activity, for there would be A-consciousness (this is  
the solution for blindsight).  This is a different picture from the Lycan-Carruthers view.  Stripping off the mental 
paint "puts the light out" for Block, but in order to "put the light out" for Lycan and Carruthers it is a different  
property that is removed, namely the higher-order relation.  This job is done for Block by mental paint and mental  
oil on the first-order level, so to speak.  The "inner light" for Block appear to be (the relation that subjects are in to,  
or the exemplification of) the properties that Russell would have taken to be properties of sense-data, that Peacocke  
takes to be primed properties of the visual field, and that the adverbialist takes to be monadic properties of the mind. 
This is also Chalmers' position, but, unlike Peacocke and Block, Chalmers does not believe in phenomenist qualia.  
On an inverse-representational theory, the content supervenes on the exemplification of these properties and so to  
remove these properties is to remove experiential consciousness in toto. Unlike Block, for whom stripping away the 
mental paint leaves the subject solely A-conscious, unless the P-consciousness is the vehicle of A-consciousness and 
not merely attendant mental paint (in which case Block would be an inverse-representationalist; sometimes Block is 
a little unclear as to which of these options he favours).  According to Lycan and Carruthers, the subject can be  
visually  conscious of  the  red  square,  but  not  phenomenally conscious  of  the  (experience  of  the)  red  square. 
However, being merely visually conscious, but not phenomenally conscious, is not what being solely A-conscious is  
for Block because being A-conscious for Block is still for the subject to be in an occurrent, conscious, mental state 
(or at least I take this to be the difference between Block's A-consciousness in experience, and Lycan and Carruthers'  
non-conscious experiences).  For Lycan and Carruthers, first-order states are not really conscious states at all in the  
sense that there be an element of "for-me-ness" which is required for conscious experience, until they are the objects 
of higher-order states.  As far as I can see, Rosenthal invokes all of these properties and relations, only the higher-
order  level  is  representational,  and the first-order  level  phenomenist!   Lycan  and Carruthers  have a  dual-level 
representationalism, with the higher-order representational level again being the locus of consciousness.  Tye and 
Dretske defend a first-order representational theory of consciousness, as does Block except his is a phenomenist 
theory.   The  present  point,  namely  whether  there  really  is  anything  like  a  phenomenal  distinction  between  
experience and thought in a robust sense, does not turn on a higher-order or first-order theory,  except for the fact 
that,  as  I  am  defending  a  judgement-theory,  experiences  must  be  conscious  first-order  as  there  can  be  no 
unconscious judgements (I take this to be a matter of definition: it might even turn out to be better for me if there 
could be unconscious judgements; but there cannot).
20 Hence, the question of inverse-representationalism falls away.  Standard representationalism is the position that the 
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3  Leaving Something Out?
This  position  is  not  often  put  forward.   Dennett,  especially (1997),21 is  an exception,  and also 
Pitcher (1971).22  Dennett defines the standard notion of qualia in the first paragraph as follows.
Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you . The particular personal, subjective  visual 
quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment.  The way the milk  
tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory 
quale ... let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descarte's evil demon, 
and yet what the figment is made of  (for you) will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences.23
The last sentence makes qualia look like qualia in Lycan's first-order sense, the first sentences as 
qualia in the other sense, i.e. a property of the experience (which is not the property of having a 
range of content).  We are asked to focus not on the way that it is, but on the way it looks.  But this  
is: "white", "liquid", "in that glass", "on the table", and so on.24  Familiarly, its looking that way has 
none of these properties.  Its looking that way is my being visually conscious of it (otherwise it  
would always look that way, as opposed to sometimes its visual properties, which are the properties 
it always has, sometimes being seen!).  The representational analysis of this is that it is represented 
under a content, and if there are no psychological elements to the experience other than this content, 
then this exhausts the way that it looks.
This is the position of Dretske, Harman, and Tye (as well as Lycan and Carruthers, with the 
phenomenal character supervenes on the content.  This is non-reductive.  But I am arguing that the non-reductive 
position leaves nothing out,  and so we can move straight  to reductive or  eliminative representationalism.  The 
question  of  inverse-representationalism now falls  away,  for  there  is  no  distinction  to  be  made  as  there  is  no  
phenomenal notion to invoke.
21 However, I do not want to rely on Dennett's verificationist arguments.  Dennett also seems to be targeting the very 
notion  of  consciousness itself  as  construed  by  many  participants  in  the  debate,  and  not  merely  phenomenal  
consciousness as distinct from the consciousness involved in thought, even though his examples are experiential.
22 'There can be no doubt that one's first reaction to the thesis that seeing something consists of nothing but acquiring 
certain true beliefs about it by use of one's eyes is to dismiss it as obviously false ... If, for example, our man with 
the insect on his paper comes, as the result of using his eyes in a certain way - I mean, by looking at the insect and  
the paper - to believe, truly, and in fact to know, such things as that there is a piece of paper lying before him  ... and  
so on - then is this not enough to constitute his actually seeing the insect and the piece of paper.  What more could  
be required?  It will doubtless be objected that what is left out of this account is the very essence of seeing - namely  
the sensous visual presentation or manifold.  But the answer to his might well be that to be aware of, or to have, that 
visual presentation or manifold just is to know, by means of using one's eyes that there is apiece of paper ...'  Pitcher 
(1971)  p.  66.   This  is  a  "no-experiences"  theory,  as  Pitcher  takes  perceptions  to  be  purely sub-personal  non-
conscious causal events which merely dispose us to believe, although he does speak, at pp. 56-58, of the acquisition 
as possibly a conscious event.  I discuss Pitcher's theory, and his objection to mine, in more detail below, where I  
argue for a judgement-theory (which according to Pitcher is 'absurd'!).  Armstrong (1968) and Roxbee-Cox (1971) 
also defend similar theories.
23 Dennett (1997) p. 619
24 How it tastes is difficult to put into words, but this is likely because we do not require words of such detail in order 
to practically communicate.  After all, the level and range of detail in vision, for which our language is more finely  
honed, is far greater than in auditory perception or in taste.  Nevertheless, we do have the demonstrative "that", 
which suffices if the property determined is commonly available.
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proviso regarding a second-order theory of consciousness in general).  The red in experience is a 
property of the red square, and this is the 'quale'.  If it is conceded that the experience does not 
possess any of these properties for the experience is a representation of these properties and only the 
relata possess these properties, and the relata are not sense-data but the same objects that are the 
objects of thoughts, the difference between experience and thought comes down to a difference in 
the  content  and  the  properties  of  the  object  that  feature  in  the  content,  or  a  difference  in 
attitude/functional role.
Recall  intermodal  and  intramodal  representationalism  from  chapter  3.   The  intramodal 
representationalalist holds that there is a psychological component inherent in each modality;  in 
contrast, the intermodal representationalist holds that there is a different range of contents for each 
modality.25  Experiences, on the reductive-representational view, can differ from judgement in two 
ways.  One, the experience has a different functional role.26  Two, the experience has a different 
content.   Both Tye and Dretske accept these two theses, but this makes the difference between 
thought and experience look rather like the difference between, say, touch and sight: and I have 
already argued that the analysis of this difference need not invoke qualia.27  Tye and Dretske, and 
Lycan and Carruthers, however, analyse the difference in content as a difference in type of content, 
i.e. non-conceptual, and not the range of content.  Thus in a weak sense, they still advocate a form 
of qualia where qualia are psychologically manifest elements of experiences which are absent from 
judgements: qualia are non-conceptual contents.  Exactly how a content being non-conceptual itself 
should explain why experiences have phenomenal character is a little unclear to me.28
To say that qualia are properties of representata is to dramatically weaken the position if the 
representational content is non-conceptual and the difference between thought consists in this (and 
perhaps a difference in functional role).  On Dretske's view, the question about what it is like to see 
red is just a question as to what red is.   However, although this is in essence correct, in my opinion,  
it has to be rephrased slightly.  For what red is like is red, but what it is like to see red is that  p, 
where  p is something like ''there is something red over there'', only as we will see below, if the  
content is non-conceptual there are difficulties.29 
25 The consequence of this is that the modalities are at least partially defined in terms of the content.
26 Kriegel (2002b) argues that this renders the representational theory really a brand of functionalism in disguise: the 
difference in psychology is analysed as a difference in functional role.  However, I am really denying that there is a 
difference in psychology in kind or type, and so this argument, even if it effective against, say Tye or Dretske, is less  
effective against the theory being proposed here.
27 Or, rather, I sketched a common position in the literature.  It is generally accepted that there is at least a very good  
probability that the intermodal representational position can be elucidated and defended successfully.
28 See my discussion of this in chapter 5.
29 For example, Dretske says that 'knowing what bats, fish, and neighbours experience is, in principle, no different 
from knowing how things ''seem'' to a measuring instrument. In both cases it is a question of  determining how a  
system is representing the world'.  Dretske (1995) pp. 81-82.  How the system is representing the world is different  
from that which is represented.  But the representation is transparent to the representata.  So, strictly speaking, how 
things seem to me when I see red is not red, for that would make the seeming red, but ''that there is a red thing there''  
or somesuch.  Only representing ''that there is a red thing there''  is to experience the red directly, at least on the 
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I think that the difference between seeing red and thinking of red is, then, that in one case 
red is before the mind in a particular way and in the other not.  The difference between what seeing 
red is like and what thinking about red is like is, I would say, that in seeing red what red is is 
revealed  in  the  way that  we call  visual.30  I  contend that  none of  this,  however,  is  enough to 
introduce qualia in any form.  Consider again Tye's description of transparency.
you are directly aware of a range of qualities which you experience as being qualities of  surfaces at 
various  distances  away  and  orientations  and  thereby  via  introspection,  you  are   aware  of  the 
phenomenal character of experience.  By being aware of external qualities, you  are aware of what it 
is like for you.31
This makes it look rather like Tye is arguing that phenomenal character is something that one is 
aware of by being aware of external qualities.   But this is nothing that one is not aware of in  
experience.  Perhaps one can compare an experience of red with a thought of red, and thereby come 
to know that  there  is  a  difference.   But  the  difference now perhaps is  only that  in  experience 
external qualities such as red are ''revealed'' (my way of putting it) in a way that they are not in 
thought.  In a reply to Maund who enquires about this, Tye says the following. 
if you try to introspect a visual experience, say, you will certainly become aware that you are directly 
aware of various surfaces and qualities, which you experience as being qualities of the surfaces, but 
you will not find yourself being aware, as you introspect, of an inner token experience or of any 
qualities of an inner experience. By being aware of the qualities and surfaces outside (or apparently 
outside), you are aware that you have an experience with  a certain phenomenal character. That is  
all.32
Maund wonders why say that there is a phenomenal character to the experience at all.
Tye’s theory is that the phenomenal qualities that we discriminate are qualities specifiable in the 
content of the experience, and are not intrinsic qualities of the experience. But if this is so, Tye’s 
theory is that the phenomenal qualities that we discriminate are qualities specifiable in the content of 
theory that I am defending.  As a mere measuring system arguably (at the very least) cannot take up the content of 
this representation into its cognitive or further rational system as the measuring machine is not a subject, it is (very) 
unlikely that the machine is really having an experience.  Demarcating the mental is a problem for a theory like  
Dretske's, but I do not engage with this matter here. It seems to me that Dretske has a problem with this element of 
his theory, but it seems to me that he is quite correct about qualia as standardly conceived.
30 Likely, I would say, because as a matter of fact, colours can only be known through vision.  Hence, these two 
notions, vision, and visual properties, are inter-defined.  This is not circular, however, as visual properties is a name 
for a class of properties and not an analysis of what they are.
31 Tye (2002b) p. 48.  I have rephrased this as Tye states in his reply to Maund.
32 Tye (2002) p. 48
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the experience, and are not intrinsic qualities of the experience. But if this is so, I find it difficult to  
understand  how  there  is  a  difference  between  what  results  when  I  introspect  my  perceptual 
experience of a brown shoe on the floor as opposed to what results when I introspect my belief that  
there is a brown shoe.33
Maund's  point  applies  not  only  to  Tye,  but  to  any  proponent  of  transparency  and 
representationalism.34  Maund takes the above to be an implausibility.  In his reply, Tye takes Maund 
to have mis-stated his thesis.  He says that the introspected content is non-conceptual, abstract (i.e. 
general and not particular) and that is poised in a certain way as regards thought and action.35  But 
why should such things result in experiences having a  phenomenal character?  Why not just say 
there is not really such a thing as phenomenal character, and do away with the notion?
I see the brown shoe.  How does it look?  Let us say that it looks to be brown.  But the shoe 
is brown (at least insofar as it is represented as brown), the  way that it  looks is "brown",36 not 
brown.  The ''is'' here is attributive and not exemplificative. I can focus on the brown of the shoe, or 
on the way that it looks, i.e. "brown".  Now, consider my thought that the brown shoe is there.  I can 
focus on the object of the thought, the shoe, and its represented properties, one of which is its being  
brown,  or  on the  way that  I  think of  it,  as  "brown".   Maund interprets  Tye's  theory as  purely 
representational-relational in the sense that it is solely a relation to a propositional content and not 
(also) to an object, and so he thinks of introspection of experience as introspecting a mental act 
which is solely a relation to a content.  And, as the content and the experience do not have the 
features of its elements, to introspect the content is to introspect something that is not brown.37  Tye, 
however,  thinks  that  as  the  proposition  itself  contains  the  property  brown,  unlike  a  conceptual 
proposition  which  contains  only,  say,  the  concept  BROWN,  then  the  property  brown can  be 
introspected.  However, as the way that things look is not brown, even if the content contains the 
property of being brown, or something that is brown, then Maund is correct: all that there is to  
introspect is that it looks brown, or that it is thought of as brown; i.e. that it is represented as brown.  
The point is that apart from the fact that in the experience I know of brown in a way that I do not in  
33 Maund (2002) p. 38
34 Disjunctive proponents of transparency will have to analyse experiences in terms of a sensing relation, or something 
similar.  This is why, for example, Alston and Langsam present the disjunctive theory as a modern version of the 
theory of appearing with a primitive appearing relation.  It is really not clear, to me at any rate, how to gloss, for  
example, Travis' (2004) notion of ''openness'' to the world in any way other than this openness being a relation  
between myself and the world.  After all, it is no good the till being open if no one puts their hand in it.
35 Although Tye (2007b) and (2009b) has changed his mind on this somewhat.
36 This is conceptualised, and perhaps the proponent of non-conceptual content will hold that there should be some 
notation to show that the way it looks is actually ineffable.  See, e.g., Byrne (2002), who defends the  ineffability of  
experiential content, and also Raffman (1995).  Raffman's defence, however, is premised on an account of memory 
which the conceptualist is required to reject.  I discuss this rejection below.  I briefly discuss Byrne's argument 
below, as he neatly sets matters up in a manner conducive to highlighting the move that I am advocating.
37 Note that I am interpreting some short remarks from Maund, and I may be misinterpreting him.  Raffman (2008) 
Section 1 seems to have the same interpretation of Tye as Maund, and the same view of its implausibility as regards 
the existence of qualia.
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thought,  there  is  no  difference  in  this  respect  between  the  thought  and  the  experience  in 
introspection.
I focus on the property brown (or an instance thereof) and I come to know, according to Tye, 
of the experience's phenomenal character.  But this is to focus on a property of the  object of the 
mental act.  Alternatively, I can focus on the content, the way that it looks.  But this is just to focus 
on how it looks, i.e. that it "looks brown", and its looking brown is its being represented as brown. 
This is a feature that thoughts have in common, and so Maund, I think, is in fact correct.38  
The ''introspection'' of, better, focusing on, the way that the object  is as thought , i.e. the 
representatum, when it is thought of (i.e. as brown, as opposed to my thinking of it as ''brown'') does 
not reveal the property to me in the way that an experience does because it  is not there to be 
experienced, only thought of, and so the property as revealed in the experience is not itself there in 
the same way.  But this is only to say that it is not experienced.  But the property as a property of  
the object of the thought is there to be introspected in logically the same way.  The difference, then, 
as concerns thoughts and experiences is not a logical difference, for in each case there is the way 
that the object is as represented, i.e. the way that it is before the mind under the content, and then 
there is its being before the mind under that content which can be introspected.  The difference is 
only that we seem to have more information about what brown is solely in virtue of the experience 
as opposed to the thought.  Can this be defended?
4  Experiences and Thoughts
One may disagree with the claim made at the end of the last section, but no consideration so far 
adduced against this is one that I find compelling.  I do not take this to be an absurdity,  but a  
consequence of accepting transparency.  Consider the following two thoughts about circles.
(1) Circles are the most common shapes of outdoor cafe table-tops.39
(2) Circles are geometric shapes on a plane with each point equidistant from a single  
point.
Here are two thoughts about circles, only one of which allows me to know of the property expressed 
by "circle" in a way in which the "nature" of circles is made manifest to me. 40  This is parallel to the 
38 I  stress  again  that  I  think that  this  is  what  Maund  means  and  rejects,  as  Maund  rejects  transparency  and 
representationalism and defends a qualia-theory.  See Maund (2008).
39 I guess this is true, it certainly seems true from experience.
40 Obviously, this is barely even to scratch the surface with respect to the issues involved here. It may be replied to 
this, for example, that the application of CIRCLE here only reveals the nature of circles as a matter of definition or  
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difference between the experience of the brown shoe, and the thought about the brown shoe.  If it 
can be established that the independent arguments against the judgement-theory can be rebutted, a 
task I undertake in chapters 5 and 6, then the difference between the experience of the brown shoe 
and a thought of the brown shoe is comparable in the relevant respect to the difference between (1) 
and (2).  And just as nothing "phenomenal" in respect of circles follows about properties of the act 
or  the  psychology of  judging (1)  as  opposed  to  (2),  so  nothing  phenomenal  follows  about  an 
experience, analysed as a thought, of the brown shoe as opposed to a non-experiential thought about 
the brown shoe.  
We may say that the property brown is a phenomenal property, and the concept BROWN, or 
whatever  concept  is  relevantly applied  in  an experience of  brown in  the  way that  the  concept 
CIRCLE is applied in (2), is a phenomenal concept, but this makes this concept a type of concept 
that  applies  to  properties  to  which  the  experience  is  a  relation  and  (via  a  mediating  but  not  
interposing range content articulated with this concept), and not to the experience itself.
The notion of a phenomenal concept is standardly invoked in discussion of experience as 
opposed to thought.   This notion can have various meanings, but the core meaning is that it is a  
concept which can only be acquired and/or applied on the basis of undergoing an experience.41  On 
what I take to be the standard use, a phenomenal concept applies to the very quality of 'what it is  
like' to which I am objecting.  So, what is introspected in the experience of the brown shoe, and 
what is lacking in the thought of the brown shoe, is conceptualised under a phenomenal concept 
which picks out this property of experiences - the property to which many quoted passages have 
been making reference.  However, the phenomenal concept need not apply to a property of the 
experience, other than that the experience has the property of having a certain range or type of 
content.42  That experience brings before the mind objects and properties in a way that thought does 
not, does not imply that experience has any properties other than this.43  
Harman, for example, originally argued in that the phenomenal concept involved (or one of 
explanation, and not merely in and of the application of the concept itself.  For example, CIRCLE is a structured  
concept, and RED, or a least RED21 is not.  However, there are presumably unstructured non-experiential concepts. 
But even if this were not so, this would only imply that the concepts applied in experience behave differently from 
concepts applied in thought.  As experiences are, on the proposed theory, a sub-class of judgements, this should not  
be surprising as this class of judgements behave differently from other judgements, and likewise the concepts that 
feature therein.  I discuss these issues in greater detail below.  There is the further problem that one may hold that  
there is a certainty to visual introspection and the knowledge of properties: I absolutely certainly know what red is  
when I see it, but, as indeed may be show by the incorrectness of (1), I may be misinformed in thought as to what 
the property is.  But if one acquires CIRCLE through (1), and most cafe table-tops are square, then one does not  
have the same concept as someone who acquires it through (2) (I think that this is a metalinguistic concept).
41 For example, in a recent paper,  Ball  (2010) p. 937, defines a phenomenal concept as a concept C meeting the 
following three conditions: there is some phenomenal experience type e, and some property p, such that experience 
tokens fall under e in virtue of their relation to  p; C refers to  p; under normal circumstances, a human being can 
possess C only if she has had an experience of type e.
42 Tye, for example, holds this with respect to type, i.e. non-conceptual, and I am arguing for a range of conceptual  
content.
43 Of course, this still individuates experiences from thoughts in the sense that experiences have this property and other 
thoughts do not, but this is extremely weak, and something that any theory will accept.
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them) in seeing the brown shoe is the concept BROWN as it is applied to the brown of the shoe, and 
not a concept that applies to the experience.  According to Harman, the concept is defined via its 
functional role,  that of being acquired in virtue of the visual experience of something brown.44 
Subjects who have not experienced brown will lack the concept BROWN, or at least lack it in the  
full  sense.   They  may  possess  a  metalinguistic  concept,  something  like  THE  PROPERTY 
DENOTED BY THE CONCEPT "BROWN".   This  still  leaves  experiences  as  non-conceptual 
representations with a content that features the property brown in some way.  Thus, as with Tye and 
Dretske, what it is for an experience to have phenomenal character is for that experience to be a  
non-conceptual  content  (plus  functional  role).   On this  argument,  the  'qualia'  are  properties  of 
representata, and for an experience to have qualia, i.e. for it to have phenomenal character, is for it  
to have a non-conceptual content (and a functional role).  This, according to proponents of this 
position,  is  the  difference  between  experience  and thought,  and  in  what  phenomenal  character 
consists.
In defending a judgement-theory, I am defending the position that the object of experience is 
an object of judgement, and that the content of experience is the content of a judgement.  Holding to 
the  distinction  between  the  act,  the  content  and  the  object,  I  identify  the  psychology  of  the 
experience or the subjective element of the experience with the content.  This is ''what it is like''.  
So, in seeing the brown shoe, ''what it is like'' is the content p.  So, and this needs to be stressed, I 
am not denying that there is something that it  is like to see that  p, I  am only denying that the 
analysis of "s sees that p" as opposed to "s judges that p" will make recourse to any distinct notions, 
specifically any qualia.  I am not, therefore, denying that one can introspect one's experience as 
opposed to the object of the experience, for s can introspect the appearance of the object, only this 
appearance is ''it looks to me that  p'', and not any qualitative properties of the experience.  One 
cannot really introspect the object of the experience, for being aware of the object is experiencing.  I 
am also not really denying logical privacy for, although I hold that the concepts used are concepts 
available  to  all  as they are used to  denote properties available  to  all,  experiences  are  logically 
private  in  the sense that  they are relations  which feature a  subject  and could feature no other. 
Hence, this experience is not available to anyone else.  
What about the claim that experiences are ''ineffable''.   According to google's dictionary, 
''ineffable'' means ''Too great or extreme to be expressed or described in words''.  Even though one 
cannot report all of one's experience at a time verbally, and although our language lacks perhaps 
words which can be used outside of experiential contexts (e.g. remembering the exact shape of 
some object) to refer to very specific properties, and it perhaps follows from this that something like 
the position that experiences have contents that are not expressible in  certain words in certain  
44 Harman (1997) pp. 669-671.  Harman is defending a thoroughgoing functionalism.
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contexts, this does not really say very much at all about experiences and their contents or features 
other than that they have this relation to words in verbal language.   I defend this below.
The position I am defending therefore only encroaches on the debate surrounding dualism in 
the sense that I am denying that there is a particular type of experiential subjectivity, analysed in  
terms the exemplification of experiential qualia, which can be used to motivate these arguments.45  I 
think that there is subjectivity, in a sense ''what it is like'' to experience, only I am arguing that this 
is the same phenomenon that is found in judgement.  One may think, for example, that reflection on 
thought in general as a perspectival locus of subjectivity gives rise to an explanatory gap, or to an a 
priori problem about the reduction of the mental to the physical.46  To hold that what it is like to see 
the brown shoe, i.e. what it is like to have an experience with the content involved in seeing the 
brown shoe is somehow "different" from what it is like to judge that the brown shoe is on the floor,  
however, is to hold that there is a difference in the subjective quality of applying these different 
concepts,  and  not in  the  exemplification  of  different  qualitative  properties  of  the  mental.   A 
phenomenal concept, therefore, if defined as a concept that applies to properties of experiences, is a 
concept that applies to the property that experiences have of having concepts of a certain range, and 
thereby bringing certain objects and properties before the mind in a way that we may otherwise be 
unable to bring before the mind if we lacked these concepts.47
One anti-physicalist  argument, that of the debate about Mary's  Room is, though, closely 
related, as it turns on the differences between experience and thought.  I am claiming here that there 
is  a  difference,  only this  difference is  between the range of concepts  applied.48  In  subsequent 
chapters, I defend conceptualism about experiences and define the concepts in experience that serve 
to  individuate  experiences  from  thoughts.   One  kind  of  concept  applied  in  experience  is  a 
demonstrative concept, and there is a point about demonstrative concepts that bears on the current 
matter.  One may put it that a demonstrative concept is applied, say, only in the presence of the 
sample.   This  is  in  contrast  to  non-demonstrative  concepts.   On a representational  theory,  that 
defended by Tye or  Dretske,  the presence  of  the  sample will  be analysed as  a  non-conceptual 
representation,  and  the  phenomenal  concept  will  be  applied  either  to  this  non-conceptual 
45 See Chalmers (1996) for  contemporary locus classicus of this dualist argument.
46 There is something 'that it is like', in this sense, for me to see the brown shoe, namely "that there is a brown shoe 
over there".  Remove myself from the world, and although the brown shoe is still there, that the brown shoe is there 
for me, i.e. my experience and its content are not there any more.  I am not denying this.
47 Compare, for example, Stoljar's (2005) typical characterisation of what he calls 'Experience Thesis' with respect to  
phenomenal concepts, which gives a necessary condition for  a concept to be a phenomenal concept, to Ball's above:  
s possesses the phenomenal concept C of experience  e only if  s has actually had experience e.  Here the concept 
applies to the experience, and is not acquired in virtue of the experience.
48 See Jackson (1982).  The argument is that Mary knows all of the physical facts about colour but is confined in a  
black and white room.  When she exits the room ans sees something red, she comes to know 'what experiencing red 
is like'.   Hence, as she knows all the physical facts, she must come to know some non-physical fact about her  
experiences.
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experience, or somehow extracted from it.49  Drestke, in defending representationalism, compares 
qualia to 'observational properties'.
If qualia are understood (as I understand them) to be be qualities that, in having an experience, one is 
consciously aware of - those qualities (therefore) that, from a first person point of view, distinguish 
one type of experience from another - then qualia are a subset of objective, physical properties - what  
used to be called observational properties.50
The conceptual correlate of an observational property is an observational concept, a concept which 
can  only  be  acquired,  or  even  applied,  on  the  basis  of  observing  an  observational  property.51 
Transparency plus representationalism plus the thesis that 'qualia' are really observational properties 
will result  in the position that experiences are the applications of observational concepts.  This 
imports only a distinction between observational properties and non-observational properties and 
thus observational concepts and non-observational concepts.  No notion of phenomenal character 
over and above a distinction between these concepts is implied.  Experiences have a richer content, 
or a content of some other yet to be defined kind, and in virtue of this richer content make available 
a greater range of properties of their object.  Dennett, for example, makes this point.
There is no upper bound on the richness of content of a proposition.  So it would be a  confusion - a 
simple  but  ubiquitous  confusion  -  to  suppose  that  since  a  perceptual  state  has   such-and-such 
richness, it cannot be a propositional state, but must be a perceptual state  (whatever that might be )  
instead.52
For Dretske and Tye, this  is  captured by the experience having a non-conceptual content  (plus 
further features).  However, Dennett is, it seems to me, correct about this.  To assert that there is a 
difference in kind is just that, to assert it.  Independent arguments are required.  Many of these 
independent arguments are against experiential conceptualism, and I rebut these below.  The  in  
principle argument which is being discussed here is not one that I accept, and as it is an in principle 
argument, I am under no obligation to accept it.
The focus here is on what a judgement-theory leaves out, not how to defend the judgement 
49 This is to defend reductive representationalism, but with a content which is ineffable, as non-conceptual contents 
can only be expressed via conceptualisation.  Thus, the phenomenal character of experience on this theory has this 
property in common with classical qualia.  Balog (2009) p. 311 notes that non-conceptual content plays the role of  
Sellars'  'given',  something  which  is  not  always  made  clear  by  proponents  of  non-conceptual  reductive 
representationalism.
50 Dretske (2003) p. 67
51 Compare this to Ball's definition of a phenomenal concept.
52 Dennett (1996) p. 162.  Pitcher (1971) p. 72 also makes this point.
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theory against independent arguments.53  Recall Maund's brown shoe.  It does not leave out the 
brown of the shoe, for by hypothesis to judge of the shoe that p, where p features the concepts the 
application of which bring the property before the mind, and it  does not leave out the relation 
between the subject and the shoe, for the subject applies a concept to the shoe and in doing so is 
related to the shoe.  And, most importantly, it does not leave out the look of the shoe: it could not 
leave out the look of the shoe, for the look of the shoe, i.e. the looking of the shoe to be some way, 
is this relation.
Recallnow Langsam's argument from chapter 1 about seeing that p and judging that p.  This 
is only effective if one  can see that  p and think that  p where  p is the same in both cases.  If  p 
circumscribes a range of contents which if  they are the contents of judgements are contents of 
experiences, and thus these judgements are defined as experiences, then one cannot see and merely 
think that p, for one would be seeing the same thing twice simultaneously.  And this is not possible,  
just as it is not possible to literally simultaneously judge twice that p.54
Take again Maund's brown shoe.  I am looking at the shoe and I introspect my experience. 
In experience, there are the properties of the shoe.  In introspection, I can discern that the properties 
of the shoe are before my mind as a term in a relation, and thus that the experience is a relation.  I 
introspect this relation, this look of the shoe, and I find no more than I found in experience, namely 
the brown of the shoe, and that I am related to the shoe.  I now think about the shoe, and I introspect 
this.  In thinking (non-visually)55 about the shoe, I think about its properties: I think about the shoe's 
properties in the way in which I conceive of it, that is it a shoe, brown and so on.  I introspect its  
properties as it is thought of: this is different from introspecting the way that it is thought of just as 
much as in experience, only this way of thinking of it is not a ''look''.  As I argued above, there is no 
difference in principle here.
Johnston identifies a  thesis  regarding our knowledge of colours  he calls  'revelation',  the 
thesis that experience of colours makes available the 'intrinsic nature' of those colours.  His example 
is canary yellow.
Revelation: The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual  
53 However, there is a relevant point to be made here, namely why the application of, say, RED in thought does not  
give rise to an instance of the property red being made manifest, but it does in experience.  There are two possible 
answers to this.  One, that the concept in experience is related to RED, but is not actually that very concept.  Two,  
that it is applied as part of an experiential content.  This may be defined either in terms of a range of content or in 
terms of functional role.  It may also be defined in terms of its epistemic features, e.g. incapable of being justified.  
See chapter 6.
54 One can no more do this than simultaneously jump twice.
55 There  is  a  complication  here  with  imagination.   I  can  imagine,  or  remember,  things  that  are  brown  in  a 
"phenomenally" similar way to experience.  Likewise for dreaming.  However, my argument concerns the relation 
between perception and judgement, and not the relation between visual imagination and dreaming, and judgement or 
perception.  I am not quite sure what to say about visual imagination and dreaming, but I do not have to take stand  
on this here.
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experience as of a canary yellow thing.56
Combine  this,  or  something  like  it  that  perhaps  does  not  imply  anything  about  the  (realist) 
metaphysics of colours, with Dretske's identification of qualia as a class of observational properties, 
and  the  resulting  thesis  is  that  the  intrinsic  nature  of  observational  properties  are  revealed  by 
experiences.  Combine this further with the thesis that in order that an observational property be 
experienced,  the  subject  must  apply  an  observational  concept.   The  resulting  position  is  that 
experiences involve the application of observational concepts.  If applying a concept in the content 
of experience is what it is to experience the property (or object) picked out by the experience, then 
the resulting thesis is that experiences are the applications of observational concepts in the content, 
and that this is what it is for the observational property to be revealed in experience.57
In experience, let us say, the observational property that the shoe has, i.e its being brown or 
rather its  brownness,  is before the mind such that the nature of this  property is  revealed.   The 
experience is an application of the observational concept, call this BROWN for the moment, and in 
applying the concept in the content of the experience,  the observational property,  the brown, is 
brought before the mind in the particularly detailed and rich way which Dennett described above. 
The experience is not brown, the experience is of the brown shoe, and the way that it is of the shoe 
is that it has a content which determines the brown shoe.  This is the psychology of the experience, 
the way in which the brown shoe is experienced, and the relevant element which corresponds to the 
brown of the shoe is the application of the concept BROWN.  Matters are exactly analogous to this 
for the thought of the brown shoe, only the concept applied is less fine, and the proposition less rich 
and precise.
Thus, pending an outline and defence of perception conceptualism, Peacocke's Adequacy 
Thesis can be defended: the psychology of an experience can be identified with the conceptual 
content of the experience.  This content will be different from the contents of thoughts, but this 
difference is a difference in the range of contents.58
56 Johnston (1992) p. 223.  Compare this to Russell's famous claim that we know colours absolutely and fundamentally 
when we are acquainted with them, and that no knowledge of truths can ever lead us to any further knowledge of  
colours.  Acquaintance and knowledge of truths, i.e. nominal and propositional knowledge respectively are different 
modes of the mental, different types of mental act.   This explicitly Russellian distinction between nominal and 
propositional knowledge has recently been advanced by Tye (2009b).  Dretske (1969) also famously makes a similar 
distinction between nominal and propositional seeing, although this is a more heavily epistemological notion.  Of 
course, Tye is sympathetic to this.
57 'Observational concept' here is ambiguous between a concept that can only be acquired as a result of an experience,  
and a concept that can only be applied in an experience.  But this ambiguity does not threaten the theory that I am 
defending.  See the note four above.
58 There are two final problems with representationalism which I must briefly deal with, namely blindsight, and the 
''zombie'' problem.  According to the zombie problem as it pertains to a representational elimination of qualia, s can 
stay representationally the same but have their phenomenal character gradually fade away to nothing.  See Chalmers 
(1996) for the origination of this argument.  However Byrne (2001) seems to answer this argument satisfactorily:  
when the qualia fade, or are switched, off, the world seems to fade or disappears from view.  A more difficult 
problem than that of zombies is blindsight.  According to a higher-order theory, Armstong's (1981) sleepy-lorry 
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The  target  in  this  section,  one  that  features  in  many  quoted  passages,  is  that  there  is  
something phenomenal that it is like to see, say, red, over and above what the red itself is like as it is 
revealed, or, rather, the revealing of the red as analysed as a representation of the red.  Red itself is  
not like anything,  save in the comparable sense.   It  makes no sense to  ask someone what,  for  
example, the table is like, unless this is elliptical for an enquiry as to the features of the table, i.e. 
the properties that it has.59  Asking what the experience of red is like, is, then, asking what red is 
like.  And the answer to this is: red.  Asking what an experience of red is, is not to ask for an  
driver's experience represents the road perfectly, indeed it has first-order qualia, however the driver is not conscious 
of this, there are no second-order qualia and no experiential subjectivity, as the proponents of a higher-order theory 
would put it, as there is nothing it is like for the lorry-driver.  Blindsight is a similar phenomenon where subjects 
report no conscious awareness and have no beliefs and hence no inclinations to (relevant) action, but they respond 
correctly to a degree higher than chance when asked (as they see it) to guess as to the properties of objects in their  
"visual field".  It is worth noting, I think, that ''higher than chance'' is really not very good at all for identifying 
objects  in  good  light  before  the  eye,  and  ,  as  I  understand  it,  there  have  been  no  actual  cases  of  Block's 
'superblindsighter'.   Armstrong's long-distance lorry-driver  does not have blindsight.   However,  he shares  some 
similarities.  If asked as to what he had just seen, as opposed to what he was seeing now, he would reply that while  
he had seen things (surely), he could not be certain.  Like the blindsighter, he would have to guess.  Only, he would 
take himself to be guessing about something that he had seen.  The lorry-driver, unlike the blindsighter, can "come-
to".  Consider another scenario.  I want to rival my sister's knowledge of Roman history, but rather than reading a  
book I play a list of facts on a tape while I sleep.  After a while, I come to realise that I know a number of these 
facts.  Did I consciously represent, i.e. hear, the tape while asleep, or did it seep into my mind without appearing 
even in a dream?  Or consider the following case.  I am playing football and I fall in the box.  Before I can get up,  
and before I have noticed or become aware of doing it, I instinctively poke my foot out and direct the ball, which I 
had not seen appear at my foot, into the goal.  Did I consciously represent the ball, did I see it?  Examples like these 
abound: did I hear the fridge humming before I realised it?  I (my brain) presumably must have represented the facts 
about Roman history and represented facts about the ball.  The brain can process more information than we can  
become even dimly, or with a great lack of detail, aware or conscious of, and this can be received through the eye  
and put to use by the brain in moving the body before the subject becomes conscious of it.  The question is whether  
this refutes representationalism by providing an example of experiential content without any conscious character. 
This would only be a problem for the representationalist if these cases show that there is visual A-consciousness,  
importantly,  and this  must  be stressed,  occurrent A-consciousness  without  P-consciousness.   According to  Tye 
(1995), for example, phenomenal character is poised, abstract, non-conceptual, intentional, content.  The reason why 
there is no consciousness in blindsight is that the relevant content is not sufficiently poised for action and belief.  
This is a rather good way of putting it.  The subject (or their brain) processes information, but the resulting content 
is not readily poised for belief, and hence this has no conscious impact on the subject.  Dretske (1997) has suggested  
that blindsighters have only propositional content but no objectual knowledge ( This could be put as a variation on 
the subjects having knowledge by description, but not knowledge by acquaintance, especially if one thought that 
acquaintance is responsible for phenomenal character.  Although it must be stressed that Dretske does not put it in 
this way, even if this is close to Dretske's theory).  Another possibility is that the subjects have such an extremely  
low level of detail in their representation, and hence why it seems to them as though they are guessing.  Compare 
this to what you see, and believe, in very low levels of light.  Although you "see" a vague shape, this does not 
readily allow you to confidently act, and nor would you confidently say even that you could see anything.  There is  
occurrency here, but the content is so low, that it is not really clear to me if I really am seeing anything at all.  
Imagine pitch black with a shape very possible hovering into view.  I think I see something and yet I am not sure.  If  
asked to guess, I might do better than chance, and yet I would not really take myself to be seeing the shape.  Higher-
order explanations of phenomenal character and why there are such "non-conscious" experiences are not available 
on the judgement-theory as one cannot have unconscious judgements, whereas on the higher-order theory one can  
have unconscious perceptual experiences.  I would say that Armstrong's long-distance lorry driver either literally did 
not see the road, and his visual consciousness went "off-line" but his brain nevertheless directed his body where 
these directions were not actions, or, and this is far more likely, that he saw the road perfectly well only he could not 
remember seeing  it.   Instead  of  a  deficiency in  experience,  there  is  a  deficiency in  memory.   On  the  former 
explanation,  the  representation,  and  resulting  bodily action,  was  sub-personal  in  the  manner  of  my instinctive 
reaction to the football.  This would go to show that some bodily actions and representations in the brain are not 
personal, not subject to the will and not consciously undergone as they are not actions performed by the subject.   As 
for blindsight, it seems reasonable to me that to hold that the subjects are not conscious of the scene before them 
because they do not make any judgements, i.e. they do not see it.  They may guess, as they put it.  But what is a 
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analysis of experience.  The difference, I am claiming between seeing red and thinking about red is 
that  experiences  satisfy  Johnston's  revelation  thesis  (or  something  like  it):  in  seeing  red,  the 
'intrinsic nature', as he puts it, of red is revealed.  As mere thoughts do not satisfy revelation, there 
must  be  a  difference  between  experiences  and  mere  thoughts.   I  identify  this  difference  as  a 
conceptual difference, and the difference in the concepts applied accounts for the difference in the 
psychological access to the object that the experience bestows on the subjects.  As far as I can see, 
there is nothing that has been left out.60
To tie the above together, let me refer to Byrne's (2002) reconstruction of Mary's Room.  He 
sets up the matter in terms of way of denying C.61  In a change from the usual red, Mary gets to see 
a blue bead.
P1 Before seeing the bead, Mary believes that the bead is blue.
P2 Mary’s visual experience represents that the bead is blue.
P3 If someone believes that an object is blue, and then has a visual experience that 
represents that the object is blue, then , she will not acquire a belief about its color.
C When she sees the bead, Mary will not acquire a belief about its colour.62
Byrne asks which premise to deny in blocking C.  The method of blocking C in this particular 
argument, therefore, is to deny P1, or rather deny it in the sense that Mary possesses the concept  
BLUE.  Rather, in the room, she possesses either a metalinguistic concept, or a concept of the  
guess in this situation?  It must be a tutored guess, as they perform better than chance, and so perhaps they make 
judgements in perception of such a low level, and lacking in such detail, that they can only, as they would put it,  
guess.   Or perhaps they make no judgements whatsoever,  and instead draw the information from sub-personal 
representation into a different attitude.  This also seems to be a reasonable explanation, and fits neatly with their 
insistence that they are guessing, a different attitude from judgement.
59 Rosenthal (2002) argues that there is nothing it is like for the table to be a table, but there is something it is like to be 
a table.  As I discussed above, Rosenthal draws from this that there is a subjective for-me-ness to the experience but  
not the table, and from this the higher-order theory.  I disagree with this and also with the framing of the statement 
that there is something it is  like  to be a table: there is something that it  is to be a table, and something may be 
(comparatively) like a table if it has some of these features. Experiences,  in this sense, are like tables.  What is it  
like for me to see the milk is that the propositional content is judged by me, and as my judgement could not be the 
judgement of anyone else, and is conscious as concept application is by definition a conscious act, it seems to me  
that Rosenthal is introducing a distinction where there is not really one to introduce. 
60 A rare case of agreement is Hacker.  'One may say, clumsily, that there is a way that it feels to have a pain. That is  
just a convoluted way of saying that there is an answer to the (rather silly) question 'How does it feel to have a 
pain?', e.g. that it is very unpleasant, or, in some cases, dreadful.  So, one may say that there is  a way it feels to have 
an acute migraine, namely dreadful.  That is innocuous, but lends no weight to the general claim that for every  
differentiable experience, there is a specific way it feels to have it.  Pains are an exception, since they, by definition,  
have a negative hedonic tone.  Pains are sensations which are intrinsically disagreeable.  Perceiving, however, is not 
a matter of having sensations, and perceiving in its various modalities and with its numerous possible objects can,  
but typically does not, have any affective or attitudinal quality at all, let alone a different one for each object in each  
perceptual modality.  And for a vast range of things that can be called 'experiences', there isn't 'a way it feels' to have 
them, i.e. there is no answer to the question 'How does it feel to ...'?  Hacker (2002) p. 163.  See also the passage 
from Pitcher in the note above
61 Jackson's original (1982) argument targeted physicalism, but it is closely connected to representationalism.  Indeed 
Jackson (2004a) and (2004b) has recently adopted representationalism in rejecting the argument.
62 Byrne (2002) p. 126
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colour which is identical with, say a spectral reflectance, or whatever (realist) metaphysics of colour 
happens to be true and Mary happens to learn in the room.63  On this view, the phenomenal concepts 
are  not  concepts  that  apply  to  experiences,  in  that  they  pick  out  a  phenomenal  property  of  
experiences, but they pick out properties which experiences are of, and concepts of which cannot be 
acquired in another way.64
I thus conclude outlining this unpopular position (pending a defence of conceptualism, if 
one  holds  that  non-conceptual  content  in  experience  counts  as  a  kind  of  qualia):  there  are  no 
experiential  qualia.   There is nothing that it  is  'like'  to have an experience,  which outstrips the 
content. To, say, see my keys is to see that p,65 and this is only like ''that p''.  And this is also true 
also of thoughts.66  
5  Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that denying the notion that there are qualia which are present in 
experience  but  not  in  thought.   I  have  argued  that  the  difference,  pending  a  defence  of 
63 See the final note of chapter 3, and compare this to the point I made there.  As I am arguing that experiences are  
conceptually structured, there has to be some concept that Mary does not have the ability to grasp in the room.  
Below, I argue that experience is articulated by demonstrative concepts.  Mary's inability to apply demonstrative 
concepts  to  colours  is,  on this  view,  an  inability to  acquire colour  concepts.   As well  as  Harman,  Byrne  lists  
Wittgenstein (1977),  Nagel (1997), Peacocke (1984), and McDowell (1985) as agreeing with the position that Mary 
lacks colour concepts.  It also seems quite fair to me to hold, although this is equally often denied as it is advanced,  
that the blind lack colour concepts and instead only have metalinguistic concepts.  Byrne's (2002) own argument is 
that the contents of experience are ineffable.  
64 Here one could agree with Dennett (2004) and (2007) that the argument is flawed as Mary could in principle learn 
the nature of colours (for 'what it is like' to experience, say, blue, is to know what blue is like, which is to know what  
blue is), or the nature of colours which we glean through experience, in the room as she knows everything and could 
work it out.  This is not a terribly popular position, and not one that I have the space to investigate in detail.  I am 
sympathetic to this, though, and whichever stand I were to take on this would not conflict with my arguments here.
65 I defend propositional-seeing in more detail below.
66 This is, I take it, the standard position, and was often, although not always, assumed without argument.  However,  
recently some more philosophers, for example, Strawson (1994), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Pitt (2004), Siewert 
(1998), and Chalmers (1996),  have argued that there is something that it is like to judge, for example, that Aristotle 
was a Greek philosopher, and that this is different, constitutively different, from judging, say, that Plato was a Greek 
philosopher.  However, the standard position, that there is nothing that it is like in the phenomenal sense, and even 
that there is unlike experience not even a temptation to say this, is the position that I hold to.  I hold to it for the 
reason that most people have held to it, namely that it seems so obviously true, much more obviously so than in the  
case of experience.  See, e.g., Lormand (1996),  Soteriou (2007) and (2009), and Nichols and Stich (2003),  for  
arguments against constitutive cognitive phenomenal character.  I have to confess that I am on the side of those, 
Stich and Nichols for example, who just think that this notion is, unlike with experience where it takes a lot of  
argument to get to the denial of experiential qualia, especially in the very strong sense in which I am denying it,  
rather clearly misapplied to thought: is there really something that it is like to think that two plus two is four which 
is different from thinking that two plus three equals five?  I struggle even make sense of this claim, I have to admit.  
In  rejecting this constitutive claim, I am also rejecting the  inverse-representational theory as  suggested by,  for 
example, Horgan and Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson and Graham (2004), and Kriegel (2002a), (2003) and (2007). 
According to this position, the content supervenes on the phenomenal character of experience, and in turn (on this 
particular version), even the content of thought supervenes on the content of experience.  This view is, I suppose, the 
ultimate opponent view to my own.  However, I reject the very notion of phenomenal character invoked.  This 
particular brand of inverse-representationalism is internalist, but one could hold an externalist version also.  Note, 
finally, that Pitt (2004) thinks that, although there is something it is like to think that p, this is constitutively different 
from what it is like in experience.
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conceptualism, can be accounted for by the difference in the content, and how it brings the object 
before the mind.  In experience,  we know more of the objects than we do in thought:  more is 
revealed;  the contents provide us  with greater  detail  regarding the object,  and it  properties are 
brought before the mind in a richer, and more precise way.  But this does not require us to say that 
there is a constitutive  psychological difference or a difference in kind between experiences and 
thoughts.  If a theory can be given on which the contents are different between experiences and 
other thoughts, and conceptualism defended, then experiences can be analysed as judgements with 
these contents.
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Chapter 5  Concepts and Experience
1  Introduction
In this chapter, I turn now to defend the conceptual nature of experiences.  Below, I define a class of 
contents which I take experiences to have, demonstrative contents.  This serves to provide a content 
which individuates experiences from other thoughts.  I  then defend the demonstrative nature of 
concepts  from objections  against  conceptualism in  general  and demonstrative  conceptualism in 
particular.  These demonstrative concepts, in their range and precision account for the psychological 
difference between experience and other thought.
In §2, I introduce the distinction between the state and content views, and argue against the 
state view, thus the content view is the position that I think the conceptualist is set against.  In §3 
and §4,  I outline a range of contents that I take experience to have and which individuates them 
from thoughts, and then set this in context in §5.  In §6 through §9 I defend the demonstrative 
concepts  response  of  the  conceptualist  against  arguments  in  the  literature,  the  arguments  from 
richness  and  fineness  of  grain  and  arguments  against  acquisition.   In  §10  and  §11,  I  defend 
conceptualism in general from some further objections.
2  The State and Content Views
A conceptual proposition is a proposition of the type towards which the attitude of judgement is  
taken.1  Thus, a non-conceptual proposition may look like a different type of proposition, and a non-
conceptual mental state or act an attitude towards this different type of proposition.  However, there 
is a distinction between the state and content views of non-conceptual content.  The background to 
this debate is Fregean, in that the central figures in establishing the contemporary debate mostly 
subscribe to a Fregean theory of thought contents.2  On a Fregean theory, the contents of thoughts 
1 I take this to be definitional.
2 See, e.g.,  Evans (1982), Peacocke (1983), (1992), and (2001), McDowell (1994), and Brewer (1999) for central 
arguments with regard to the specific debate in question.  The framework of the debate is set by Evans (1982) and 
followed by Peacocke (1992) and McDowell (1994). Crane (1998a), (1988b), and (1992) also discusses the matter 
in terms of Frege's cognitive-significance criterion.  See, e.g., Frege (1997).  Byrne (2005) notes this background 
and its importance to the debate.  I am adopting this standard position and arguing for an extension of this view to  
experiential  contents.   As I  am defending a very common position in  the  literature,  especially with respect  to 
thought, I do not motivate this position with respect to thought with a full-dress defence, but rather assume it to  
extend to perceptual experience. Frege's theory of sense neatly solves the problems of  salva veritae substitution 
failure into mental contexts defines concepts in terms of differing cognitive value.  Further, by holding that concepts 
are abstract objects, we can explain how two people can have the same thought.  This provides us with a neat  
explanation of the inference to the fact that both believe the same thing: they do so, because they both bear the 
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are propositions which are complexes of senses or concepts.  Fregean contents are fine-grained in 
the familiar way argued for in terms of the cognitive significance of different linguistic terms.3  A 
central principle involved in characterising conceptual content is what Evans called the 'generality 
constraint'
We cannot avoid thinking of a thought about an individual object x, to the effect that it is F, as the 
exercise of two separable capacities; one being the capacity to think of x, which could  be equally 
exercised in thoughts about x to the effect that it is G or H; and the other being a conception of what 
it is to be F, which could be equally exercised in thoughts about other individuals, to the effect that 
they are F.4
This capacity to think of one object as F and another object as F involves the separate application of 
the same concepts in distinct thoughts, and thus the subject must possess the concept in a way 
which is independent from the thinking of a particular thought.5  
judging relation to the same proposition.  If propositions are somehow internal to the judgement, then as judgements 
are non-repeatable particulars, two people could not judge the same proposition to be true.  As propositions are 
composed of concepts, the same follows for concepts.  We introduce such concepts to solve the problem with salva 
veritae substitution  into  intensional  mental  contexts.   This  is  a  perspective  problem:  we  can  in  thought  and  
perception take a different perspective on the same object.  Hence this relation must be more than a two-place 
relation as there is more to the psychology of standing in this relation than the two-place theory can account for. 
Therefore, we introduce the level of sense (Russellians make a different move).  The Fregean theory is commonly 
adopted, as all theories are, in the face of some outstanding problems. One main objection to such concepts is that 
they themselves  should introduce a mode of presentation problem: concepts are modes of presentation of their 
referent.  See, e.g., Fodor (1998).   Let me make a gesture as to the answer to this.  In grasping the sense of a name, 
for example, we bring the referent before the mind: we use the sense to think of the referent.    If I kick the ball 
twice, say with slice and flatly, both times I kick the ball, but differently.  The way in which I kick the ball is the  
application of a skill, of an ability.  This skill or ability is what allows me to stand in the relation, kicking, to the ball.  
The manifestation of the skill is what relates me to the ball.  The skill explains how I come to be related to the ball.  
Similarly for concepts.  Without firmly adopting the thesis, from Evans (1982), that the possession of concepts is the 
possession of abilities, let me use this as an analogy.  The application of a concept, like the kicking of the ball, is  
what explains my relation to the referent.  Just as there is no problem in explaining the relation to the kicking in 
respect of the reason that this is introduced in explaining my relation to the ball, there is no equivalent problem in 
explaining my relation to the application of the concept in respect of the reason that this is introduced in explaining  
my  relation  to  the  referent.  Another  alternative,  the  mental  representation  theory,  is  that  concepts  are  mental  
representations.  These two theories may be related: representations individuated by Frege's criterion.  Laurence and 
Margolis (2002) suggest this.  The theory is open to Frege's psychologist objection: my concept C is not the same as 
your  concept  C.   Laurence  and  Margolis  (2002)  argue  that  Frege  is  assuming that  mental  representations  are 
'conscious mental images', and that this is unwarranted.  However, if a mental representation is some token of a 
general type, then the type must be identified with the concept.  Types, however, are abstract entities; and, if the type 
is individuated by the mode of presentation argument, then we have switched from an abstract grasped Fregean 
sense to an abstract tokened mental type.  Perhaps there is not a great difference.
3 See,  e.g.,  Frege (1956).   Familiarly,  s can believe that  Superman flies,  but  that  Clark Kent does not fly.   The 
cognitive significance associated with the use of ''Superman'' and ''Clark Kent'' by s cannot be the referent.  As a 
condition, if s can judge that p and that q, without irrationality then p and q have a different cognitive significance 
and thus are composed of different concepts. That this leads to senses as components is denied by philosophers who 
hold a Russellian theory of propositions whereby a proposition is a complex of universals (and perhaps a particular). 
Thus  s believes  the  same proposition in  both cases,  and  the difference is  explained  away in some other  way. 
However, I take this to be an antecedent debate.
4 Evans (1982) p. 75.  See also Evans (1982) Section 4 Part 3.
5 'I certainly do not wish to be committed to the idea that having thoughts involves the subject's using, manipulating, 
or apprehending symbols – which would be entities with non-semantic as well as semantic properties, so the idea I  
am trying to explain would amount to the idea that different episodes of thinking can involve the same symbols, 
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A subject has to possess concept C in order to think a thought with this concept as a content. 
Denying this for experiences leads to  a distinction between the 'state view' and the 'content view' of  
non-conceptualism, as introduced by Heck.
In particular, one might think that there is no reason we must distinguish the kinds of contents belief  
and perception have: whatever one might take the contents of belief to be - Fregean Thoughts, say - 
there is no reason that perceptions cannot have the same sorts of things as their contents; it is just that 
the contents of a thinker's perceptual states can, while the contents of her beliefs cannot, involve 
concepts she does not possess.  But if this were one's view, it would be misleading to summarize it  
by saying that perceptual content is non-conceptual.  There is, on this view, which we might call ''the 
state view'', nothing unusual, as it were, about perceptual content.  Perception is just a state of a  
different  sort  from  belief:  a  non-conceptual,  or  concept-independent,  state,  as  opposed  to  a 
conceptual, or concept dependent state.  Since Evans does speak, quite explicitly, of of perceptual  
states as having non-conceptual content, I think we cannot interpret him as having intended to defend 
the state view.  His view is what we might call ''the content view'', that the content of perceptual 
states is different in kind from that of cognitive states like belief: The former is non-conceptual; the  
latter, conceptual.6
The state view is that experiences are attitudes to a conceptually articulated content but that the 
subject need not possess the concepts that articulate it.  The content view is the thesis that the type  
of content in experience is not composed of concepts.  The content view is, I think, the predominant 
view.7  Heck remarks, without explanation, that he suspects that the state view is 'indefensible'.8  
This is an important distinction as the adoption of the content view really makes clear the 
underlying motivation for the introduction of non-conceptual content.  Indeed, the two views are 
each motivated by one of the central arguments.  The state view is motivated by the argument that 
some subjects such as children and animals lack the concepts which would characterise the content 
of their experiences, and yet we want to credit them with experiences which outrun their repertoire 
of  concepts.   Evans  was  relatedly  motivated  also  by the  thought  that  experiences  are  a  more 
identified by their semantic and non-semantic properties.  I should prefer to explain the sense in which thoughts are  
structured, not in terms of their being composed of several distinct elements, but in terms of their being a complex of 
exercises of several distinct abilities'.  Evans (1982) pp100-101
6 Heck (2000) p. 485
7 See, e.g., Tye (1995) and (2000), and Peacocke (1992), who present the content view.  Crane (1992) sets things up in  
terms of the state view but Crane (2009) later retracts this.
8 Heck (2000) note 6.  Since Heck's paper there have been a number of closely related distinctions made in the  
literature.   Speaks  (2005)  distinguishes  between  'absolute'  and  'relative'  non-conceptual  content;   Wu  (2008) 
between 'possession' and 'involvement' conceptualism: the difference between the subject's  needing to possess the 
concepts  that  merely  'characterise'  the  content,  and  those  concepts  'involved';   Crowther  (2006)  between 
'composition' and 'possession' conceptualism: a content is compositionally (non) conceptual if the content is (not)  
composed  of  concepts;  possessionally  (non)  conceptual  if  the  subject  need  (not)  possess  the  concepts  that 
characterise the content.
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fundamental type of representation.
The position that I am defending is that experiences are a class of judgement, and the theory 
of judgement that I  am subscribing to is  what  I  take to  be a standard Fregean theory.    Frege 
distinguishes between the following.
(1) the apprehension of a thought – thinking.
(2) the recognition of the truth of a thought – judgement.
(3) the manifestation of this judgement.9
There is a relation of logical priority between (1), (2) and (3).  (1) is the act whereby any mental act 
gets its content.  A (contentful) mental act of any type acquires its content through the subject's 
apprehending a conceptual proposition.  To grasp the concept is to bring the referent of the sense 
before the mind under this mode of presentation.10   (2) rests on (1) because in order to assent to the 
truth of a proposition, one must first have apprehended it.  Apprehension of  p is common to all 
attitudes with a content p, and the apprehension of p is a complex of the grasping of the constituent 
concepts.  To grasp a concept C, one must possess the concept C.  I am defending this as applied to 
experiences.11
Consider the four options available.  In Crowther's (2006) terminology, an experience can 
be:  compositionally conceptual  and possessionally conceptual,   compositionally  conceptual  and 
possessionally non-conceptual,   compositionally non-conceptual  and  possessionally conceptual, 
and  compositionally non-conceptual and  possessionally non-conceptual.  That is, using p now to 
refer to a conceptual proposition, the options are as follows.
Experiences as relations to propositions which are complexes of concepts:
(4) s is required to possess the concepts that articulate p.
(5) s is not required to possess the concepts that articulate p.
Experiences as relations to propositions which are not complexes of concepts:
(6) s is required to possess the concepts that ''characterise'' the metaphysically  
9 See Frege (1956) p. 294.
10 I do not want to subscribe to Frege's theses that predicates express the sense of functions, or that sentences express  
the senses of the True and the False, or that the functions map objects to the True and the False.
11 I must stress one point here regarding the characterisation of judgement as the 'recognition of the truth' of a thought.  
This makes judging that  p look rather like the result of first the apprehension and then as a matter of a  distinct 
mental act, assent to the proposition.  One need not hold this.  Rather, judging that p is the taking of the attitude of 
judgement to  p which has as a  logical part the apprehension of  p.   I  wonder if the picture of judgement I am 
rejecting here is one to which Pitcher subscribes when he says that he 'shall not be defending the wholly absurd  
thesis  that  sense perception consists,  either  wholly or  in part,  of  entertaining [apprehending?] propositions and 
assenting to them, of making (conscious) judgements, or anything of that sort'.  Pitcher (1971) pp. 70-71.  Whether  
(3) depends on (2) is not relevant.
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non-conceptual content of the experience.
(7) s is not required to possess the concepts that “characterise” the 
metaphysically non-conceptual content of the experience.12
I am defending (4).  (6) seems to me to be odd: why should s need to possess any concepts in order 
for s to undergo an experience with non-conceptual content?13 And, importantly, the proponent of 
this  view is  taking experiences to be very much like thoughts,  unless thoughts have a Fregean 
content.
(5) is the canonical understanding of the state view.  Experiences are constitutively a relation 
between the subject and a  conceptually articulated proposition, but the subject does not need to 
possess the concepts that articulate it.  (7) is the canonical characterisation of the content view. 
Experiences are constitutively a relation between the subject and a  non-conceptually articulated  
proposition.  Further, the subject does not need to possess the concepts that would characterise it.  
There is, I think, a strong argument against the state view with content conceptualism.14  
This argument does not knock down the state view, but it makes it rather difficult for me to 
see how it could be defended.15  Compare (1), (2) and (3).  (1), that s apprehends the proposition, p, 
is a necessary condition for s to be in mental state M with content p.  Apprehension is a complex of 
graspings, where these are occurrent: i.e.  applications of the concept (not necessarily applications 
to something in thought).  A subject can only grasp a concept C if the subject possesses the concept. 
This means that (1) is a complex of  applications.  Possession is not application (I possess many 
concepts I am not applying), but it is necessary to apply C that I possess C.
12 'Characterising'  the  content  is  a  rather  loose  notion.   I  take  it  to  mean  what  s could  conceptualise  from the 
experience.   A standard argument that I discuss below is that experiences have a more finely grained content than 
thoughts:  particular  shades  of  colour  can  be  non-conceptually  represented  in  experience.    That  one  shade  as 
opposed to another is non-conceptually represented is determined by the fact that the subject of this experience 
would conceptualise the content in terms of one concept as opposed to another.
13 One could hold that only genuine subjects can be in non-conceptual representational states, and the subject must be 
capable of being in some conceptual states.  This is a strengthening of the denial of Peacocke's 'autonomy thesis', 
which is the thesis the thesis that non-conceptual states are possible for non-conceptually able subjects.   Peacocke  
(1992) Chapter 3 denies this.  Bermudez (1994) criticises Peacocke's reasons for denying it.  What explains why a 
non-conceptual content cannot be the content of an experience in terms of the subject lacking a concept which is  
related to the content in some way other than the fact that the content is partly composed of the concept? I think,  
also, that this is quite a good argument against a theory of (uncontroversially) cognitive states on which the subject 
has to possess certain concepts and yet the propositional contents themselves are not composed of concepts: the 
standard Russellian view of thought contents.  The propositions are complexes of universals and but the subject, in 
order to have a thought with such a content, has to possess concepts.  Why?  If I cannot swing a golf club it is  
because I lack the skill to swing it: I am unable to swing it in any way.  What explains my lack of being able to stand  
in the relation of  swinging to the golf club is that I lack the skill that would allow this.  With respect to concepts, the  
clearest reason why lacking a concept C disbars me from thinking a thought is that the application of the concept in 
the thought is a necessary condition on having that thought.  And if this is what disbars me from having the thought,  
then it looks like the reason for this is that the concept is waiting to be applied in the thought as it is a constituent  
somehow of the content.   However, I certainly do not want to engage in an argument for this which extends further  
than this sketch here.  Stalnaker (1998) argues that all contents are sets of possible worlds.  This is another version  
of state non-conceptualism but content conceptualism.
14 And I think, although I have no evidence for this, that this is why Heck says that the state view is 'indefensible'.
15 Bermudez (2007) Section IV argues against the state view similarly, but with less detail.
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Nothing in this precludes the state view.  But we are surely owed an explanation of how p 
can be the constitutive propositional content of an attitude (in the sense of Pautz's (2009) identity 
view) where s does not possess, and so cannot apply, the articulating concepts.  It does not seem 
promising that there could be a convincing answer to this.  There would have to be a convincing 
explanation of why a proposition  p,  which is  composed of concepts, could  constitutively be an 
element of an experience in which the subject does not possess, and so cannot apply, the constituent 
concepts.  But the Fregean picture of the relation between grasping and apprehending I outlined 
above looks to be very close to definitional.  Hence, the position in question would fall foul of the 
way in which matter are defined.  The condition that in order to  apply a particular concept the 
subject has to possess it would have to be dropped.  
Speaks (2005) points out that many of the non-conceptualist arguments would only establish 
the state view, but I take it that in establishing the state view, the purpose is to draw from the 
different conditions on a content being the content of an act that the contents are different, i.e. the 
content view.16
3  Individuating Contents of Experience
I argued previously that there are no experiential  qualia:  seeing a red square is  psychologically 
exhausted by the propositional content of the experience, and the red, say, present in experience and 
not in thought is not a psychological property of experiences.  Certain concepts, which I called 
''observational concepts'', when applied reveal what the property to which they are being applied is. 
So, when something green is seen, the concept application in experience to the green of the object 
seen is what it is to experience the property, and thus for what that property is to be revealed in the 
experience.  When the property is merely thought about, what the property is is not revealed.  
My explanation of this was that the subject has less information about the property as a 
result of this mental act.  Experiences have contents of greater richness and detail.  When I see the 
red square, I see that it is that exact shade, and that it is that exact size, at that exact place, and so  
on.  When I merely think about this, the level of detail in the content is less.  The concepts applied 
in experience are demonstrative concepts.  These are not linguistic demonstratives, but experiential, 
or perceptual, demonstrative concepts.
Linguistic demonstratives are linguistic communicative devices. Perceptual demonstratives 
are are elements of the content of experience.  And, although metaphorically one may put it that  
experiences are like communications to oneself, this is not strictly accurate as a communication 
16 Bermudez (2007) seems to share this view.
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takes place between two subjects.
That  the  conceptual  contents  of  experience  are  demonstrative  is  the  move  that  the 
conceptualist  about  experiences  makes  in  defence  of  their  position  against  the  standard  non-
conceptualist arguments.  I discuss these arguments below, and defend the demonstrative concepts 
theory.   Beforehand,  however,  I  would  like  to  argue  that  perceptual  demonstratives  are  an 
individuating feature of experiences: experiences are judgements with these contents.  This ties 
together two related elements of my discussion so far.  Firstly, it serves to individuate experiences 
as thoughts with a content of a certain type, namely a content containing perceptual demonstratives. 
Secondly,  the  fineness  and multitude  of  the  demonstratives  explains  the  richness  and detail  of 
experiences that is lacking in thought.  
The  most  fundamental  knowledge  that  I  can  have  of  a  particular  object  is  that  gained 
through perception.  This can be cashed out in terms of an acquaintance relation, such as Russell's 
original notion or Tye's (2009b) revival of it, or in terms of the use of a demonstrative (which is  
acquired ''on the basis of'' perception), and so on. These are glosses on the following point.  
Ways of coming to think of an object, or ways in which an object is conceived  within a 
certain mental  act  (call  this  the  ''conception''  of  an  object)  which  are  not  acquired  through 
experience are, in a way, epistemically lesser.  ''Conception'' here is a shorthand for the content of 
the singular term used partly to express the content of a mental act.  Experience, I will now argue, 
provides the most fundamental conception of an object available to us.17   This content, i.e. the 
conception of the object of the experience, is what individuates experiences from other mental acts. 
The  standard  demonstrative  concepts  defence  of  experiential  conceptualism  is  that  the 
contents of experiences feature the demonstrative concepts expressed linguistically by the use of the 
linguistic  demonstratives  ''this''  and  ''that''.18  These  apply  both  to  the  particular  as  it  is 
fundamentally conceived as a particular, and to its properties experienced.  I deal with these two 
elements in turn.
To agree with Brewer (1999), in seeing a red square the content of the experience would be 
expressed as  ''that  is  thus'',  where  the  concept  THAT expressed  applies  to  the  red  square  as  a 
particular, and THUS to the red or the squareness of red square.  In contrast, a non-experiential 
content partially expressed by ''that'', is an expression of the anaphoric THAT, not a demonstrative 
THAT.  These are two different concepts, and thoughts featuring these two concepts have different 
contents.
If I say to you, reporting my current experience while running and pointing, that ''that tree is 
going to fall'', ''that'' expresses a different concept than it does in you telling me the day after that 
17 This follows a line of thought originating in Strawson (1959) Chapter 1.
18 See, centrally, McDowell (1994), and Brewer (1999) and (2005).  Chuard (2006) and (2007) does not endorse the 
theory, but defends it against counter-arguments.
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''we were  lucky to  get  out  from under  that  tree''.   In  the  second  case,  ''that''  is  used  to  refer  
anaphorically to  a tree already named in a previous conversation.   In that  conversation,  it  was 
named as ''that'': it was referred to demonstratively.  Although the referent is the same, the falling 
tree, the concepts expressed are different.
4  Demonstratives and The Role of Experience
There are at least three ways to approach the philosophical analysis of perception, I think, which are 
certainly not mutually exclusive but are distinct in their starting points.  One is the phenomenal 
approach of, e.g., Block and Chalmers.  The coming together of the other two starting points can, I 
think, help to explain away the intuitions of those such as Block and Chalmers.
One of these is to focus on perception as the mental output of the sensory organs as, e.g. 
Quine does.19  We cannot deny this, and one difference between experience and thought is that 
experiences are a result of a causal interaction with the object through our sense-organs.  Hence, 
and this is a strong point in favour of the demonstrative concepts defence, the different level of 
information in experience can be explained in terms of this.  Thoughts of objects are not a direct  
result of delivery of information via the sense-organs.  But this does not imply that the structure of 
the reception of the information is different.20
Relatedly, one may focus on the way in which perception (or experience) as a mental act is 
the mental act through which we have a primary conception of external objects and their properties.  
This is to focus on their internal epistemological role.  What I mean to highlight is the importance 
of perception as regards the way that we come to think of objects not in general as objects, but as 
regards the way that we come to conceive of particular objects.
Consider  the  sometimes  irritating  habit  that  children  have  of  asking ''why'',  but  instead 
consider one who always asks ''which''  object.   Most fundamentally,  the answer, the one which 
would satisfy any such child whose conceptual scheme was functioning correctly, would be ''that 
one''.  There could be no further answer as concerns our basic way of conceiving of things.  To 
identify an object as ''that one'' is to supply the most fundamental identification possible.  And, of 
course, to identify the object as ''that one'', would be to show it to them: i.e. it would be for them to 
perceive it.
This is marked in language by the demonstrative use of the  word ''that''.   Kaplan (1989) 
19 Consider the way Quine (1960) begins with: 'This familiar desk manifests its presence by resisting my pressures and 
by deflecting light to my eyes. Physical things generally, however remote, become known to us only through the 
effects which they help to induce at our sensory surfaces....'.
20 Evans  (1982)  would  agree  with  this,  but  would  hold  that  the  reception  of  information  in  experience  is  non-
conceptually structured.
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distinguishes between genuine linguistic demonstratives and pure linguistic indexicals.  The former 
require  a  demonstration,  the  latter  not.   Indexicals,  such as  ''now''  and ''here''  do not  require  a 
demonstration because their  linguistic meaning supplies the required restriction.   In the case of 
''now'', for example something analogous to the ''demonstration'' is implicit in the linguistic meaning 
of the word: there is a rule that ''now'' is used to refer to the time of utterance (or production of a 
token sentence more generally).  In the case of genuine demonstratives, ''this'', ''that'', ''there'', for 
example, these are linguistic demonstratives in that their use in communication requires an actual 
demonstration.   A  perceptual demonstrative,  however,  does  not  require  a  demonstration.21  The 
proponent of non-conceptual content, as I discuss below, holds that the non-conceptual experience 
plays  the  role  of  the  demonstration  in  supplying  the  referent  of  the  demonstrative  concept  in 
thought.
My claim is that the perceptual content ''that is thus'', is in its full form: ''the object now at  
egocentric location l is that shade, that shape, etc''.  I argue first that the content of the conception of 
which object it is that is being experienced is egocentric, and subsequently for the demonstrative 
concepts such as THAT SHADE which are the concepts of the properties that the object has.  
Non-experiential thoughts do not have demonstrative contents which articulate the way in 
which the properties of the object are before the mind, such as THAT SHADE, and the descriptive 
content of the singular term is different, the ''conception'' as I have been calling it.  
The former point presumably rests on the way in which we are able to process information 
received through the sense-organs (and that the brain can put itself in this state, and thus the subject 
come  to  hallucinate).   Should  a  subject  be  able  to  recall  in  full  detail  the  contents  of  their 
experience, then they would be able to recall exactly the psychology of that experience.
However, one cannot recall the conception of the object:  the articulation of the conception 
of the object in recollection will be different.  The conception of the object in recollection is of the 
object that  was the object previously experienced.  So, should I see that the object at egocentric 
location  l is  a  lemon of  such and such a  colour  and so on,  then should I  recall  the lemon in 
equivalent detail (which, as I discuss below, does appear to be empirically not possible so far as we 
know) then I would recall as the lemon that was, and not is, at egocentric location l and so on.22
My conception of the computer in front of me, for example, is a long description of its visual 
properties, and also such properties as its being mine and so on.  However, the conception of it in 
experience which serves to individuate it as an object of thought is that it is the object now located 
at a particular egocentric point.
21 Otherwise we would be off on a regress (I rebut a similar argument below, namely that a demonstrative requires  
attention)  Levine (1988) makes this point, and argues that demonstratives in experience are tokens of mentalese, 
non-conceptual 'percepts' as he calls them.
22 Should the content of the experience be duplicated in judgement, in the same way that the recollected content of a 
memory is a form of judgement, then this would be a hallucination or an illusion.
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If you tell me of such an object, or I read of such an object and so on, then the conception 
within that experience, the content of the experience pertains to whichever means of communication 
it  is  that  I  am  experiencing  and  through  which  I  mediately  come  by  a  conception  of  an 
egocentrically located object.  But the experiential conception is of this means of communication, 
whatever that is, be  it a sentence or a person, a pointing finger and so on.  Of course, if I can see the 
object at the same time, say you direct my attention by pointing, then this will lead me to focus on it 
and thus I will come to know of it in experience.
Seeing, then, has a content which picks out an object as the object at a particular egocentric 
location  l  where  the  specification  of  the  location,  or  my  knowledge  of  the  location,  or  my 
commitment to its being there, is not qualified in any way.  It is not qualified by it being according 
to such and such that it is there, or that it might be, or is likely to be there, or is still there.  These 
will be results of inferences, and the conception of the object will be inferential.  And, crucially it is 
that the object of the experience, that picked out by the singular term is the object that is there now, 
and not that was there.23
The test for this is how one would fully express in language the conception that one has of 
an object.  If the conception is of an object that is there now and that this is not qualified in any way, 
then this is the content of an experience: what one is expressing is a looks-report.
Consider now extended experiences, such as looking out of the window at a tree for some 
time.  There is an independent but related question here about counting experiences which I do not 
go into.24  Either the extended experience consists in a very long single experience which ranges 
over many times in one act, or it is a complex of sub-acts at each time.  Let us discuss the latter  
case, for the former presents its own difficulties with respect to extended experiences which are far 
from central to my discussion.  One sees the tree continuously as the same tree, but this consists in, 
I would contend, repeatedly seeing the tree, identified as the object (tree) now at egocentric location 
l, as the same tree as was previously there.  This is not to qualify the conception of the object within 
the experience, but to make an identity between two conceptions in terms of their having the same 
referent.
So,  to state  the condition for the particular  demonstrative as opposed to  the predicative 
23 What if I am unsure as to whether or not there is an object there?  Perhaps it is dark, a shape looms into view,and I  
am unsure if something is there.  Would I be thinking that there might be an object there, and therefore is it the case 
that I am not experiencing this object?   I discussed this with respect to blindsight, and my conclusion was that this  
is a borderline case of seeing as opposed to sub-personal, i.e. non-conscious, information processing delivered not to 
the subject as an experience but delivered in some other way.  Further, as one changes one's mind about whether or 
not there is something there, i.e. about whether or not one is seeing something, one will alternate between taking  
oneself to see and not.
24 The current problem concerns seeing objects as the same through time, or over different experiences,  See, e.g., 
Campbell's (1987/1988) discussion of seeing the bee, turning away, and then looking back at the bee: are you seeing 
the same bee, and do you take yourself to be doing so?.  Campbell does not think that experience is demonstrative 
reference, but that experiential consciousness 'targets' objects for attention and thus demonstrative reference.  He is, 
in this sense, close to the Roskies' position I discuss below.  See  Campbell (2004).
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demonstrative which individuates experiences along this dimension, an experiential content is one 
whose particular content is stated in (8).
 (8) that which would be expressed as the content of the singular term in a looks-report, 
is: the object now at egocentric location l.  
This is to analyse the perceptual concept THAT, which I claim articulates experience, in terms of 
the concepts THERE and NOW.  NOW pertains, I argue, to the position of the act in the stream of 
consciousness, and THERE names a point in egocentric space.
Evans (1982) advances an analysis of demonstrative thought, couched in terms of reference, 
of an object which is contrasted with the two other types of identification of an object: recognition-
based  and  descriptive.   Descriptive  thought  here  is  what  Evans  calls  non-acquaintance  based 
thought,  non-perceptual  thought.   Evans  subscribes  to  Russell's  principle  of  acquaintance,  his 
understanding  of  which  is  that  in  order  to  think  about  an  object  one  must  have  individuating 
knowledge of it, for one must know which object it is that one is thinking about.25  This is analysed 
firstly in terms of possession knowledge of the fundamental ground of difference of the type of 
object.26  For numbers, this is their position in the number-line, for external objects, their spatio-
temporal location.
In perception we are presented with external particulars, spatio-temporal objects, hence the 
fundamental idea of an object will be that which individuates this object uniquely by its spatio-
temporal location.27  What I have been calling the conception of the object is in perception a grasp 
of the fundamental idea of the object as a given particular.
Our grasp of the very notion of an external particular rests on our general conception that all 
such objects are individuated by their spatio-temporal location.  In order to grasp the proposition 
that a is an external particular, we must have grasped that external particulars are individuated by 
their spatio-temporal location.  This is the fundamental  ground of an object (and what makes the 
statue-lump question a problem).28  In order to have a  a fundamental idea of a given particular, we 
25 Russell's original Cartesian principle is stronger.  It is that the subject must be acquainted, in that they have full  
knowledge,  of  either  sense-data or  universals  that  are before the  mind.   Hence Russell  has  a  perspective  free  
ontology of objects that can be directly before the mind: sense-data, logical notions and universals.
26 See Evans (1982) Chapter 4.
27 For Evans, experience is non-conceptual and the non-conceptual content, much as for Campbell, plays the role of  
facilitating the conceptual demonstrative grasp of the fundamental idea of an object.  The conceptual egocentric  
representation is a matter of the non-conceptual content being conceptualised.
28 Arguably not, however, if the statue and the lump although co-located and therefore identified egocentrically under 
the same conception have some different perceived properties.  The case of a shadow on a wall is a similar case, for  
although they are co-located they have quite different properties.  One object is a wall, and the other is a shadow on 
the wall, however this is analysed.  There seems to me to be no difference in principle here between this case and a  
spot of paint on the wall, only that the shadow is, like water, for example, in a sense transparent in that it can be seen  
through to the wall.
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must  be able  to  identify its  spatio-temporal  location.29  This we do egocentrically.   Firstly,  we 
identify the position of the object egocentrically and then in virtue of this we orientate this property 
with the general, fully objective, spatial map with which we picture the layout of our environment. 
This then provides us with our fundamental  idea  of that object.  A mere grasp of the egocentric 
location of an object is enough, in one sense, to provide individuating knowledge of the object; only 
without the conceptual ability to link this to an objective knowledge of its relative non-egocentric 
relations we would be unable to grasp its objective nature, for the fundamental ground of external  
particulars as a type is that they are objectively spatio-temporally located.  This seems like a very 
good theory  to me, and I basically assent to these fundamentals of Evans' account.30  
According to Evans, this map is in some way non-conceptual, and based upon our ability to 
unreflectively navigate our way around the environment.31  However, I see no reason, which is not 
an  independent reason  against  some  feature  of  the  position,  why a  spatial  map  could  not  be 
interpreted  as  a  set  of  judgements  about  the  relative  objective  positions  of  objects  which 
individuates each object (and its parts, perhaps) as distinct objects of experience.
Egocentric space could be understood as a three-dimensional system of axes emanating from 
the subject.32  It is perhaps rather arbitrary to define a particular bodily point from where theses axes 
are centred.  However, the best candidate is either the gravitational centre of the subject, or the point 
between their eyes.  Perhaps, there are many such systems of axes, which are integrated via one's 
sensory-motor  system.   This  seems  more  than  plausible,  especially  if  the  egocentric  space  is 
analysed as a set of beliefs.  For each object in the visual field will be identified by its egocentric 
position with respect to each body part.33
Egocentric space is differentiated from objective space in that the egocentric space is a space 
that has a privileged point of perspective.  We require that there be such a perspectival point in order 
that we have a fixed point from which to describe an object in such a way that this description 
guarantees that the description uniquely picks out one object.34  This fixed point, the origin of the 
egocentric axes is the point that we occupy.35  
29 This implies that there are no cases of perceptual thought about an object that presents the object as external but not 
at some point in space.  Putative counter-examples to this, such as white-noise or enveloping smells, are, I think,  
answered in terms of their being sometimes presented as being all around the subject as is the case with swirling  
white noise.  In these cases, it feels as if the white noise is coming from all points, and in related cases that it is  
moving around.  The egocentric location, as with blurry vision, can, of course, also be more or less specific.
30 This discussion is conducted in terms of particulars, but, if, say, events, or  properties of particulars, can be the 
objects of perception, so to speak, then what has been said covers this.
31 See also Heck's (2007) discussion of 'cognitive maps'.
32 See Peacocke (1992).
33 I set aside here the matter of one's awareness of one's own body, kinaesthetic and proprioceptive awareness and how 
this is integrated.
34 See Strawson (1959) Chapters 1 and 2.
35 In order for there to be a unique description of an object, it is only necessary that there be such a point from which 
the content is specified, and not that we physically occupy it.  However, we do occupy it, presumably because it is 
empirically necessary that our sense organs be located there.  I suppose that our sensory organs or sensory point 
could in  principle  be  dislocated from our body.   In  these  circumstance,  we would perceive  the objects  in  the  
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There is a point ommitted by Evans here.  Egocentric space supplies a fixed point from 
which  a  description  of  an  object  will  necessarily  uniquely  determine  it.   However,  egocentric 
location must be supplemented with an identification of the object in egocentric time. As we, so to 
speak,  carry our  egocentric  axes  around with us,  the identification of  an  object  at  a  particular 
egocentric location will not individuate it unless the time is also stipulated (unless duplicated scenes 
were not possible).  And, just as our understanding of objective space is defined in terms of our 
understanding of egocentric space, likewise for time.  
The simplest explanation of this is that egocentric time is a matter of indexing conscious 
mental acts into the stream of consciousness which only ''flows'' in one direction.  All mental acts  
are individuated along this dimension by their position in the stream of consciousness.36  The object 
we conceive as being there now, the object that is there in experience is the object conceived of in 
the way that I am discussing now.  The object that  was there, i.e. the object that as a matter of 
inference we might conceive of as still being there, is the object conceived of in an unqualified way 
in a previous  experience.37  Thus,  as experiences involve conceptions of objects  which are not 
qualified with respect to objects seen in previous experiences, what it is to say that the object is at  
egocentric location l now is to say is that the conception of the object is solely that it is at egocentric 
location l.  If the conception lacks any further qualifications, involving memory, tense, probability, 
testimony, representation,  inference, and so on, then this is the pure conception of an object of 
current experience.
To  recap  my  claim.   I  am  claiming  that  the  content  of  the  singular  demonstrative 
linguistically  expressed  by  ''that'',  which  is  used  to  communicate  the  content  of  the  concept 
experiential THAT, is: the object now at egocentric location l.  The egocentric location is specified 
by the subject's egocentric ''axes'', and the tense is given by the fact that the conception of the object 
as the object at this location is not qualified in any way.  It is not the object that was there, although 
one may identify it as so by inference from identification two conceptions as co-referring, and it is 
not  the  object  that  I  was  told is  there  (for  this  would  be  a  mediate  conception  involving  an 
perceptual field, but we would be unable to locate them objectively with respect to our bodies.  Unless, that is, we 
had some way of connecting the location of the sense-organs to the body.
36 See Strawson (1959) Chapter 1 Section 1 Part 3 (of course, Evans was well aware of this).  Is  this a temporal 
ordering or a logical one?  That is, could experiences M and N be such that N follows M in the temporal order, but M 
precedes  N in the stream of consciousness?  From a conceptual point of view, this does seem to be acceptable, 
presuming, of course, that sense can be made of the divergence of the order of the stream of consciousness from the  
temporal order of events in the world.  See also Le Poidevin (1999).
37 Does this imply that a subject with a grasp of tense, i.e. a subject able to conclude, as a squirrel certainly does, that  
the nut left under the bush will still be there, requires a grasp of the notion of experience?  If so, this might be a bad  
result for my theory.  But it is not immediately clear that the attribution of tense in this way does not occur within 
the  content,  as  opposed  to  inferentially  as  a  matter  of  consideration  of  past  experiences  rather  than  previous  
contents.  It may be automatic that a recalled content is, as a matter of the different attitude (perhaps cashed out  
functionally), that the tense is different from an experiential content.  In  remembering  that the nut  was under the 
bush, I remember that the nut conceived of as being under the bush there and now at that time, is likely still under  
the bush now at this time, i.e. that were one (i.e. a squirrel) to look under the bush there would be a nut there now  
which is identical (presumably) to the original nut.
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experience of the vehicle of communication) and it is not the object that as a matter of inference 
might be there, and so on.  The tense is a function of the position of the experience as a mental act 
in the stream of consciousness.  Let me set this into context, before addressing the question of 
predicative demonstratives.
5  Perceptual Demonstratives and the Articulation of Perceptual Contents
The theory of judgement that I am adopting, in order to extend to perceptual experiences (and thus 
perceptions), is that s judging that p is analysed as s bearing the judging relation to a conceptually 
articulated proposition p.  Recall my discussion of the state and content views above.  I am arguing 
that the way to analyse the difference between the psychology of experience and judgement is in 
terms of the content.  The above description of the way in which the fundamental idea of an object 
is articulated in experience, stated in (8), serves to individuate experiences as a way of conceiving 
of objects from other thoughts.  Further to this, experience reveals to us in great detail, far more 
than does thought, what the properties that we experience objects to have are.
The  classic  example  of  this  is  colours.   Recall  my  discussion  of  Johnston's  theory  of 
'revelation'.  I argued that the psychological difference between experience and thought is that the 
contents of experiences are richer and finer in detail.  There is a greater range of content, i.e. more 
volume, and a greater precision in the content.  One could perhaps put this that the representation 
goes further down the determinate/determinable scale than does the content of thoughts.  
One way to look at perception is that it must be defined in terms of it being an output from 
the sensory organs.   This looks to  be an empirical  truth:  we gather  information about  external 
objects from the sensory organs.  Some of this information may itself be representations of further 
facts about external objects, but this rational knowledge, to put it in this way, is mediately based on 
immediate perception of the representation.  It should, therefore, not be surprising that the level of 
detail in experience, the level of information we gather about the world through the sensory organs, 
should outstrip the level of detail that can be retained or processed via a non-sensory method.38 
After all, it is seeing and escaping from the tiger that is important, not recalling it in detail.
However,  these  empirical  facts  about  experiences  as  they are  caused  do not  imply that 
analysing what an experience is in a philosophical sense requires us, in fact, to mention the sensory 
organs within the analysis.  Compare this to Snowdon's (1980/1981) point about the causal theory 
of perception.  Perhaps it is indeed empirically impossible (although this may not be so) that a 
perception M of y not be caused by y.  Snowdon points out, and I agree with him, that this does not 
38 Compare here the now derided theory of Hume that recollections and thoughts are ideas, faded sensory impressions.  
This, perhaps, does get something correct in that the level of retained detail drops.
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appear to be constitutive.  Neither, indeed, does the role that the sensory organs and perceptual 
processing system seem to be constitutive in a philosophical conception of experience ''from the 
inside'', so to speak.  There is a further point in favour of not mentioning the sensory organs in the 
analysis and that is that the use of ''sensory organ'' in the analysans has the flavour of circularity 
about it.39  In any case, if experiences can be individuated from other mental acts in virtue of their  
epistemic role and properties, then the addendum of a reference to their functional or causal origins 
will not be necessary.40
The theory that I am defending is an extension of a standard Fregean analysis of judgement 
to perception.  A perceptual experience is, on this theory, a relation to a complex of concepts each of 
which the subject has to possess, as the relation involves the application of the concepts.  This  
proposition is the content of the thought.  If the same is true for experiences, then the content of an 
experience is also a proposition.41
The use of the linguistic demonstrative ''that'' in communicating the content of an experience 
is  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  listener  to  the  object  which  is  the  content  (or  one  of)  of  an 
experience.  Hence, as I am not discussing here communication, I can set aside detailed discussion 
of how linguistic demonstratives perform their function.  However, consider Kaplan's (1989) theory 
of  linguistic  demonstratives.   Kaplan  distinguishes  between  pure  indexicals and  genuine 
39 Roxbee-Cox (1971) raises this against Armstrong (1968).  I do not press this here, as it is not clear that this is a  
worrying circularity.
40 Should, however, I come to be persuaded that this  is necessary, then this would not refute the theory that I am 
defending. Rather, it would only enforce the  modification that the judgement be caused, or be more intimately 
related to the sensory organs as in Pitcher (1971).
41 But what kind of proposition is it?  Is it de re, as opposed to de dicto, or singular as opposed to general, and how 
does this relate to it being demonstrative on my view?I am analysing experiences in terms of a three-place relation. 
In this sense, this is the type of theory held by one branch of the Austrian intentionalist tradition,stemming from  
Brentano.  It it the theory of Meinong and Twardowski (however, they would not have invoked propositions in the 
Fregean sense that I am invoking them).  In contemporary terms, the psychology of the judgement is the content as it 
features in the attitude and the object is that which the content determines.  Holding to a theory of de re senses, such 
as those inspired by Evans and McDowell (1984), makes this Fregean theory similar.  Another similar theory is 
suggested in Quine (1956).  Quine distinguishes between the three-place relation, reported in a sentence such as  
''Someone is such that Quine believes him to be happy'', or ''Someone is believed by Quine to be happy'' and ''Quine  
believes someone to be happy''.   The latter express only a two-place relation.  It  is analysed in terms of 'belief-
notional' as Quine puts it.  The former expresses a three-place relation between Quine, a proposition (sentence), and 
the person that Quine believes to be happy.  The three-place relation is fundamental, and cannot be analysed in terms 
of the two-place relation.  Burge (1977) also holds to this view, namely that de re and de dicto beliefs, i.e. Quine's 
beliefs-relational  and beliefs-notional,  are fundamentally distinct.   Whether or  not this is  something to which I 
would need to subscribe or reject, is not a matter I pursue here.  I can set it aside for the reason that however the  
terminological lines are drawn, experiences, construed as judgements, will be unquestionably de re.  What else is de 
re, e.g., my belief that Plato taught Aristotle as opposed to someone's belief that someone taught Aristotle, is not  
something that  I  need to take a stand on here.   This matter concerns the relations between types of belief,  or  
judgement, and not the relation between experience and judgement in question here.  I take it that experiences (if it  
is accepted that they have such types of content) are unquestionably de re if anything is.  Experiences are sometimes 
held to have singular contents, and this is taken to mean the same thing: that an experience is an experience of a  
given particular, and not just of a notional particular in the sense that someone's believing that someone taught 
Aristotle  of  course  schematically concerns a  particular  in  the  sense  that  the  belief  is  about  something that  is  
notionally particular but not a specific one.   Compare the belief that not all dogs have tails.  This does not even 
schematically  concern  something  that  would  be  a  particular.   These  distinctions,  general  content  and  singular  
content, de re and de dicto all closely align, although different theories will distinguish them in different ways.
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demonstratives.   Both  are  linguistic  terms  which  change  their  referent  depending  on  context. 
Genuine demonstratives, however, require a demonstration in order to fix the referent and are not 
just fixed by the context of use.42  Let me focus on ''that''.  ''That'', as a linguistic demonstrative, only 
has a content, i.e. only picks out an object, in a context.  It always has a linguistic meaning in that it  
performs the same role of function when used, i.e. to refer to a particular.  It acquires its content in a 
context.   The context is the circumstances of use of this particular expression (the speaker, the 
location and time of utterance, etc).  The linguistic meaning of the term is a function that gives the 
content from the context.  So, the use of ''that'' has a linguistic meaning, roughly that it picks out the  
demonstrated object.  This linguistic meaning fixes the content of the term ''that'' when it is used in 
a context.  So, when I say ''that tree is going to fall'', either I need to point to the tree or there needs 
to be some other salient proxy for pointing. 
In  contrast,  I  am  making  two  different  claims  about  perceptual demonstratives.   The 
perceptual demonstrative does not have a linguistic meaning which is a function from a context to a 
content, and, as I am analysing experiences in terms of the application of perceptual demonstratives, 
it cannot be that these require a demonstration.  That is why I tried to reduce ''that'' to ''there'' and 
''now''.   ''There''  cashes  out  in  terms  of  egocentric  spatial  location  which  I  argue  is  as  given 
propositionally as anything else is in experience, and ''now'' in terms of the egocentric location of 
the experience in the stream of consciousness.  These two dimensions of content and location in the 
stream of consciousness individuate each experience uniquely: no two experiences could have the 
same overall content in that they identify two qualitatively identical objects as being at the same 
egocentric point and these two experiences be at the same time in the stream of consciousness even 
if  the same subject were to have their memory erased and then undergo a qualitatively identical  
stream of consciousness to the one they had previously undergone.43
The theory that I am defending is the analysis of perception (experience) in terms of a three-
place relation.   s seeing y is analysed as s bearing the judging relation to a proposition p and to an 
object y.  The proposition p, as on the general Fregean theory, is the psychology of the experience, 
the subjective element of how things are for the subject.  On this theory it is a complex of concepts.  
The complex of concepts that I am claiming articulate the propositional content is that the object in 
experience is conceived of as the object now at egocentric location l, where this is unqualified in 
any way.  ''Now'' as it is used in this sense is only introduced in contrast with conceptions of objects  
42 ''I'',  as  a  term,  always  refers  to  the  speaker,  for  example,  but  ''that''  is  not  like  this.    ''That''  will  require  a  
demonstration in order to pick out the referent from other objects in the environment.  This distinction is not be 
clean cut: if there is only one woman in sight, ''she'' will not require a demonstration, but if there are two, it will.
43 Thus this theory can neatly solve the problem of content  with respect  to  identical  scenes.   The content  is  not 
identical, indeed no content  actually could be identical, assuming that no subjects can be identical.  This lines up to 
some degree  with Martin's  (2002)  p.  194  discussion  of  unrepeatable  aspects  of  the  psychology of  experience. 
Martin, however, thinks that the unrepeatability pertains to the object, but I think it pertains to the experience's place 
in the stream of consciousness.
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acquired in past experiences.  To have a conception of an object as being located at egocentric point  
l, where this is unqualified in any way is to have a conception of it as being now at egocentric point 
l.44
I turn now to defending the use of demonstrative concepts not for individuating the object in 
experience but for our experience its properties.
6  The Richness and Fineness of Grain Arguments
The richness and fineness of grain arguments are that the content of perception exceeds the range of 
concepts that a subject can generally apply in judgement.45  There are two separate arguments.  One 
is that as there are more individuated elements represented in experience, more by number, than can 
be judged, experiences cannot be judgements.
The first argument is the argument that to analyse perception conceptually would be an error 
because it would involve more concepts than the subject could apply.  Consider one of the examples 
discussed by Tye (2005), where subjects can only recall/see a certain number of letters on the screen 
but where the subject is visually conscious of more than they can identify in this way.  However, 
one  could  hold,  that  all  that  this  shows  is  that  we  cannot  say  that  subject  applies  high-level 
concepts, such as LETTER, or THE LETTER "T", to these letters.  But this does not show that they 
do not apply lower-level concepts to those letters in perception.  In other words, they do not see a 
"T" as the letter "T", but as a certain shape.  And this is compatible with a range of concepts being 
applied in perception, but these perceptual contents being linked to the contents that are reportable 
after the fact in a way such that not every concept applied in perception is one that can be applied in 
reporting.  Further, when the subject focuses their attention on the "T" they may then come to apply 
the concept THE LETTER ''T'' to it, indeed this may be focusing on it in the relevant sense, but this  
only implies that they did not apply this concept before, and not that they applied no concept.  And 
certainly one's memory is constrained: for example, I can no longer remember in full detail even 
how things were before my eyes a few seconds ago.  Nevertheless, this tells us about memory: about 
the relation between concepts as applied in experience, or if one is a non-conceptualist, on the basis 
44 Assuming that experiences can be called de re, this means that even if Quine and Burge (see the note two above) are 
correct that the three-place relation and the two-place relation which de re and de dicto are respectively analysed in 
terms of cannot be analysed equivalently in these terms, then another of Burge's (1977) theses, namely that  de re 
attitudes require a non-conceptual link between the subject and the object is in some way non-conceptual  p. 347, 
can be rejected on this theory.  On a full ''Fregean'' theory, see Frege (1956), all indexical elements are analysed out  
in favour of non-indexical senses.  See Heck (2002) and May (2006).  Compare this with Tye's view on which de re 
experiential  contents  are  analysed  in  terms  of  a  non-conceptually  mediated  link,  what  Tye  (2009)  now  calls 
acquaintance (which I take to be a form of ''nominal-knowing'').
45 The argument originates in Evans (1982), and is defended by, e.g., Peacocke, (2001), Heck (2000), Kelly (2001), 
and Tye (2005).
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of experience, and those concepts which are retained for future use.  Indeed, this feature, the loss of 
concepts is a feature not only of perceptual concepts.  I  am certain that I have possessed non-
experiential concepts and come to lose them: i.e., I have forgotten that I ever had them.46
I do not see that the richness argument, on the basis of the observation that experiences have 
a greater volume of representation than thoughts alone, is compelling.  After all, experiences have 
other features than other conceptual acts, one of which may be, as a result of empirical circumstance 
explained in some evolutionary way, that the volume of representation is greater: and, presumably, 
the  explanation  of  this  is  that  the  volume  of  information  in  experience  cannot  be  retained  or 
duplicated in non-experiential thought because this was not evolutionarily necessary.  One can fit a 
greater volume of representation on a DVD than a CD, but this does not make these two types of 
thing different types of representations: both are, at bottom, digital representations.
Chuard concludes that the problem for the conceptualist raised by the richness argument is 
one of plausibility.47  He probes the motivation for the thesis that it can be drawn from this that 
experiences are non-conceptual.  He distinguishes this from closely related claims, failure to report 
detail  as  in  the  Sperling  experiment,  change blindness,  coming to  notice  something previously 
unnoticed,  coming  to  remember  something  that  previously one  thought  one  had not  seen,  and 
concludes,  correctly  in  my view,  that  these  do  not  motivate  the  move  from richness  to  non-
conceptualism.48
As Chuard diagnoses it, to get from the richness of experience to non-conceptualism about 
experiences,  something  like  the  what  he  calls  the  'bridging  thesis'  will  be  necessary:  'if  s’s 
experience ... is rich in information, it is possible that S does not deploy a concept for at least one of 
the many objects … or properties ... represented simultaneously'.49  However, in order to motivate 
the bridging thesis, some further work needs to be done, and this is done by arguing that such a 
concepts cannot be deployed, i.e. applied, in experience simultaneously.50  And, as Chuard notes, the 
conceptualist will reject this. 
Chuard  mentions  Noe's  (2002)  discussion  of  the  'snapshot'  view  of  experience,  where 
experiences represent all of the detail (that could be represented, not microstructure for example) 
about every object in the visual field.   The conceptualist  can reject this,51 and will  analyse the 
46 For example, I struggle even to remember basic calculus, let alone the more advanced maths that I learned in school.
47 See Chuard (2006) p. 183.
48 It is interesting that these arguments bear great similarity to arguments I discussed above against representationalism 
about experiences.  Conceptualism is to non-conceptualism what representationalism is to non-representationalism 
in a sense, and if these arguments are unsuccessful, which in my opinion they are, against representationalism, it  
should not be surprising that they are unsuccessful, which in my opinion they are, against conceptualism.  
49 Chuard (2006) p. 156
50 See Chuard (2006) Section 3 for discussion,
51 It is interesting that a notion very similar to this, that whereby there is some element of experience that is like a  
photograph, and that experiences are in some way akin to viewing a photograph, is one keeps re-appearing.  Neither 
part is entitled to assert this or its negation, but the tendency seems strongly to be in favour of holding this in various  
guises.
126
notions of 'attention' and 'noticing' that Chuard distinguishes from the richness argument in terms of 
the application of concepts.52  I conclude that the richness argument can be rebutted.
Relatedly, the precision, or fineness, of concepts that are applied in experience may seem to 
outrun the fineness of concepts that are applied in experience.  This leads into the fineness of grain 
argument,  the  conceptualist's  defence  of  which  turns  on  the  rejection  of  a  condition  on  the 
possession of demonstrative concepts as opposed to a stronger conditions on the possession of non-
demonstrative concepts.  However,  these possession conditions perhaps serve to  individuate two 
types of concept, and thus (contingently, perhaps) to individuate experiences from thoughts along 
this dimension.
The fineness  of  grain  argument,  again originating in  Evans  (1982),  is  that  the range of 
properties represented in experience, in terms of the precision and not mere number, outstrips the 
range of concepts that subjects  possess:  the conceptual repertoire of the subject is too coarsely 
grained  to  articulate  experience.   The  conceptualist's  rejoinder  is  that  the  concepts  applied  in 
experience are demonstrative concepts. The central non-conceptualist argument against this, pressed 
most forcefully in Kelly (2001), is that the possession conditions are not met for these concepts: the 
subject cannot re-identify a property and so cannot be said to possess the concept.
Consider the concept DOG.  I certainly possess this concept, and one reason that we will 
accept this is that I can re-apply the same concept, DOG, repeatedly.  Supposing that DOG is a 
perceptual concept, should I see two dogs, I would both times apply the same concept, DOG, and 
come to see the two dogs as dogs.  Should I see the same dog, I would re-identify the same dog both 
times as a dog.  Subjects cannot do this for very fine-grained experiential concepts.  Should I see a 
specific shade of red, or a very determinate shape, I would be unable to re-identify the shade or 
shape even moments later.  I would be unable to knowingly apply the same concept twice.
So, a condition being appealed to  for a content to  be conceptual,  is  that the conceptual 
elements  pass  the re-identification  test:  a  subject  must  be able  to  use  concept  C to  re-identify 
properties or objects falling under it.53
The argument here is that a demonstrative concept will be lost once it ceases to be applied. 
Think of a very specific shape.  In looking at the shape of the tear in a piece of paper, my thought of  
it may be articulated by THAT SHAPE.  But when I look away from the shape, I can no longer 
52 See, e.g., Tye (2009c) for an argument against the ''snapshot model''.
53 See Chuard (2007) Section 2 for discussions of the various re-identification constraints in the literature.  The two 
dimensions are temporal, i.e. diachronic or synchronic, and epistemic, i.e. whether or not re-identification mean that  
the subject knowingly re-identifies.  Diachronic re-identification of the same property as a property that falls under 
the same concept which is known (should the subject think about it) to have applied before, is the strongest criterion. 
This is what we think about DOG for example.  When I re-identify something as a dog, I know that I am using the  
same concept as before.  When I look twice at a shade and apply THAT SHADE, the comparable knowledge is not 
available solely from the experience.  Should I suffer amnesia, and come tomorrow to look at my sister, I might  
apply a concept on the basis of testimony, say the descriptive concept (that  I do not spell out for brevity) MY 
SISTER, but this would not be to re-identify, but merely to identify, my sister.  The reason is that I am unaware of 
possessing and applying the same concept. 
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think of the shape using this concept.  This is unlike the SHAPE component of the demonstrative. 
Chuard compares this to a specific other type of concept, that which, after Campbell (2002) he calls 
a 'sortal concept'.54  A subject can only possess such a concept if they are able to apply the concept 
(although  not  necessarily  to  a  particular  that  falls  under  the  concept)  absent  an  experience  of 
something that falls under it, and they possess a criterion for sorting those things which (would) fall  
under it from those that don't.  Demonstrative concepts need not be taken to be like sortal concepts, 
but this does not mean that they are not concepts of a different sort, namely demonstrative concepts. 
Perhaps some sortal concepts begin as demonstrative concepts.  A good candidate for this is the 
class of colour concepts.  In seeing something as THAT SHADE, I retain, i.e. draw into my retained 
sortal  repertoire perhaps COLOUR and RED, or even MAROON, but not THAT SHADE.  As 
Chuard  points  out,  there  is  no  prior  reason  to  hold  that  either  the  first  condition  above,  the 
application of the concept absent a sample needs to be taken to hold for demonstrative concepts.
What about the second condition, that the subject knows a criterion for sorting those which 
(would) fall under it from those which do not?  Recall my discussion of objectual demonstrative 
concepts in terms of our knowledge of which thing a thing is.  This applies also to properties.  And 
to know which property a property is, i.e. to know which objects with those properties (would) fall 
under it when it is used as a sortal, and which not, is to be able to re-apply the concept.  To be able 
to knowingly apply the same concept twice, and thus know that the two particulars it is used to sort 
fall under this same concept.
To hold this is to hold that demonstrative concepts, although they do not meet the same 
conditions for possession as sortal concepts, nevertheless meet Evans' Generality Constraint as a 
condition on their being possessed by a subject.  Notice that in moving from re-identification as a 
condition to re-application, indeed possible re-application, as a condition, and that in moving from 
re-identification  to  re-application  we have  moved from a  discussion conducive  to  a  diachronic 
condition to a discussion conducive to a synchronic condition.  Consider a subject faced with four 
squares, two of which are one colour and two another.  According to the proponent of demonstrative 
concepts, the subject identifies each colour in terms of the concept THAT COLOUR.  However, the 
subject here will be applying two of the very same demonstrative concepts twice, once to each of 
the two squares.  Further, the subject will know that the very same concept is being applied, for the 
subject will possess a criterion for sorting objects with respect to these two properties; indeed this is 
undertaken in the experience.   That the subject fails  to meet a further diachronic conditions of 
knowing re-identification, shows only that there are certain conceptual capacities, which behave 
differently with  respect  to  these  parameters.   The  central  condition  on  a  mental  act  being  the 
exercise of conceptual capacities, and thus concepts, namely the Generality Constraint, is met.  I  
54 Roskies (2010) compares demonstrative concepts to 'standing concepts' which subjects retain absent an experience  
of the sample.
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thus  conclude  that  the  challenge  posed  by the  fineness  of  grain  argument  can  be  met  by the 
conceptualist.55
7  Experience, Demonstrative Concepts, and Acquisition
I  have  argued  that  the  richness  and  fineness  of  grain  arguments  are  unpersuasive.   There  is, 
however, another challenge specifically in respect of demonstrative concepts as the concepts that 
articulate the content of experience.  This challenge is first put forward in Evans (1982).  It is that a 
level of nonconceptual content is required to ground the acquisition of a concept based on that 
perception.  The argument that I am now going to consider is that the acquisition of the concept 
requires the presence of, i.e. the experience of, the sample.  Heck takes up this argument as follows.
In Evans's own writings, the notion of nonconceptual content is introduced, not to resolve problems 
in the theory of perception,  but  because it  is  needed  in  his  theory of  demonstrative reference: 
Without  the  claim that  perceptual  content  is  nonconceptual,  Evans  could  not  give  the  sort  of 
account he does of what fixes the contents of demonstratives 'that object'.  Very roughly, Evan's 
story goes like this: For a demonstrative concept to be of a particular object x is for one's attitudes 
towards contents containing that concept to be sensitive, in the right sort of way, to information 
about x, information that is, in central cases, delivered by perception.  It should be obvious that this 
explanation  would  be  viciously circular  if  the  information  to  which  one  was  supposed  to  be 
sensitive  (the  content  of  the  relative  perceptual  experiences)  had  the conceptual  content  'That 
object  is  F':  One cannot  have information with such a conceptual  articulation without  already 
having  the  demonstrative  concept  that  object.   But  the  circle  is  broken  if  the  information  is 
(typically, and in relevant respects) nonconceptual.56
Peacocke (1992) also argues that the concept THAT SHADE cannot be a part of the content of the 
perception, for then there would be no non-circular explanation of how I come by the concept in the 
55 Let me add two notes.  Firstly, there may be some people with extraordinary powers of memory for whom  all 
concepts would be sortals in the sense discussed.  However this would not tell against the position I am defending, 
for  then a demonstrative concept would be a class of sortal  concepts for which some subjects  lack certain re-
identification abilities.  This would tell us something about the capacities of subjects across time and how these can  
vary.   Secondly,  although  my  point  about  some  sortals,  concepts  of  very  unspecific  determinables  (with  are 
themselves determinates), such as RED, starting life as demonstratives is just a hypothetical option.  I do not wish to  
advance this as my view.  There is, however, an interesting point here, and that is that we ought not to be led into  
individuating concepts by the names that we give them.   ''THAT COLOUR'', as opposed to ''THAT SHADE'', and 
''RED'' might in fact be the same concept, only we name them differently.  Peacocke (2001) argues that this overly 
determines the content of perception, but I am not convinced.  After all, I can think of a shape simultaneously as a  
shape and as a square.  Even if this were not so, but it were in experience, this could be explained by the fact that  
some of the concepts are re-applications in the sense of applications of antecedently possessed sortals, and some, the  
determinates of the sortal determinable, are not.
56 Heck (2000) p. 493
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first  place.   Rather,  perception  includes  a  'positioned-scenario'  level  of  content,  whereby  the 
surfaces and their positions are mapped along axes centred on the subject's body, and a level of 
'proto-propositional'  content  which  is  non-conceptual  but,  unlike  the  scenario  content, 
representational.  This explains, in the manner that Heck describes with respect to Evans, how the 
concepts are acquired.
We require an explanation of the acquisition of the concept THAT SHADE which picks out, 
say, something that is red21.  The conceptualist holds that the subject's application of THAT SHADE 
is their experiencing something which is, in this case, red21.  Recall my example of the subject 
presented  with  two  sets  of  identically  coloured  squares.   According  to  the  conceptualist,  the 
experience of the squares consists in four applications of the demonstrative concept THAT SHADE. 
But these four applications are two sets of applications of the same concept.
The non-conceptualist worries that experience is being explained in terms of the application 
of a concept, but that experience is necessary to acquire a concept.  But it seems to me that the 
conceptualist  is  entitled  to  hold  that  experience  is  both  acquisition  and  application  of  the 
demonstrative concept.57  The burden is on the conceptualist to explain this: how can the application 
of a concept be its acquisition?  There is, I think, a good answer to this.  The acquisition of a  
concept  is  identified,  in  the  relevant  sense,  with  the  first  time  that  the  concept  is  applied  (or 
unknowingly re-applied; in which case it is a different concept).
This stands in opposition to the way in which Evans, and Heck and Peacocke, see the non-
conceptual content as playing a role in the acquisition of the concept.58  The non-conceptual content 
is supposed to explain the acquisition of the concept, as the conceptualising move exploits the non-
conceptual  presentation  of  the sample (this  is  McDowell's  unfortunate way of  putting it,  for  it 
implies something like the non-conceptualist's view).  There is no circularity on the conceptualist's 
account: the presence of the sample is not explaining the acquisition of the concept; the presence of 
the sample to the mind is the acquisition of the concept.
At some point sub-personal processing, which is of course non-conceptual, gives rise to a 
mental act.  Which objects are the objects of my experience depend on where I am at that time and 
what is there (to be seen).  If there is an  F in my visual field, and my brain and sensory organs 
processes the information, I will come to see the F.  Whatever theory is given, at some point I will 
acquire the concept.  At this point, there is a transition to the state of affairs of my possessing the  
concept under which I think of the F, from a state of affairs whereby I did not possess this concept. 
Recall  my discussion  of  demonstratives  in  general  above.   Linguistic demonstratives  require  a 
demonstration.  Experiential demonstratives do not require a demonstration, and were there to be a 
demonstration in  the form of a prior  mental  act  then the demonstrative concepts  theory of the 
57 See McDowell (1994) Afterword Part II.
58 See, e.g., Evans (1982) p. 122.
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conceptualist would indeed fail.
Before I discuss this line of attack, in particular from Roskies (2008) and (2010), consider 
the  role  of  non-conceptual  content  as  characterised  by Evans.   If  it  is  invoked  to  explain  the 
transition  from not  possessing  to  possessing  THAT SHADE,59 then  the  non-conceptual  content 
stands between a sub-personal state, which is non-conceptual, and a conceptual state, whereby I 
possess and apply the concept.  However, does the insertion of another non-conceptual state help? 
Perhaps it helps by being a bit like a conceptual state.  Perhaps it is structured and so on.  One 
problem with this is that the more that non-conceptual contents (and the abilities required to be in 
the  state,  recall  the  state/content  distinction  from above)  are  tailored  to  fit  the  way in  which 
conceptual states with conceptual contents integrate with each other, the less motivated the notion 
of non-conceptual content becomes.60  Further, at some point there is still the move from a non-
conceptual state to a conceptual state whereby the concept is acquired.  The acquisition is either this 
transition, or it is the act of applying it for the first time.  A level of non-conceptual content is not 
required,  indeed does  not  help,  to  explain  this.   Indeed,  now  two transitions  stand in  need  of 
explanation: from sub-personal to non-conceptual, and from non-conceptual to conceptual.
I discuss now a related problem to this, that of the 'conceptual nativism' of this account put 
forward by Roskies (2008), before returning in more detail to the current problem of the alleged 
ungroundedness  or  circularity  inherent  in  the  conceptualist's  account  of  the  acquisition  of  a 
demonstrative concept.
8  Concept Acquisition and Conceptual Nativism
In a  recent paper,  Roskies (2008) argues that one would 'either  have to deny that  there is  any 
scientifically  viable  explanation  of  how  [concept]  acquisition  occurs,  appealing  to  miracles  or 
magic,  or one would have to invoke demonstrative concepts',61 but that demonstrative concepts 
themselves would require an explanation of how they came to be acquired.
Learning intimately involves the person level: it requires effort and attention; it is a goal-driven, 
cognitive activity.  The philosophical intuition is that in concept learning, concepts are actively 
constructed by thinkers, they do not just occur to them.  They are not constructed ex nihilo, but on 
the basis of experience.  The content of an experience plays a role in fixing the content of the 
59 And I mean here THAT SHADE as used in a thought, and not the ability to use THAT SHADE.  On the account I 
am defending, this is the ability to perceive shades of colour.
60 This, of course, can be turned around, especially with respect to the strength of the theory of concepts.  The key 
here, I think, is the Generality Constraint and the re-application condition discussed above.
61 Roskies (2008) p. 639
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concepts a thinker acquires.  We might characterize this view of learning  with the slogan "learning 
is  a  cognitive  achievement".   This,  I  maintain,  is  the  only viable  way to  account  for  concept 
attainment,  for  it  is  the  only one  fit  to  explain  how concepts  can  be  person-level  constructs,  
available for deployment in thought.62
The key is understanding 'on the basis of experience', and concepts being 'personal-level constructs'. 
This language is, I think, a little loaded, and one ought not to be tempted to draw conclusions from 
this language alone, however naturally it fits exposition.  'On the basis of' implies that the based and 
the  basing  are  distinct,  and  'personal-level  constructs'  that  the  concept  is  constructed  in  an 
intentional (purposeful)  act.   Compare this to the constructing of a paper aeroplane.   The final 
product is constructed in the sense that it is the result of an action.  Moving this analogy back to the 
mental, a concept as a construct would be the outcome of a purposeful act.  Roskies does indeed 
think this, but I think that she equivocates over two notions of purposeful.
In opposition to the above construal of 'on the basis of', one may put it that concepts are 
acquired in experience as experience is the acquisition of some concepts, and allows for others to be 
acquired.
A further difficulty comes with the idea that the 'content of the experience plays a role in 
fixing the content of the concept'.  If the former use of 'content' actually is better rendered, to keep 
the distinction clear, as object instead, then the conceptualist will not deny this.
Roskies is  appealing to the idea that the acquisition of the concept  C is  the result  of a 
conscious process, like the construction of the paper aeroplane in the sense of its being finally 
constructed, is constitutively the result of the process of constructing it.  This distinction, between 
the process and the result, is, I think, underwriting Roskies argument.  
I  would like to  defend the position that the acquisition of the concept  C can in fact  be 
defined as the first time the concept is applied.  There is a slight terminological wrinkle here, for I  
can  acquire  non-perceptual  concepts  by  mention  and  not  use.   When  I  acquire  a  concept  via 
explanation, I do not apply the concept to anything.  If empiricism about some concepts is correct, 
then those empiricist, or observational, concepts will be those which can only be acquired through 
application.  And these will be the concepts that can be acquired only as demonstrative concepts.
So, s acquires the concept C when s applies it for the first time.  This is sufficient but not 
necessary.  If  s merely  mentions  the  concept,  or  uses  a  metalinguistic  concept,  such  as,  THE 
CONCEPT C, then s will not have applied it.  If s already possesses C, then then mentioning of C is 
not the application of it, but s could apply it, and so s possesses it.  However, if s acquires C through 
explanation (or through inference of some sort), then s will not apply C to anything, but will come 
62 Roskies (2008) p. 643
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to acquire it.  So, perhaps the full analysis of the notion of acquisition here is that a concept C is 
acquired when it either is or could be applied to something that falls under it for the first time.  The 
current  interest  is  in  demonstrative  concepts,  which  cannot  be  acquired  through  inference  or 
explanation.
The subject's acquiring the concept is a matter of their grasping the conditions on sorting 
objects under this concept, and therefore being able recognise objects as falling under this concept. 
An example of something like this would be the concept TABLE.  We can, presumably, specify 
what it is for something to be a table.  Of course, and as is well known, there has been successive  
failures in any attempts to outline such a specification for the concepts for which it is suggested that  
this is possible.  Nevertheless, it is sufficiently intuitively clear that a concept like TABLE can be 
somehow be acquired in virtue of the subject possessing certain more fundamental notions, in the 
sense  that  they comprise the  definiens,  such  as  ''function'' and ''artefact'',63 as  well  as  concepts 
pertaining to shape and structures and so forth.
Roskies' argument is that if the demonstrative concepts theory of experience is accepted, 
then the account of acquisition is nativist, in the sense that it is unlearned.  Again, I would argue that 
for a concept to be learned here is for it to be acquired as the result of learning it via some mental 
process.  
Conceptual  nativism  is  here  a  theory  about  the  acquisition  and  logically  subsequent 
possession  of  concepts  which  asserts  that  the  concept  need not  be  learned,  and thus  acquired, 
through a mental process such as a transition from a non-conceptual content to a conceptual content 
or a transition between conceptual states.  The definition thus turns on the notion of learning.  I 
think that there is an error that may be made, and that I think Roskies makes, regarding acquisition 
and attention.   The error here is  structurally similar to the present error.   This error is  that the 
acquisition of a concept is constitutively the result of a mental process.  
If I purchase a toy aeroplane, I acquire it.  However, my acquiring it may be understood in 
the sense of my coming to possess it, which occurs at the moment that the transaction occurs, or the  
process of my shopping for it and so on.  Recall my point about the construction of the concept 
above.  For Roskies, learning is closely related to construction, both of which constitute acquisition. 
However, imagine that I have never thought of a table before, and you introduce the notion to me.  
Let it be, for the sake of argument, that TABLE is defined in terms of three concepts, A, B, and C. 
When I come to consider what a table is, i.e. to acquire the concept TABLE (by mention, not use), I 
grasp the relation between A, B, and C, and thus will come to possess TABLE.  However, and this is 
central,  during the process of putting these together,  I  did not possess,  and so at  no point had 
acquired, the concept TABLE.  This occurred when the process had finished, and the culmination of 
63 Maybe not all tables are artefacts, actually, as there may be ''natural'' tables apt for use as a table.  However, the point 
is clear.  To grasp the definiens is to have concepts of these notions.
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the process here is my acquiring the concept.  I can only be said to have acquired when I either 
applied, or in this case could have applied, it: while I was queuing for the till, I had not acquired the 
toy  aeroplane.   This is  what  acquisition is.   This  is  what  is  common  to  all  cases  of  concept 
acquisition, and not the process.
According  to  Fodor  (1998),  those  concepts  which  are  acquired  empirically,  i.e.  those 
concepts which are acquired through perception, are acquired as a matter of the subject's 'locking' 
on to the property which falls under the concept.  This is because all concepts are lexical and all are 
innate in that the acquisition of the concept is atomic and not a matter of any process involving the 
grasping of conditions or a definition.  In other words, no concept decomposes into conceptual units 
in a manner similar to the way in which a proposition decomposes into concepts.  I think that this  
Fodorian nativism is correct in at least one sense.  
There is, I think, an important point here, namely that the application of the concept, or the 
mention of it,  is not equivalent to the application or mention of the concepts out of which it is  
constructed,  they  must  be  grouped  together  somehow:  to  grasp  a  sense  is  not  in  this  sense 
comparable to the apprehension of a proposition, which is like this in that the apprehension of Fa is 
the joint application of the constituent concepts.  For example, the subject will have to possess  
OBJECT, SHAPE, etc, in order for them to acquire TABLE, but will have to combine them in some 
way to result in TABLE.
The acquisition of  TABLE, on this theory, would depend on the subject's possession of a 
further group of concepts and grasp of the relations between them.  So, this is structured and the 
concept  is  structured  in  the  sense  that  it  is  defined,  and  to  possess  the  concept  is  to  know a 
definition (perhaps one of many) of the notion (i.e. to grasp the concepts exercised in the knowledge 
of the  definiens).  However, the  concept itself is not structured in this sense, and, crucially,  the 
acquisition of the concept is not structured, even though the process by which it is acquired is 
structured.  At one point I did not know what tables were or lacked the concept, and at another I had 
it.64
If the charge against the conceptualist is that if experiences are articulated by the application 
of demonstrative concepts that this renders the theory unacceptably nativistic, then I think that this 
can be rejected.  There is no magic.  Rather, the experience is the application, and therefore in some  
cases acquisition of  a  concept.   For  non-empirical  concepts,  the presence of  the sample is  not 
necessary in acquiring the concept, and the acquisition is still not identified with the process of 
acquiring it, but with the event of the subject coming to be able to apply it, i.e. their possessing it.  A 
concept is something that is applied by the subject, and so in acquiring it, it must be that the subject  
64 Peacocke (1992) Chapter 1 discusses the notion of partial  mastery,  but  then, at  which point  did I have partial  
mastery of the concept?  Concept acquisition does not seem to happen on a curve; the sophistication of the concepts  
grasped happens on a curve, but not each individual grasping.
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comes to be able to use it.  One way to do this, is to actually use it, and if one cannot use it, then one 
does not have it.  In objecting to Roskies, I would apply this analogy directly to the acquisition of  
concepts.
9  Demonstrative Concepts and Attention
In the previous section, I argued, the acquisition of a demonstrative concept can be identified with 
the first time that it is applied.  The second of Roskies' arguments that I will rebut is similar.  Instead 
of there being a process of learning which stands constitutively and logically prior to acquiring the 
concept, there is the subject's attending in experience to the sample which falls under the concept 
acquired.  Here I think that Roskies is mistaking the conditions under which we acquire concepts 
for an analysis of what it is to acquire a concept.  In the previous argument, learning C, construed as 
constitutively prior a process or mental act of some sort, necessarily preceded the subject's ability to 
apply  C, and thus be said to possess  C.  On this version, the subject attending to the sample is 
playing the role of learning.65
Suppose we are going to form a demonstrative concept of an object O not previously  encountered, 
for which we lack a concept.  In  order to form a demonstrative concept, we  must delineate with  
attentional mechanisms that part of visual space that corresponds to  O.   However, since we have 
never before encountered  O, we have no pre-experiential  information about  O's boundaries.  We 
must therefore rely upon the deliverances of  experience to provide us with content representing that  
object, in order to successfully  delineate it with attention.  Since, by hypothesis, this something in  
our  experience  cannot  be   conceptual,  it  must  be  nonconceptual.   Thus  demonstrative  concept 
formation itself requires  nonconceptual content.66
However, I argued that the boundaries of the object can be delineated conceptually: that is what it is 
to see the object.   Roskies repeats this  argument,  this  time making some matters explicit,  in  a 
subsequent paper
1 Forming a demonstrative concept requires a demonstration.
2 The relevant demonstration in conceptual demonstrative formation is the endogenous 
(voluntary, intentional) focusing of attention.
65 Notice  again  that  another  notion,  that  of  attending,  is  playing  the  same  strategic  role  with  respect  to  a  non-
conceptualist argument against conceptualism as it did with respect to a non-representationalist argument against 
representationalism.
66 Roskies (2008) pp. 655-656
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3 Intentional focusing of attention involves representational content of experience.
4 To be a response to the learning argument, that representational content cannot 
always already be conceptual.
5 Thus, forming a novel demonstrative concept appropriate to account for novel 
concept learning must involve focusing attention on contentful aspects of experience 
that are nonconceptual.67
The first premise is only true if the demonstrative is a linguistic demonstrative, and not a perceptual 
demonstrative which is a concept in terms of which experiences are articulated.  No demonstration 
is required for this.  Or, at least, Roskies is not entitled to assume this position without argument by 
analogy to linguistic demonstratives.   The third premise will be accepted by the conceptualist.  The 
fourth premise concerns the learning argument which can be rejected as above.
Consider the notions of ''attention'' and ''endogenous'' in the second premise.  The object of 
my attention is the object that I am looking at.  There may be many objects I see, but only one that I  
am attending to.  But no problem arises from this.  Recall  the argument from attention against 
representationalism.  The rebuttal to this argument was that changing attention, i.e. changing mental 
if not physical focus, changes the content.  Thus, if attention means only this, then the conceptual 
content,  i.e.  demonstrative  content,  will  change.   Thus,  this  cannot  be  an  argument  against 
conceptualism any more than it  was against representationalism: all  objects  seen are objects  of 
attention; ''attention'' here serves to highlight the object of my interest or focus, but the other objects 
are still seen.  But if ''attending'' only means seeing, then this is of no help.
Consider the quoted passage:  'In  order to form a demonstrative concept, we must delineate 
with attentional mechanisms that part of visual space that corresponds to  O.  However, since we 
have never before encountered  O, we have no pre-experiential information about  O's boundaries.' 
The experience provides the ability to attend to it, i.e. to 'delineate it with attentional mechanisms'.  
But, according to the conceptualist, this is a very loose paraphrase of what it is to see it.
Consider this,  the second premise,  and the ambiguity in ''attention''  between attention to 
something in the visual field,  i.e.  something seen, and, what is  not really attention,  but putting 
oneself in a position to see something.  In order to see in the drawer, I have to open it and direct my 
eye into it.  This is, in a sense, to attend to the contents of the drawer.  Alternatively, when I am 
seeing the contents of the drawer, I can attend further to something in the drawer that I already see. 
This latter notion was covered in the paragraph two above.  What if, after I have been looking in the 
drawer for some time, a jumping spider leaps out and, instinctively, I direct my attention to it?  This 
was not a purposeful act, like looking in the drawer, and so was not attending in any sense over and 
67 Roskies (2010) p. 123
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above seeing.  But then what notion of attention is left?  The notion of looking in the drawer to see 
its contents cannot be the notion in the second premise.
Consider  now the  first  premise,  for  the  ambiguities  inherent  in  the  second premise  are 
related to the error in the first premise.  As well as the notion of attention, the second premise  
contains the notion of a demonstration.  Indeed, the attention is really playing the mental role of the 
linguistic  demonstration:  the  non-conceptual  experience  functions  like  the  pointing  does  in  a 
linguistic use of the word ''that''.  But this is a communicative act between subjects, and not the 
delivery via perception of content to the subject.  To hold that there needs to be an analogue of the  
demonstration required with the use of a linguistic demonstrative in experience is unwarranted. 
One may put it that the sub-personal system functions in this way, but then this is not relevant to the 
acquisition of a concept any more than my choosing to look in the left-hand drawer as opposed to 
the  right-hand  drawer  was  relevant  to  my  seeing,  which  according  to  the  conceptualist  is 
conceptually articulated,  the jumping spider.   As I  argued above,  the way that  the  experiential 
demonstrative concept works is that it picks out an object via its egocentric location.  This pattern 
then is subsumed into the linguistic rules of verbal demonstratives.  In respect of properties, to see 
the shade as ''that shade'', is to apply a demonstrative concept which satisfies Evans' Generality 
Constraint in the synchronic way I described above to the shade.  I thus conclude that this argument 
from Roskies can also be rejected.
Let  me  discuss  two  other  arguments  against  conceptualism in  general,  and  not  against 
demonstratives in particular.  In chapter 6, I discuss the argument against the judgement or belief 
theory.
10  The Motion Aftereffect
This argument is pressed most famously in Crane (1988a), (1988b) with respect to the waterfall 
illusion.  The motion aftereffect results in a visual phenomenon whereby, as a result of looking at  
something that  is  moving for  a  while,  looking at  something stationary will  result  in  a  curious  
phenomenon whereby it ''looks as though the object is moving, and simultaneously that it is not 
moving''.  The object appears to be moving and staying still, within the same experience.  This is 
unlike the Müller-Lyer, which I discuss in chapter 6 whereby the lines looks longer and one knows 
that they are the same length.  It is a scope difference, between (p and not-p) as a content pertaining 
to the aftereffect, and p and not-p as two contents pertaining to the Müller-Lyer.  As the constituents 
of contents are individuated by the following principle, the conceptual theory, which holds to a 
Fregean individuation of concepts, faces a challenge.
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F  and G are different concepts if it is possible for a subject to rationally judge, of an object a, that a  
is F and that a is not-G.68
From this, Crane derives the following.
F and G are different perceptual concepts if it is possible for a subject to have (at the same time) an 
experience with the content that a is F and an experience with the content a  is not-G.69
Thus, as it is possible to experience that (a is F and not-F), the experience cannot be conceptually 
articulated as this violates the individuating criterion for concepts.  Crane mentions Craig's (1976) 
discussion of the Necker-Cube which ''switches'' between orientations in experience.  This preserves 
the  application  of  the  principle  of  individuating  concepts  to  experiences,  as  the  contradictory 
contents are the contents of different experiences.   Mellor (1988) suggest this with respect to a 
switch between  moving and  having moved which are delivered differently in  experience.   This 
suggests another explanation, not that there is a whole content pertaining to the illusion, but two 
different contents pertaining to two different parts of it.
It is not clear to me, in fact, that the object really looks to be moving in quite the sense that 
one takes this to mean.  One might hold that the interior of the object looks to move, but the edges  
not.  This seems somewhat accurate to me, in fact.  However, what of an object for which there is 
no relative spatial comparison: could the interior look to move, but the edges not without their not 
looking to move being relative?  I would say, in fact that the object looks not really to move, and 
presumably this is because the visual system is misfiring: it is itself representing (in its own sub-
personal sense) something as moving, or trying to, and yet it is not representing the usual range of  
features that would occur when something is moving and so this cannot be integrated into the usual 
content delivered to the subject.  Rather it looks as if it is warping and not that its boundaries are 
moving in the sense that the centre of the object is travelling anywhere, especially with respect to 
the surrounding objects.  It is as if the space that the object occupies is changing in some way, and 
not that the object is moving and not moving.   Hence, although this argument puts pressure on the 
conceptualist, perhaps pressure to reject the Fregean principle for individuating concepts, it is not 
clear to me that this example, nor indeed other such examples of the aftereffect that I have seen,  
have the actual visual effect that Crane takes them to have.70
68 Crane (1988a) p. 144
69 Crane (1988a) p. 145
70 It must be noted, however, that it may be that there are other such phenomenon which do have a more difficult to 
explain away.  Another alternative, which I discuss in chapter 6 with respect to the Müller-Lyer, is that perhaps 
experiences, although they are conceptual, function in some respects differently from beliefs.  However, I do not 
think that the example itself shows it necessary to adopt this position in this case.  Another argument which I would  
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11  The Continuity Argument
The continuity argument is the argument that the mental lives of adult humans are continuous to 
some degree with the mental  lives of animals and young children who do not  (by hypothesis)  
possess  any concepts.71  The  most  likely continuity is  in  perceptual  experience:  a  mouse  or  a 
newborn baby can see me equally as well as I can see them.  More specifically, if we are all three  
looking  at,  say,  a  dartboard,  neither  the  mouse  nor  the  newborn  baby  have  the  concepts 
DARTBOARD.  What we have in common, according to this prima facie plausible argument, is the 
non-conceptual experience.  The first point to note is that if the non-conceptualism in question is 
state non-conceptualism, then this argument will look perhaps rather good: the psychology of the 
experience is explained by the conceptual content, but the mouse and the baby do not possess the 
required concepts.  However, I question the validity of the state view, and the central position in 
question is the content view. 
The content view here has perhaps its strongest intuitive pull.  Nevertheless, this assumes 
two things.   One, that we are entitled to say that animals and very young children really have  
experiences in the way that we would understand this.  Secondly, it presumes that these subjects do 
not have any concepts at all, and that their conceptual capacities are fully formed.72  Perhaps as their 
conceptual capacities emerge, so does the psychological complexity of their experiences  Perhaps 
they do have a limited range of concepts, in some cases a very limited range.  The mouse maybe has 
CIRCLE, RED, and BLACK and can see the dartboard like this, or even mostly only demonstrative 
concepts  which  cannot  be retained for  any length of  time.   Even though it  has  some standing 
conceptual capacities, it does not have a stock of retained concepts and therefore a stock of retained 
conceptions.  What is the lower bound for possession of very simple colour concepts?  Animals 
seem to reason to some degree, for example.  Their reasoning is often not sophisticated in the sense 
that the concepts involved are sophisticated, but it looks like reasoning nonetheless.  How do we 
know  what  it  is  ''like''  for  a  mouse  to  see  the  lake  but  not  possess  the  concepts  WATER,  
FLOATING,  etc.,  but  only  some  limited  colour  and  texture  concepts  very  few  of  which  are 
retained?  Is the non-conceptualist entitled again to the ''photograph model'' of experiences?
While this argument has a prima facie appeal it seems to me less appealing the more that one 
thinks about it.  For example, to possess a colour concept and a shape concept, and the concepts of 
DANGER and FOOD and so on, what is the lower bound of inferential relations that a subject has 
take  not  to  work  would  be  an  experience  of  an  impossible  object.   For  this  would  be  an  experience  of  a  
representation of an impossible object that invovled the content (p and  not-p) somehow.  Just think of a ''round 
square''.  Of course I cannot visualise a round square, but when I see an impossible diagram, when I come to realise  
that it represents something impossible, I take it to be, a representation.  And a representation can be of something 
impossible or contradictory and be seen a such.
71 See, e.g., Dretske (1995) and Peacocke (2001), and many more.
72 I think that something like this is McDowell's (1994) view when he talks of 'bildung'.
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to be able to enter into in order to grasp these basic concepts that can allow them to see and to 
reason to some degree based on their perceptions?  The argument would be a very strong one if 
conceptual capacities could be tied to highly sophisticated communicative verbal abilities.  But it is 
not clear that this is necessary.  Further, the notion of language is a communicative notion, and it 
may be,  as things look ever more likely,  that animals are indeed capable of more sophisticated 
communication than we previously gave them credit for.  
Until there is a very solid theoretical reason to attribute experiences which are very much 
like our experiences and  not a stock of concepts of a low level of sophistication to animals and 
young children, then this argument has intuitive pull, but less to it than one might think at first 
blush.73
12  Conclusion
I conclude from the above that there is a content that can be given that experience uniquely have: if 
M has a content of this  type,  then  M  is  an experience,  and that the concepts involved, namely 
demonstrative concepts, can be defended.  Further, the discussed arguments against conceptualism 
in general can also be rebutted.
73 This is perhaps an all too brief discussion, but I lack the space to go into every argument in detail.
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Chapter 6  Perception and Judgement
1  Introduction
I have argued against the the sense-data, adverbial, and appearing theories.  I subsequently argued 
for transparency and the representationalist's supervenience claim, then that the representationalist, 
if they can secure a difference in contents between experiences and other thoughts can analyse the 
purportedly  phenomenal difference between experience and thought  in  terms of a difference in 
content.  I then outlined this content and defended conceptualism about experiential content.  In this 
chapter, I defend now the claim that the experiential attitude is that of judgement.  
In defending this theory, I have offered something of an ''incremental defence'' by attempting 
to knock down rival theories and their supporting arguments.  I argued against experience being 
held to be constitutively different from thought in terms of its objects, its phenomenal nature, and 
then I rebutted the arguments that experiences must have non-conceptual contents.  This leaves me 
in the position of having  defended the thesis that experiences are like thoughts in that they have 
conceptually articulated contents and that  they have no constitutively individuating experiential 
phenomenal psychological element.
However,  short  of  the negative tactic  of  objecting to arguments  in favour  of  a contrary 
position, I have not yet provided a positive argument for the thesis that experiences are judgements. 
This should, in a sense, not be surprising, as many of the arguments against this are arguments that 
such  a  theory  does  not  accurately  account  for  the  phenomenal  nature  of  experiences,  or  that 
experiences exhibit features which renders them non-conceptual, theses weaker than this one. 
A central argument for experiential conceptualism, the argument from reasons, is that the 
relations between experience and judgement must be conceptual as that is the only way that we can 
cash out the claim that experiences justify beliefs is that they are, or provide, reasons, and hence that 
they are conceptual.  Given the arguments that I have advanced so far, namely that the reasons for 
holding that experiences have features which judgements do not can be rebutted, I do not need to 
rest my argument for conceptualism on a deductive version of this argument. I do think that it is  
intuitively very compelling, however, and I discuss it favourably.
But is there being no impediment to the theory enough of a reason to hold it, or to want to 
hold it in the face of a final objection?  In a sense, yes, if the theory itself is inherently appealing, as 
I think the judgement-theory is.  There seems to be no distance between our experiences and out 
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beliefs.
Byrne (2005) §4 makes what I take to be an excellent point.  He argues that conceptualism 
should  be  the  'default  position'  as  it  is  generally agreed that  experiences  have  representational 
content.  This, of course, is not generally agreed.  However, if this is conceded, as those involved in 
the conceptualist debate do concede, Byrne argues that it should be 'puzzling' why one should not 
hold that we can bear the judging (or belief, as Byrne puts it) relation to the content of experiences 
as this is the 'natural position'.  This seems intuitively correct to me.  When I see the cup on the 
table, there appears to be no distance at all, certainly no temporal distance, and no mental or logical 
distance either, between my seeing that the cup is on the table and my judging this.  It certainly does 
not seem as though the former causes the latter, and as I argued before it seems as though the 
content or the representation involved is a representation of the objects in which the properties I 
experience  reside.   I  share  Byrne's  intuition  here,  and  go  further  (Byrne  is  not  defending  the 
judgement-theory).
In §2, I introduce Davidson's claim that only a belief can justify another belief, and relate it 
to the position that I have defended so far.  In §3, I discuss McDowell's argument from reasons, and 
in §4, Heck's response.  I conclude by defending the judgement-theory against the Müller-Lyer 
objection in §5.
2  Davidson's Claim
The Davidsonian coherentist position with respect to justification that 'nothing can count as a reason 
for  holding  a  belief  except  another  belief',1 is  summarised  with  respect  to  perception  in  the 
following often quoted passage.  
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or  
other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is  
causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a  
causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified.2
Relations between beliefs are 'logical', with justification being such a relation.  The relation between 
a 'sensation' and a belief cannot be a logical one, and hence it is a causal one.  Further, logical  
1 Davidson (1986) p. 310
2 Davidson (1986) p. 311
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relations hold between all propositional attitudes, i.e. conceptual mental acts.  Hence, any mental 
act  which  does  not  stand  in  a  logical  relation  is  not  a  propositional  attitude,  and  vice-versa.3 
Substituting 'sensation' with the notion of experience, the conclusion is that experiences cause, but 
do  not  justify  or  are  otherwise  logically  related  to,  beliefs.4  As  a  mental  act  can  only  be  a 
propositional attitude if it stands in a logical relation, experiences are not propositional attitudes
If 'sensations' are sub-personal events, say the causation in s of the first mental state or act 
which  has  a  particular  content,  then  if  sensations  cause  beliefs,  then  experiences  are  beliefs.  
However, this is not the usage of ''sensation'' that Davidson intends.  Rather, sensations are non-
conceptual conscious experiences.
However, consider Davidson's claim with respect to the position that I have been defending 
so far.  I have argued against features of experiences that would fall under Davidson's classification 
of them as sensations.   Consider now that I am analysing experiences in terms of thoughts with the 
features I outlined in chapter 5.  So far I have not defended the attitudinal component of this claim, 
so for the moment take experiences to be a propositional attitude of some kind with this content.  
Now, these are playing the role of sensations.  Thus, the position seen in Davidson's terms 
alters significantly.  Byrne's point that I raised above is a good one.  When I see that the cup is there, 
it  really does sound puzzling to hold that the content of my seeing is not something that I can 
literally judge.
So, on the view that I have set up, the relation between experiences and judgements is not a 
causal one, but a justificatory one.  However, the experiences themselves are propositional: they are 
the mental acts with the contents that I have specified in the previous chapter.  Further, as these 
justify  other  beliefs,  they themselves  must  be  beliefs,  and as  they are  conscious  they must  be 
conscious beliefs, i.e. judgements.  Are they themselves justified?  No, because they are caused and 
interjected into the stream of consciousness without a prior rational relation to other mental acts: I  
could not justify them in any sense.  If there are two boxes, and I look in one rather than the other, I  
may be unjustified in looking into this box rather than that one, but my seeing into the box was 
neither justified nor unjustified: it was, like the box itself a-justified.  Does this necessarily render it 
non-conceptual?  No, for the experience itself can certainly justify my other beliefs, or interact with 
my desires.  It can play all of the classical justificatory roles.  And it can do them with ease, for it is  
a  judgement  and that  is  its  role.   Having done the spadework in previous  chapters,  this  is  the 
position that I am defending in this chapter.
3 Recall  my discussion of  Crane's  (1988a),  (1988b),  and (1992) arguments  against  experiential  conceptualism in 
chapter 5.
4 'Sensations' stands for: 'sensation, perception, the given, experience, sense data, the passing show'.  Davidson (1986) 
p. 310
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3  McDowell
Can  we  find  some  argumentative  support,  however  for  the  conceptualist  thesis,  and  then  the 
judgement-theory?   McDowell's  famous  (1994)  argument  is  that  experiences  have  to  have 
conceptual  content  because  only  propositional  (conceptual)  attitudes  can  stand  in  justificatory 
relations  to  other  propositional  attitudes  and,  as  with  Davidson,  the  choices  are  either  that 
experiences justify beliefs, which is a logical relation, or that experiences cause beliefs.  However, 
we  cannot  give  up  the  thesis  that  experiences  justify  beliefs,  and  hence  we  must  hold  that 
experiences have propositional content.5
McDowell's argument is multi-faceted and intended to establish at least two points.  One is 
that  experiences  have  conceptual  content  in  terms  of  their  articulation,  and  the  other  is  that 
experiences are articulated with a certain range of concepts.
He diagnoses a repeated move back and forth between two constraints.  One is the constraint 
between propositional attitudes, the rational internal constraint.  The other is the empirical external 
constraint.  Assuming that a state's content is a function of the constraints it is under, if one or other  
of these constraints is taken in isolation to define the content of an experience, then something will  
be lost.6  If we focus solely on the rational constraint,  then we will lose the empirical content.  
However, if we focus solely on the empirical constraint, we will lose the rational nature of thought.  
I think putting the matter in terms of the content being a function of the constraint helps to precisify 
this.7
McDowell's  solution  is  that  experiences  are  constrained both empirically and rationally. 
They are constrained by the rational relations that they stand in to each other, which gives them 
their  conceptual nature, and by the fact that their  content is empirically constrained by a break 
between the fully rational  qualities  of  judgements  and experiences.   Their  content  is  empirical 
because unlike judgement where one actively assents to a proposition, in experience one does not 
assent.  In Fregean terms, one could put this by saying that the proposition is merely apprehended in 
experience,  but  assented  to  in  thought.8  When  we  see  that  p,  we  merely  take  in a  fact  in  a 
conceptually articulated way.9  Thus, it is a mental act, but not a mental action.
5 This argument is also taken up by Brewer (1999) and (2005).  Brewer  (2005) reconstructs the argument almost  
exactly as I have done in this paragraph.
6 I am very briefly summarising McDowell (1994) Lecture I.
7 Once could perhaps think of the difference between a causal theory of semantics and a purely conceptual-role theory 
of semantics.
8 This caused difficulties for McDowell, and he has recently recanted his theory that experiences are the exercises of 
concepts in McDowell (2008).
9 Indeed, there seems to be an identity-view here between the fact and the propositional content, which I find peculiar. 
But I do not enquire into this.
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This is unlike thought in that to judge that p is to make a transition from one mental act or 
state to another. Even if one spontaneously comes to remember that one has left one's keys in the 
door, the choice to keep judging this renders the continuing assent to it a mental action; it may begin 
as a mental act,  but it persists, or disappears, as a result of a mental action.  As it has already 
acquired its content, it is now fully constrained by its internal rational relations.  
The  transition  to  a  new belief,  or  the  holding  of  the  old  one,  in  and  of  itself  is  only 
constrained by the rational relations, and so to acquire empirical content, an empirical constraint 
will be required.  The mere apprehension of the proposition is not constrained, like the assent to the 
proposition, by the rational relations governing assent.  
Experiences  are  also enmeshed in the conceptual  sphere,  the 'space of  reasons',  and yet 
experiences, unlike other thoughts are not the assent to a proposition  in virtue of their relation to 
other thoughts.  Unlike these thoughts they bear other constitutive relations, namely content-giving 
relations  to  the  external  world.   Empirical  beliefs already  have  their  content,  acquired  from 
experiences, and thus are otherwise constrained only by the rational relations.
McDowell's  argument  is  that  the  non-conceptualist,  like  the  sense-data  theorist,  is 
advocating a theory that is a version of the 'Myth of the Given', one version of which is the sense-
data theory.  Recall the many problems that this theory encountered in accurately explaining how 
our experiences are related to thoughts and how our experiences struggle to be interpretable on the 
sense-data theory.
The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or  warrants,  
extends  more  widely than  the conceptual  sphere.   The extra  extent  of  the  space  of   reasons is 
supposed to allow it to incorporate impacts from outside the realm of thought.  But we cannot really 
understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as relations within the  
space of concepts: relations such as implication or probabilification, which hold between potential  
exercises of conceptual capacities.10
So, the argument is that in order to justify any beliefs following from the experience, the experience 
has to be conceptual.  This argument, Brewer's also, that in order that mental act M justify mental 
act N, M has to be a conceptual attitude, is a familiar epistemological one that features especially in 
coherentist accounts of justification.
The argument that experiences have to be conceptual is that experiences justify the beliefs 
that arise from the experience.  What this means is that experience M has to justify thought N, and 
10 McDowell (1994) p. 304
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that this can only be explained if M is, or provides, a reason for N.  And to provide a reason is to 
provide something citable.  ''I believe that there is a cup on the table because I can see that there is a 
cup on the table'' means that ''that there is a cup on the table, which I can see, is my reason for 
believing that there is a cup on the table''.  In citing the content of the experience, or the experience 
itself, the content must be conceptual for citing is a conceptual act.  For this to be a reason or a 
justifier, is for it to be conceptual.11  However, there are two notions at play here.
McDowell and Brewer are apt to talk of reasons as the subject's reasons, or reasons that the 
subject can use in an argument.  This is not to say that in transitioning from M to N, that they run 
through the argument but that they could run through the argument.  One is always aware, implicitly 
at least, of the argument.  Davidson also assents to what Pryor calls the 'premise principle', namely 
that a justifier, a reason, must be a possible premise in an argument for holding the conclusion.12  It 
does not matter what kind of argument this is, deductive, abductive, inductive etc.13  But one has to 
be careful to separate this point from the other point.
There are two points to separate here.  One pertains to the justification of our beliefs in what  
we could call a content-giving sense.  McDowell's concern with the empirical constraint arises from 
this.
One  good  argument  against  sense-data,  and  indeed  anything  that  shares  some  of  the 
problematic features of sense-data, mainly its being non-representational, is that if we are trapped 
behind the veil of ideas, it becomes difficult to see how we can come to be justified in believing that 
there are external objects.  If experiences are mere qualitative happenings, with no content, and 
these cause our beliefs, it seems hard to see how our beliefs are justified in their content.  This, 
however, presumes that the belief is not justified in respect of its content, i.e. that there is a good 
explanation as to why our beliefs have such content as they do, and why we should not abjure 
beliefs with such contents and instead become more sceptical.14  According to the non-inferential 
foundationalist,  there is such an explanation: that the qualitative sensation is reliably caused by 
11 See, especially, Brewer (2005) for a clear statement of this
12 'The only things that can justify a belief that P are other states that assertively  represent propositions, and those 
propositions have to be ones that could be used  as premises in an argument for P.  They have to stand in some kind  
of inferential relation to P; they have to imply it or inductively support it or something like that'. Pryor (2005) p.  
189
13 Within reason, presumably, as to what can count as an argument.  Recall that possession of concepts is related to the 
relations  between  propositions  which  concepts  give  rise  to.   Grasping  the  concepts  and  apprehending  the 
propositions in  which  they feature  comes with grasping the  relations between them.  Merely satisfying Evans' 
Generality  Constraint  without  grasping  the  relations  between  the  concepts  is  either  insufficient  for  concept 
possession or (more likely) not possible.  ''All dogs are goblins, some dwarf is a horse, therefore some goblin is a  
dwarf'' may arguably be thought by someone who satisfied a weak reading of the Generality Constraint in that they 
could  apply the  different  concepts  independently of  each  application.   Nevertheless,  one  would be  hesitant  to 
attribute conceptual capacities to this person if  all of their ''reasoning'' appeared to be like this, and this was not 
merely an explicable aberration (e.g., madness, brain injury, etc.)
14 Or, as an alternative, one could move towards phenomenalism.
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external objects, and it, in turn, (very) reliably causes our beliefs.15  
One of McDowell's arguments against this is that it is obscure how the belief could come to 
have  the  content  that  it  does,  seems  weak  to  me  here.   What  is  wrong  with  the  following? 
Causation is an external constraint.  Experiences are caused, and the beliefs they in turn cause hence 
come to have the content they do as a result of this.
Nevertheless, in respect of whether my belief that there are really such things as computers 
as we naively conceive of them, the sense-data theory does, I think, run into difficulties with respect 
to the relation between the belief and the experience. 
Although sense-data do not represent to me, i.e semantically, that such and such, if they are 
''natural signs'' of external things, and they cause my beliefs as a result of their being caused, then 
this  seems  perhaps  a  pretty  good  story  about  how  beliefs  come  to  have  empirical  content  if  
empirical content is a function of such a relation.
However, this question, about how we justify the general contents of our beliefs, is not the 
question that I want to press, and it seems to me to be an independent matter from the central one 
for  my discussion,  namely whether  in  order  for  an  experience  to  justify  a  belief  it  has  to  be 
conceptual. 
Two notions have to be kept distinct.  It may be that what we do when we justify ourselves, 
the process of justification, allows us to say that we are justified, but that, actually, there is another 
notion of ''justification'' on which, regardless of our being justified in the first sense in believing that 
p, we are not justified in the sense that, from a third person perspective, we ought not to believe that 
p.   That  is,  perhaps  I  believe  that  there  really  is  a  computer  on  the  desk,  and from my own 
standpoint I am justified.  Maybe, like Jackson and Russell, I think that the best explanation is that 
there really is a computer corresponding to my experience.16  I am justified in the sense that I can 
give good arguments, the premises seems reasonable and so on: indeed, being able to engage in this 
process is constitutive of my being justified in this sense, regardless of the truth of what I believe. 
Should I be asked to account for my belief, I could defend it well.  However, perhaps I went wrong 
in taking inference to the best explanation as my motivation.  It turns out that this is not the best 
explanation as it is not the correct one, even though for all the world it looks to us as though it is. 
From this standpoint, I am not justified in believing what I do because, from this standpoint, I ought  
not to believe it as it is false.17  The negation of this is also true: if there is something, then I  am 
justified.
15 Or we could hold with Russell (1912) and Jackson (1977) that what justifies our empirical beliefs is that this is the 
most likely explanation.
16 According to McDowell, there is a content that I cannot believe.  But set that aside.
17 See Ginsborg (2006) for a thorough discussion of this with respect to McDowell (1994).
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McDowell is  attempting to solve two problems,  are  we justified empirically and how it 
works  as  an internal  process,  simultaneously,  as  his  account  of  the rational  constraints  and the 
empirical  constraint  intersect  in  experience  as  experiences  are  propositional  and externally 
constrained. 
However, there is another, better, argument standing behind this, that which could be called 
the ''integration'' argument.  How do I integrate a sensing of a sense-datum into the inferential web: 
it  does  not  have  the  correct  structure  or  form;  it  is  not  a  proposition,  let  alone  a  conceptual 
proposition.  If this is so, how do I use it?
Recall also that not all proponents of sense-data, e.g., Price and Broad, held that experiences 
were wholly sensational.  On this view, sense-data are the objects of experience but only in the 
sense that they are relata of a qualitative sensing; experiences also have a representational or quasi-
representational component which takes as its object something distinct from the sense-datum.
Heck argues that as a non-conceptual experience  itself is representational, the integration 
problem does not arise.  On the non-conceptual theory, experiences  themselves have content, and 
they do represent the world.  Furthermore, the content can entail the content of the belief.18
Thus, on this view, the experience represents, say, the cup on the table non-conceptually (i.e. 
it has non-conceptual content in the articulatory sense) and then my belief that the cup is on the  
table results from this experience with this content.  The transition between the experience and the 
belief is a transition directly between two representational states. It did seem difficult to see how we 
could use a sensing of a sense-datum as a reason.  A reason for what? It  just  sits there,  mute. 
Further, it is not of the correct structure to be taken up into belief, or for its content to be used as a  
reason: it has no inferential elements.
Can this circumvent the argument?  It is certainly better placed than the sense-data theory. 
But does it solve the integration problem, and also a further problem that, at least as it seems to me, 
my belief just seems to go straight through to the actual content of the experience?
4  Non-Conceptual Reasons
If an experience has a non-conceptual content which is logically equivalent to a conceptual content, 
i.e. they both pick out the same states of affairs and are both equivalent to the same set of possible  
worlds,  and  both  have  these  semantic  features  and  the  required  structure to  stand  in  logical 
relations, where does this leave McDowell's argument?  The first point to note is that I think that the 
18 See Heck (2000) Section 4.
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thesis that experiences do justify beliefs is a sound one,  Of course one could hold that experiences 
merely cause beliefs, but I question the plausibility of this: does your experience of the cup really 
cause you to believe it?  Really?  When I see a cup on the table, I  do  think that a judgement is 
caused, because I think that the best model to sort out the tangle that we find ourselves in is that 
experiences are judgements.  But if I did not believe that, I would find it very odd to hold that an 
experience caused me to have a belief, or make a judgement.  This seems to put too much distance 
between this and what I see, even if I have reason to be guarded about what I see.
If  experiences caused beliefs,  our beliefs would stand in an odd internal relation to our 
experiences.  There is certainly no introspectible temporal distance between my seeing the cup on 
the table and my coming to believe that it is there.  And there seems also to be no logical distance 
either.  Indeed as there seems to me to be no sense-data, or qualia and so on, in experience at all that 
I can discern, and no compelling argument for non-conceptual content, and it seems very much to 
me that  my experience just  goes straight through, as a judgement,  I  find the judgement-theory 
extremely intuitive.
McDowell's and Brewer's position is (was) that experiences are not beliefs but that they are 
propositional and hence rationalise and not merely cause beliefs.  Here, motivating the thought that 
experiences rationalise beliefs, is Heck.
I do not just find myself having certain beliefs, such as that there is a brown desk in front of  me, 
having no idea where they came from; it is not as if perceptual experience gives rise to  beliefs  in the 
same sort of way a bump on the head might cause me to believe that I am  Napoleon.  On the  
contrary, I see the desk, and I believe that it is there for that reason, not  just because I see it there. 
To be only slightly more precise: The formation of perceptual  beliefs is a rational (not just a causal) 
process.19
The argument turns on the claim that the experience provides a (defeasible) reason to believe its 
content (and other propositions).  There are, however, at least two ways in which the notion of a 
reason can be interpreted.  McDowell's argument is that the relevant sense of a reason must imply 
that the reason is conceptual for it must be the subject's reason, a reason for the subject, and that in 
the case of the actual process of reasoning, independent from the other notion of justification, being 
a subject's reason is being a proposition, or a propositional state.
Consider first  a case of practical reasoning, of deciding what to do.   A hitherto happily 
married couple are sleeping in bed.  The husband awakes at 8.59.  He reaches over to the bedside  
19 Heck (2000) p. 510
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table,  picks up a small  statue and kills  his  wife by hitting her in the head.  One question that  
someone may ask is why he used the statue and not the gun that he has in his safe.  The answer to  
this may be that he wanted to kill his wife quickly, and statue was to hand and fit for the purpose.  
In cross-examination, these reasons would be good reasons to explain why the used the statue.  But 
they would not explain why he killed his wife.  Did he have a reason  to kill his wife, and not a 
reason to kill her in the way he did, which itself presumes the other reason?  
Imagine  that  the  husband  was,  even  unconsciously,  completely  unaware  of  his  wife's 
intentions or thoughts.  His lawyer uncovers the wife's secret diary and it transpires that she had 
planned to kill him at 9. Now, perhaps her husband had an antecedent reason to kill here, perhaps he 
had many, or perhaps he had none.  But crucially, if the prosecutor asks him what his reason was, 
the judge would certainly not accept in mitigation the fact that his wife planned to kill him as his 
reason.  It is not that this is a bad reason.  A bad reason would be that he did not love her any more 
or that he fancied a change (or something utterly unconnected, such as that he thought it was a full  
moon).  It is that it is not a reason in the correct sense.
When the prosecutor asks him the question using the word ''reason'', the prosecutor is trying 
to elicit from him something something that he can cite in justification of his action.  The judge is  
not going to accept the statement that ''it turned out that there was a good reason''.  
We may say that there ''actually was a good reason''.  However, this is loose language.  What 
we mean by this is that he acted in his best interest, or that he performed an action which was to his  
overall benefit.  But something being in my best interest, or an action being beneficial, are different  
from there having been reason for me to proceed in this way.  If I empty my bank account and bet it 
all on a long shot the day before I am due to go to debtor's prison unless I settle my debt, the fact 
that  I  win  certainly  did  not  absolve  me  of  acting  irresponsibly.   And  the  reason  that  I  acted 
irresponsibly was that it was very likely that I would lose.  Reasons in the sense of justifying cannot 
be retroactive.  When we say that ''it turned out that there was reason to do it'', this means something 
quite different from there having been good reason to do it.  The latter attributes the the subject a 
reason, the former makes a statement about the circumstances in which the subject is in, comes to, 
or came to, be in.
This second notion is not an illicit notion, there is a clear sense in which this distinction 
picks out something correct, related to the discussion above of content justification.  It  was better 
for the husband (let us say) that he killed his wife.  This was a beneficial action, and it was in his 
best interest.  However, he certainly could not be entitled to claim to have used this as a reason, for, 
as Brewer emphasises, it was not his reason.  That the wife was going to kill the husband, this fact, 
could not have been his reason any more than my winning a bet on the horse at time t could have 
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been my reason for placing the bet at a time before t.  The temporal case makes vivid what is also 
true in the other case.20
This  is  the  difference  between these  two types  of  reasons.   And as  reasons  come with 
justification, there are two types of justification.  As McDowell and Brewer stress, what it is to be a  
reason, in the relevant sense, to draw a belief, is for the reason to be the subject's reason: they have 
to possess the reason.  This is why, like Davidson, they assent to Pryor's premise principle.  A 
reason is something that it  used in reasoning, even if it is only implicit that it could be used, to a 
conclusion.  The conclusion is the justified, and the premise a justifier.  And the reason that they 
assent to the premise principle is that they think that in order for something to serve as a reason in 
this sense it has to be conceptually articulated. 
However, if, as Heck claims, experiences rationalise beliefs as they are reasons for them, i.e. 
the  relation  is  a  rational  relation  of  justification  between  experience  and  belief,  because  the 
experience has  representational content, then why should we think that the reason cannot be the 
subject's reason, only it is non-conceptual?  The reason is not, like the fact that the wife was going 
to kill the husband, a reason for the subject to believe, it is their reason for believing.  
When we say that the subject was justified in believing that there is a cup on the table  
because he had an experience, we are are saying that they have a good internal reason to believe it, 
namely that they can see it, and he can use the fact that he can see it to come to believe this.  On 
Heck's view, this rationalisation is a transition between a non-conceptual and a conceptual state. 
Further this representational state has force, in the way that a judgement has force.
We can accept that if experience M justifies judgement  N then M provides a reason for N, 
and that the reason must be my reason, it must be possessed by me and realised by me to be such. 
However, Heck presents a good case that a non-conceptual theory can meet these requirements.21
What the McDowell/Brewer argument amounts to is that in justifying my belief that the cup 
is on the table by citing my seeing it as a reason, I at least have to implicitly be able to give an  
argument for this, where the experience, or its content, is a premise.  Further, I must be able to 
'scrutinise' these premises and draw the conclusion.
The sensing of a sense-datum now looks to be in trouble as a reason in this sense.  How do I 
use the sensing of a sense-datum?  All that I can believe is that I am sensing a sense-datum.   How 
do I get from this to any belief at all?   How do I scrutinise the sense-datum as a reason?  All that I  
can scrutinise as a reason, for all that I can use as a reason, is my belief that I am sensing a sense-
datum.
20 Compare Pryor's  (2005) distinction between reasons for,  and reasons to,  or  Byrne's  (2005) distinction between 
reasons for a subject, and reasons the subject has. 
21 Peacocke (2001) Section 4 also makes an argument like this.  See also Millar (1991) for a similar discussion.
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The  non-conceptualist  is  in  a  better  position  with  respect  to  this  problem.   The  non-
conceptual content represents the external object or state of affairs, and to undergo the experience 
with this content is to have the object or state of affairs represented to you.  Heck explains as  
follows.
On Evans' view, the judgements I make about how things appear to me – just like my judgements 
about how the world is – are based upon my perceptual experience:  To say how things now appear 
to me is to say how I would judge the world to be if I were to judge purely on the basis of my current  
experience,  that  is,  in such a way that  the judgement would  be prima facie,  though defeasibly,  
justified by that very experience.   ...  So,  though the (non-conceptual)  contents of  my perceptual  
states do not themselves figure in my thought, in  reflecting on how things appear, I still reflect on  
the contents of my perceptual states, on  how they present the world as being.  I am, moreover,  
reflecting on what they give me reason to believe.
According to Evans ... for me to say, or think, ''It appears to me as if p'' is for me to  report, or make, 
a  judgement, one that requires me to conceptualise the non-conceptual  content of my experience, 
just as making judgements about the world does: In making such  judgements, I exercise ''the very 
skills of conceptualization'' I exercise in making judgements  about the world.22
So, in scrutinising the relation between experience and belief, I consider what I  would believe on 
the basis of the non-conceptual content.   The reason for me to draw the belief  that  p from the 
experience is that I would ordinarily go on to believe that  p (subject to defeasibility). Thus the 
rational relation between a structured but non-conceptual experience and a structured belief based 
on that experience is that in conceptualizing this experience, I would normally come to believe that 
p.
This does seem, in a sense, to satisfy the worry that McDowell has that there could be no 
rational relation between a non-conceptual experience and a judgement, for, unlike the sense-data or 
adverbial theories, or a full qualia-theory, the transition between a non-conceptual experience and a 
judgement is a natural, and easily explicable one: it is conceptualization of a content poised to be 
conceptualised; like a belief, it is made for the role.  Hence, a non-conceptual experience  M can 
justify  a  judgement  N where  the  former  is  one's  reason  for  making  the  judgement,  but  the 
experience is non-conceptual.  This rejects the premise principle, for the content is not used in an 
argument but is conceptualized.  Further, the judgement is not about the experience, but about the 
very same objects as the experience represents under a content.
22 Heck (2010) p. 156-517
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However, what, exactly, does it mean to conceptualise one's experiential content?  This is 
rather an obscure notion, for it asserts that experiences have a level of content which is different 
from the content of judgement, and one comes to the judgement by conceptualising the content and 
then,  if  one  accepts  it,  taking  the  content  up  into  judgement.   This  is,  I  think,  a  significant 
explanatory commitment.
Further,  it  means that  the  content  of  the  experience  is,  as  on the  content  view of  non-
conceptual content, not something that can be believed.  What is judged is  not the content of the 
experience,  but  a  different  content  which  results  from the  conceptualisation  of  the  content.   I 
literally cannot judge the contents of my experiences.  Now, it is unclear exactly what this amounts 
to in the sense of how it is supposed that this is to ''feel'' or ''seem''.  But it seems  untrue to me, on 
the basis of reflection that when I look at the cup, my experience has a different type of content 
from my judgement, and that my belief is a relation to a different content than my experience.
I  understand that this  may not be taken as a strong argument,  but what I think is  more 
compelling is the rather mysterious notion of conceptualisation.  To conceptualise the content of the 
belief is to bring the content, through a transition between one type of content to another which 
cannot rest on any notion of a  translation.   Could this be automatic?  Is there a level of non-
conceptual content which is conceptualised automatically?  If this conceptualisation results in a 
judgement, then I would ask what role the non-conceptual content plays.
This argument, that the experience provides the reason, namely the conceptualisation of its 
content, for judging that p to a significant extent concedes the premise principle.  The reason that I 
judge  that p  is  not  that  I  experience  whatever  p picks  out  non-conceptually,  but  that  I  can 
conceptualise this content as  p.  My reason for judging that  p is that the conceptualisation of the 
content is not rejected: I assent to p because I have good reason to, namely no thought that not-p.
In judging that it  looks that p, I explicitly conceptualise the content absent any background 
beliefs (''the stick is bent'' – ''if I did not know of illusions, I would believe this'') and this is what  
rationalises our beliefs and provides the rational link between experiences and judgement.  I then 
can reject that p, if I know of some reason why p is untrue.  Heck says that normally we do not do 
this, and this is a standardly made point about the moment where an experiential content is just 
about drawn into belief, just waiting to be rejected.  But there is a difficulty here.
It must either be that I conceptualise p straight into judgement, in which case judging that it 
only looks that p is to consider how I am taking things at the moment, i.e. what my judgement is at 
the moment, or I do not conceptualise straight into judgement but into some kind of ''holding state''  
like the one above. But, then, what is the relation between the holding state and the judgement? 
The holding state is something that occurs automatically, conceptualisation is not a mental action, 
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and so without this being judging that it looks that p which would, unlike its looking that p, be a 
mental action, there is an attitude towards p between experience and judgement.
Further, and I must press this intuition unfortunately, it really does not look to me like there 
is a level of conceptualisation between experience and judgement in this sense.  Hence, I think that 
Heck should say that we do conceptualise straight into judgement.  But, then, as I do not believe the 
arguments for non-conceptual content, or for sense-data, qualia, etc., it looks like conceptualising 
straight into judgement is what an experience is.
5  Experiences as Judgements
So, I find that the integration argument looks promising.  It must be, otherwise it would not be so 
popular in the form of the premise principle.  However, the thesis that experiences are judgements, 
that we conceptualise straight into judgement, is not a popular one.  This is despite the fact that 
everyone admits that experiences provide us with tendencies to believe, and that we almost always 
do believe what we experience, that we ''take up'' our experiences into belief as a matter of course. 
And the thesis that experiences have force is now widely accepted.  Indeed, to deny that experiences 
have force is rare.  Further, there are well-known problems with the view that experiences give rise 
to some kind of force-less consideration state, as how does one use an attitude with no force as a 
reason, and if this state, what I called the ''holding state'' with respect to Heck, is not playing the role 
of a reason to believe the content of the experience,then what is it doing?  This pushes us back to  
Davidson's point: only a belief can justify another belief.  Justification seems to be a function of the 
content  and the force of the attitude.  So, why not the settle  for the thesis  that experiences are 
judgements?
One reason is the thesis that experiences have non-conceptual content, but I have questioned 
the  arguments  for  this.   The  other  is  that  experiences  have  phenomenal  character,  and  I  have 
questioned this also.  
It  seems difficult  to  posit  a  state  with no force between experience and judgement:  our 
experiences seem to automatically transition into judgements at least; moreover, the best theory 
surely is, like Byrne points out, that literally the content of the experience is the content of the 
belief.   And I  have rebutted two reasons for arguing against  this.   Further,  the argument  from 
reasons, interpreted as the ''integration'' argument, i.e. how concerning something plays a  role in 
transitioning  mentally  between  one  state  and  another  requires  it  to  look  like  an  inferentially 
structured state, now piles on the pressure: either we conceptualise the content of the experience and 
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our reason for moving from experiencing the cup on the table to judgement is as I described above 
with respect to Heck's argument, which still holds that the content of the judgement is literally not  
the content of the experience, or we hold, as I think that we should and I think matches well to 
introspection, that we ''conceptualise straight into judgement''.  
As I have argued against a notion of non-conceptual content in experience, and against the 
thesis that experiences have a phenomenal nature that thoughts do not, if we conceptualise straight 
into judgement, then experiences are judgements.
My  task  here  is  to  defend  this  thesis,  and  not  to  elucidate  a  full  theory  of  internal 
justification and the implications for this thesis, or anything so ambitious.  I am happy just to have 
made a  good case for  experiences  being judgements,  as  this  is  an unpopular  theory,  despite  is 
obvious advantages.  There is one negative implication, though, and that concerns the Müller-Lyer. 
Nevertheless, I think that this can be explained, and that it is not as damaging as it is often taken to 
be.  The main advantage is that, although there are issues with respect to inferential justification, 
matters with respect to this are more clear cut than with respect to the relation between experiences 
and beliefs.  To hold that experiences are judgements, is to hold that this is a sub-class of these 
relations, and this would be a significant result.23
So, to the Müller-Lyer objection.  This objection is raised by practically everyone who writes 
on the subject, even Craig (1976) and Pitcher (1971) explicitly reject the judgement-theory on this  
basis   The argument is as follows.  The Müller-Lyer lines are the same length, but the arrows on the 
edges of the lines make the lines look different lengths.  Even though one knows that they are the 
same length, they still look the same.  On any other theory, there is no clash between knowing that 
they are the same length, and them looking to be different lengths.  For seeing and judging are not  
two states or acts between which contradictory contents are problematic.  Things are different with 
respect to two judgements.  Craig, for example, makes the point as follows.
Just because we see something as F we do not have to believe that it is F, and this means that  if we 
go the whole way and speak of perceptions as beliefs we will be involved in great awkwardness if  
not in absurdity. Suppose I am faced with a visual illusion in which some object, in fact only a few 
feet from me, appears to be quite a long way off. Suppose further that I know that it is just a few feet  
distant, having set the experiment up myself only seconds before. If both of these are beliefs in the 
full sense then I am simultaneously believing that p and that - p . Nor is it that I am just holding two 
contradictory beliefs - I am holding them whilst clearly realising them to be contradictory. No doubt 
my rationality has its flaws, but surely things aren't as bad as all that?24
23 Heck makes this point, but, predictably, says that experiences cannot be beliefs.
24 Craig (1976) pp. 15-16
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Are things as bad as all that?  Perhaps.  Or perhaps not.  In a few moments, I will bite the bullet and  
say that, yes, things are as bad as all that.  I think that we are in this state, however briefly.  What is  
important is, one, that this is not impossible, and so I am not solving this problem by appealing to 
an impossibility.  Another is that this does not call into question the conceptual nature of the state.  
This is the most serious objection, but I think that it can be met.
Beforehand,  however,  consider  the  alternatives.   The  most  well-known  solution  is 
Armstrong's  (1968)  and  Pitcher's  (1971)  solution  that  in  this  case  we  receive  a  suppressed 
inclination to believe.25  I return to this in a moment.
Secondly, one could hold that the background belief actually overrides the experience:  the 
lines actually look the same length.  This may be met with incredulity, but, at least in the case of the  
Müller-Lyer, it has some force behind it for the illusion depends on a stationary view of the object.  
If one casts one's eye over it, the effect fades.  However, this does not work, or at least does not  
work as well, when one looks straight into the diagram.  Further, one will always be able to source 
some illusion or effect where this is not the case.
A third option would be Gluer's (2009) theory that experiences are beliefs about the way that 
things look.  This has the appealing feature that it circumvents the current problem, and it meshes 
experience into the inferential system very neatly.  However, the view surely has problems.  For a 
start, there is the air of circularity.  More importantly, a belief about the way something looks is 
either a belief about its visual properties, which is to say, a belief, or about it looking some way to  
one.  But how could this be the content of an experience?  Further, this is a relatively high-level  
theoretical notion.
It seems clear that this illusion, and if not this one then certainly others are not susceptible to 
arguing away, and if one holds a judgement-theory, then one has to hold that this is not susceptible 
to being overridden, and one has to face the fact that one judges that p and judges that not-p.  Can 
the force of this objection be weakened.
It  can  be  initially  weakened  to  the  degree  that  there  is  something  correct  about  the 
Pitcher/Armstrong view.  One tries quite hard not to see the lines as being different lengths.  This 
connects to a degree with the ''switching'' option.  The Necker-Cube, for example switches between 
interpretations, and one sees it as pointing ''in'' and then ''out'', but never both (or neither).  Now, can 
one say this about the Müller-Lyer?  To a degree, I think one can.  But the effect is not a suppressed 
inclination to believe, but more of a desire to stop believing.  One knows that one has a false belief, 
and one wants rid of it.  This is why one scans one's eyes over it, trying to detect its flaw, and find 
out if one can see through the illusion.  
25 See Armstrong (1968) p. 140, and Pitcher (1971) p. 93.  See also Craig (1976) p. 17.
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What, then, of the fact that the two judgements are in conflict,  especially the background 
judgement?  One could hold that, as there is this difference in the behaviour of the two judgements, 
that this signals that they are judgements of a different type. And this is indeed true.  One is an  
experience, and the other is not.  The other is a judgement that we have to make.  It is a judgement 
where one has to hold the proposition before the mind.  If one forgets that they are the same length,  
then there is no problem.  It is just a false belief.
The difference to the Necker Cube is that both are experiential judgements.  Both ''fight 
each'' other within the attitude of experience, within a sub-class of judgements.  And one always 
wins out.  The reason, I think, that the backgrounds judgement cannot win out over the experiential 
judgement is that the latter is  caused, and  caused continuously, and caused with a great level of 
detail and richness.  Perceptual judgements are the most important judgements that we make, they 
have the greatest role in out cognitive lives, and they are continuously caused.  We have control 
over our background beliefs, and this makes them weaker in a sense: can one really go on judging 
that p?  When we register that p, i.e. take it to be true, the act of judging is very short, for we usually 
only need to make an actual judgement for a short period of time, maybe less than a second, and 
then the next thought becomes more important.
That it is continuously caused is the explanation of why the background belief cannot win 
out: it can match it, when we are occurrently irrational.  And this explains the frustrating feeling that 
one has looking at it.  Of course  I know they are the same length, and yet I cannot help but not 
believe it.
If experiences are judgements, then they will have qualities that judgements have, but also 
the qualities that experiences have.  This, I think, is the key to explaining what is going on.  One is 
irrational in the sense that one can be judging that p and judging that not-p, but this is because one 
of the judgements is caused: and if something is caused, then it is out with the subject's otherwise 
rational control.  And so the subject is in the curious position of being helplessly irrational.
Consider the following scenarios.  Someone is hypnotised to believe that,  say,  there are 
penguins dancing on the table. But the hypnotist is skilful, and this does not force out his perceptual 
beliefs that there are no penguins dancing on the table.  When asked he answers ''yes'' and ''no''.  He 
genuinely believes that there are and are not penguins dancing on the table.  Can this be explained? 
Yes, by the fact that he has been hypnotised.
Or consider a subject who knows a secret and does not want to. They try their hardest to 
convince themselves that they do not know it, and sometimes they succeed: and yet, all the while in 
the back of  their  mind is  the knowledge that  they do know it.   Or consider  another  scenario.  
Someone has been fitted up by the police and is being worn down in the interrogation room.  They 
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know that  they did  not  do  it,  but  at  the  same time,  they find  themselves  ever  closer  to  being 
indoctrinated into believing that they did.  There is just a point where they are not sure any more: do 
they make both judgements at the same time?
Perhaps, but perhaps the objector will say ''no''.  Because it is impossible to judge that p and 
not-p simultaneously.  If this were true, my thesis would be refuted.  However, can I not say that the 
Müller-Lyer shows that this is possible, and shows it regularly?  And the reason that it is possible is  
the one I gave above, namely that it is a caused perceptual judgement; the most important thoughts  
that we have.
So, I take it that I am on firm, at least not very slippery, ground in holding that it is not  
impossible   to  judge that  p and  not-p.   However,  the  scenarios  I  gave  above are  all  unnatural 
scenarios.  They involve hypnosis, or very unlikely descriptions of events.  However, the fact that 
these judgements, unlike all other judgements are caused is itself a novel scenario with respect to 
the rest of our mental lives.  All of our other judgements are subject to the will, at least post fact.
This brings me on to what I take to be a more serous objection, Crane's (1992) §4 objections. 
Again, I will rely on the fact that these judgements are caused.  Crane argues that it is constitutive 
of a conceptual state that the state stand in relations to other conceptual states.  And he argues that 
the Müller-Lyer shows that this is not true of experiences.  Let me try to answer these objections.
Crane argues that, unlike beliefs, experiences are revisable.  However, each experience is a 
caused event: the subject is not responsible for the judgement, as they cannot rationally affect it, and 
hence revise it.  As it is caused it cannot be revised.  One can only revise a belief, by judging that 
the previously held belief  was false  (or unsupported),  but while  one knows that one's  previous 
judgement was false, and so one abjures it, there is immediately caused another judgement, and the 
process repeats itself.  One  cannot revise one's experiences, and, if experiences are judgements, 
then one cannot revise these.  However, judgements are revised by a new judgement to the effect 
that old should be abjured.  This is possible, but, again, immediately another judgement is caused.
Secondly, one cannot, as Crane points out, make a deductive transition between experiences. 
Hence, one cannot make a deductive transition between experiential judgements.  But, this should 
again  not  be  a  surprise,  given  that  they  are  caused.   Further,  Crane  argues  that  there  are  no 
conditions on what one ought to believe on the basis of experience, but there are on the basis of 
judgements.  However, this is to stack the deck against the conceptualist, for one could hold that 
unless one was such that they ought to draw certain inferences or relations from the perceptual  
content,  then  one  could  not  be  a  subject.   Finally,  Crane  argues  that  experiences  contain  a 
predicative  content  which  judgements  do  not  necessarily  contain.   For  example,  one  cannot 
experience the colour of the table without perceiving the shape of the table.  However, this is easily 
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explained by the logical form of the content of the experiential  judgement:  experiences are,  as 
Crane says, richer and more detailed.  However, as I argued in chapter 5, this does not preclude us 
from holding that they are conceptual, and further than they are judgements. 
This defence was, in large part, premised on the fact that if experiences are judgements, then 
these judgements will behave both like experiences and judgements.  But, then, this should not be 
surprising, as they are both experiences and judgements.  That our visual system can be tricked in 
the way that the Müller-Lyer tricks it, does not show that experiences are not judgements, because it 
is in the nature of belief and judgement to be false sometimes.
6  Conclusion
I thus conclude my defence of the theory that we can analyse experiences as judgements with a 
certain type of content.  I have explained the representational theory, and why, if it is accepted, the 
path is open to analyse the different psychology of experiences and thought in terms of judgements 
with different contents.  I have explained why transparency and the representational theory can give 
rise to the questioning of the intuition that there is particular phenomenal psychological property of 
experiences that judgements (and other thoughts) lack.  By arguing that experiences do have an 
individuating type of content, and defending the thesis that this content is conceptual, and finally 
motivating and defending the attitudinal claim, I have discharged this commitment.
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